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ABSTRACT 
This thesis attempts to develop a pedagogy for devised theatre conceived of as a 
praxis.  
 
Part One explores the status and history of both devised theatre and theatre 
pedagogy, particularly in the UK but also in other contexts.  In doing so, it attempts 
to demonstrate the multitude of ways in which both devised theatre and the 
pedagogy of drama, theatre and performance have been conceived.   
 
Part Two goes on to look at three frames through which devised theatre might be 
conceptualised: contemporary theories of language, creativity and social practice.  
With a particular focus on the theories of Jacques Rancière, I suggest that each of 
these offers a potential vision of art as a realm which can exist at a remove from 
everyday life, whilst still functioning within structures that indicate its social basis. 
The frames each contain a focus on process rather than only focusing on a 
finished artistic product.  They also each suggest simultaneous reflection and 
action.   
 
In the final part of the thesis I map these three notions, particularly that of social 
practice, onto theories of praxis.  I suggest that the notion of praxis offers a vision 
of what a pedagogy for devised theatre might look like, recognising the importance 
of process as well as product; reflection as well as action.  Finally I use the 
Chicago based performance company Goat Island, who made work between 1987 
and 2009,  as a case study of what devised theatre praxis might look like through 
a discussion of their process, performance and pedagogy.   
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INTRODUCTION 
This thesis arises from my work as both a schoolteacher and as a 
university lecturer in the UK.  Although it is primarily written to address this 
context, I aim to draw conclusions that will have a more general relevance to the 
teaching of drama, theatre and performance.  
During my time teaching in UK schools between 1994 and 2007, I saw an 
increasingly prescriptive curriculum classify and quantify drama, theatre and 
performance.  At this time, as Philip Taylor argued in 1996, the “pedagogical 
climate [was] constructed by a conventional scientific paradigm which promotes 
outcomes, controls behaviour, and permits individual reflective turning within 
foreseen categories and codes”.1  This was despite the fact that many involved in 
the education of drama, theatre and performance argued for a more fluid, open 
model which allowed for greater flexibility and experiment.  For example, Jonothan 
Neelands suggested in 1991 when discussing the school curriculum, “We certainly 
cannot assess theatre-art in a manner which is consistent with the testing of skills 
in science and maths”.2  And Steve Dixon stated in 2000 that teachers of Theatre 
Studies in Higher Education were “using an inappropriately rational, objective, 
quasi-scientific model to assess a largely irrational, spontaneous and subjective 
art”.3 
Since my time spent teaching in schools, the arts and particularly theatre 
have been marginalised from school curricula.  Drama is absent as a discrete 
subject from the National Curriculum and from the English Baccalaureate, the new 
GCSE performance measure.  According to the Guardian in 2012 this resulted in 
uproar from the arts community, and resulted in a 6.3% reduction in students 
taking GCSE Drama.4  At the same time, however, devised theatre has come to 
                                                          
1
 Taylor, p.3 
2
 Neelands, J (2010) ‘The Meaning of Drama’, in O’Connor (ed.),p.70 
3
 See Dixon 
4
 Higgins, p.11 
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form a major component of A level and even GCSE curricula: at the time of 
writing, the two major examination boards for schools incorporate the teaching of 
devised theatre into both their GCSE and A level specifications.  Companies 
considered experimental, or at least innovative, are part of this.  For example, 
Frantic Assembly, who pride themselves on attracting “new and young audiences” 
with their “unique physical style”,5 form an example of GCSE practice on the 
Edexcel website,6 and Forced Entertainment, described in the Guardian as 
Britain’s “most brilliant experimental theatre company”,7 are cited as a potential 
area of study on the AQA A level syllabus.8   
In my time teaching theatre in UK universities since 2006, I have seen a 
similar trend.  As Harvie and Lavender notice, devising has shifted from “a fairly 
marginal position in the 1970s to one of significant disciplinarity and institutional 
orthodoxy in the first decade of the twenty-first century”.9   Just after this decade, 
the Conservative-led coalition government introduced tuition fees for 
undergraduate students of up to £9000 per annum.  As Claire Bishop notes, this 
has “turned students to consumers”, with education “increasingly a financial 
investment, rather than a creative discovery; a career move, rather than a place of 
epistemological inquiry for its own sake”.10  Students have responded to this 
financial climate in particular ways: according to the Sunday Times in June 2013, 
“Hundreds of university courses are being axed as students [...] increasingly 
choose vocational courses that they think will give them the best chance of 
securing a job”.11  In response university courses in drama, theatre and 
performance are moved to have to justify themselves in terms of the employable 
skills they will offer students, and since devising companies such as Kneehigh, 
                                                          
5
 http://www.franticassembly.co.uk/what-is-frantic/ [Accessed 2/12/12] 
6
 http://www.edexcel.com/subjects/Performing-Arts/Pages/default.aspx [Accessed 2/12/12]  
7
 Cited in Kingston  
8
 http://store.aqa.org.uk/qual/gce/pdf/AQA-2240-W-SP.PDF [Accessed 2/12/12] 
9
 Quoted in Mermikides and Smart (eds.), p.4 
10
 Bishop (2012), pp. 268-9.  Throughout the thesis square brackets indicate my additions or 
deletions. 
11
 Griffiths and Lawson, p.15 
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Shunt, Frantic Assembly, Complicite and Forced Entertainment can now be seen 
in mainstream subsidised theatres and in some cases even London’s West End it 
is hardly surprising that in many cases devising, alongside more conventional 
acting and directing skills, form part of such a supposed ‘skills set’.  In both 
schools and universities, then, devised theatre has grown in status whilst the arts 
more broadly have become both increasingly marginalised, and quantified in 
terms of assessment.   
Accompanying the growth in the status of devised theatre is a growing 
body of British literature on devising theatre.  When Alison Oddey’s Devising 
Theatre was published in 1994, she stated that the main reason for writing the 
book was “a lack of information on the subject of devising theatre”.12  Ten years 
later, according to Heddon and Milling’s Devising Performance, “it [was] apparent 
that very little had changed”.13  Since then, however, in addition to the books cited 
in a footnote to Heddon and Milling’s claim (such as Gill Lamden’s Devising: A 
Handbook for Drama and Theatre Students and Tina Bicat and Chris Baldwin’s 
Devised and Collaborative Theatre: A Practical Guide) several other books have 
appeared: for example, Alex Mermikides and Jackie Smart’s edited collection of 
articles on devising companies Devising in Process,  Anna Furse’s anthology of 
play texts which have arisen from a devising process Theatre in Pieces, and Scott 
Graham and Steven Hoggett’s Frantic Assembly Book of Devising Theatre.   
Heddon and Milling suggest in their footnote that the texts that exist tend to 
be “practical manuals or workbooks for educational purposes”.14  Looking at the 
books mentioned above, one might add documentation of devised theatre 
processes, as well as performances, to that list.  Since the term ‘devised’ itself 
explicitly foregrounds how the work is made rather than what it looks like, this is 
perhaps hardly surprising: in the very notion of the performance being ‘devised’, 
                                                          
12
 Cited in Heddon and Milling, p.1 
13
 Heddon and Milling, p.1 
14
 Ibid, footnote, p.232 
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conventional categories and hierarchies of director/writer/performer can be seen 
to be opened up, allowing a variety of different processes to be explored.   
So how is current educational literature articulating this relationship?  I am 
going to begin by considering two recent pedagogical texts which attempt an 
overview of devised theatre (which may fit into the description of ‘workbooks for 
educational purposes’) that have made a significant impact in their fields.  One, 
Making a Performance by Emma Govan, Helen Nicholson and Katie Normington, 
is aimed at undergraduates and seeks to “trace innovations in devised 
performance from early theatrical experiments in the twentieth century to the 
radical performances of the twenty-first century”.15  The other, Advanced Drama 
and Theatre Studies by Jonothan Neelands and Warwick Dobson, is aimed at 
supporting the “new A level specifications for 2008” and “is a practical book which 
is designed to provide students with the information they need to make and study 
theatre”.16  These two books might be interesting to compare and contrast, 
therefore, since they choose to emphasise different aspects of devised 
performance in their approaches.  Advanced Drama and Theatre Studies seeks to 
provide information pertaining to making theatre as a first priority over studying 
theatre, whilst Making a Performance, despite its title, seeks as its priority an 
overview of professional devised performances themselves.  The books also 
address different audiences – a subject to which I will return later when looking at 
approaches to devising in schools and universities.  For now, though, whilst 
looking at only two books offers an inevitably limited perspective, I will argue that 
the different focuses of the books serve to illustrate some of the varied conceptual 
frameworks within which devised work is often perceived and constrained.  
Specifically, I will contend that the books illuminate what I will argue is a tendency 
                                                          
15
 Govan et al, back cover 
16
 Neelands and Dobson, back cover 
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to see devised performance either in processual terms or in terms of a product, 
but not often in a way that incorporates the relationship between these two things.   
The authors of Making a Performance state at the outset that they seek to 
“offer [...] an investigation into the practices, processes and principles of devising 
performance”.17  Yet despite this statement their discussion is less commonly 
focused on these elements, the ‘making’ of the title, and more often focused on 
the underlying principles of the work and the practice of the work itself.  For 
example, the main mention of creative process in Chapter Two, ‘But Is It Art?’ 
occurs in the discussion of chance as a method of creative decision making in the 
work of John Cage.  The authors recognise that “chance problematises the idea 
that great art is dependent on the skill of the artist”.18  This process is mentioned 
principally because it deliberately challenges conventional notions of the need for 
a process.  As the chapter continues, however, process begins to disappear from 
focus.  For example, when discussing Kaprow’s work, the performances 
themselves are outlined but how decisions were made, what the actual creative 
process was, is not mentioned.   
In Chapter Three, focusing on ‘The Creative Performer’, the process of the 
performer is foregrounded more explicitly.  The work of Grotowski and Chaikin is 
analysed in terms of how the performers were incorporated into a creative 
process.  Even here, though, there is an interesting absence of process at points 
where one might expect discussion of process to be foregrounded.  We are told 
that “Living Theatre extended its desire for personal liberation by inviting members 
of the public to take part in performance events [...] ‘[P]erformers and public were 
to be given the taste of freedom’ through ‘improvisation unchained’”.19  Some 
description of the process to which the public were invited follows, but as the 
authors move to talking about the final performance of Paradise Now (1968) there 
                                                          
17
 Govan et al, p.1 
18
 Ibid, p.22 
19
 Govan et al, p.35 citing J. Beck (1986) The Life of the Theatre (New York: Limelight), p. 83 
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is a slippage, as if the rehearsal was the same as the final performance.  We are 
told that “audience members were encouraged to ‘speak out about sexual taboos, 
to undress, and to join the “body pile”, a gathering of onstage actors and audience 
groping for each other”.20  There is clearly a distinction between audience and 
actor here, so the event is not totally random, but how the creative decision was 
reached about when this encouragement would happen, who would do it, and 
how, is not discussed.  This focus on performance may be understandable since it 
is arguably easier to research the performance than the process, witnessed as it is 
by many more people and documented more fully through reviews.  However, by 
doing so, the authors do not reflect their own stated awareness of the importance 
of ‘making’ devised work. 
 In the fourth chapter of Making a Performance, ‘Art, Politics and Activism’, 
process is again discussed.  Given the fact that in the authors’ own words “one of 
the legacies of socially committed theatre of the twentieth century is the 
democratisation of processes of working”,21 however, it is notable that process is 
not really mentioned until five and a half pages into the chapter.  There is then 
detailed description of the importance of collective creation and of improvisation 
techniques in Theatre Workshop’s work and how these were linked to the socialist 
principles of the company, but how these working processes were linked to an 
aesthetic outcome is not clear.  The description of the Blue Blouses’ work, which 
“used forms such as popular songs, acrobatics, burlesque and vaudeville” 
precedes the description of their process which was “built from the players’ 
experiences of industrial life”,22 but again how these experiences contributed to 
the theatrical style previously described is not clear. 
                                                          
20
 Tytell, J (1997) The Living Theatre: Art, Exile and Outrage (London: Methuen) p.228 quoted in 
Govan et al, p.36 
21
 Govan et al, p.47 
22
 Ibid, p.44 
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What I am trying to trace in these examples is that although process is 
addressed, its link to the aesthetic product is not fully explored.  And ultimately 
how the making of devised theatre might create a different type of aesthetic 
product from work that is made through a relationship with a published play, for 
example, is not discussed.  For example, we are told that “the processes of 
devising also allow for the kind of collective and collaborative action that has the 
potential to create a renewed sense of belonging in the participants and in 
audiences”.23  But there is a conflation here between the ‘belonging’ in 
participants’ processes, which take place over a considerable time, and the 
‘belonging’ created for an audience who watch an aesthetic product on one night.   
This conflation fails to explore the transition from what happens in the rehearsal 
room to what happens in the performance space.  If the ‘making’ is important, as 
they initially claim, they do not always address it fully.   
In contrast, Advanced Drama and Theatre Studies’ chapter on devising 
addresses process almost immediately, listing six aspects that the devising 
process will demand from students.  A historical context for devised theatre 
follows which emphasises the ways in which the contemporary concept of devised 
theatre can be related to historical genres such as Greek theatre and Commedia 
dell’Arte.24  The focus is on how these genres incorporated improvised elements, 
shifting away from an initial focus on process to performance.  As in Govan et al’s 
book, however, the link between process and product is not clear.  There is a shift 
from one to the other but not a clear articulation of their interconnection.   
However, there is an articulation of the link between devising process and 
artistic product in the description of a “coming together of diverse performance 
skills in the search for new forms of performance”25 as a central tenet of devised 
theatre: the process of bringing these diverse skills together is linked to the artistic 
                                                          
23
 Ibid, p.195 
24
 Neelands and Dobson, p.162-3 
25
 Ibid, p.164 
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form of the performance itself.  And shortly after this, the authors discuss how the 
working methods of Joint Stock led to the actors’ “personal politics and their 
relationships with other members of the collective”26 becoming aspects of the 
process that would then be seen in the performance itself, most notably in the 
production of David Hare’s 1975 play Fanshen.  One could extend the link 
between process and product still further here since the content matter of 
Fanshen, where peasants “stood up... [and] gained land, stock, implements and 
houses”27 in a threat to the authority of the landlord, could be argued to have 
influenced the process, with the collaborative devising process challenging the 
authority of the director and playwright.  Whilst the idea that devised theatre will 
necessarily be collaborative has been disputed,28 in these moments the book does 
suggest the possibility of starting to explore how a devising process might lead to 
a performance product. 
However, when the book turns to devising’s intersection with physical 
theatre, the processes of the companies covered becomes less clearly articulated.  
The performances themselves are discussed more than the processes.  So 
whereas Govan, Nicholson and Normington discuss how Grotowski’s process 
“raises questions about the significance of collaboration and the role of the 
director within devised performance”,29 Neelands and Dobson focus on a 
description of the performances themselves.30  Since this section of the book is 
relatively brief it is not perhaps surprising, as in the case of Govan et al’s 
description of Living Theatre, that the product, more widely seen and discussed 
than the process, is discussed.  Later in the chapter, though, three case studies 
place process back at the centre.  The socio-economic basis of the analysis 
makes clear the focus of the authors.  The first case study clearly discusses how 
                                                          
26
 Ibid, p.169 
27
 Hare, D (1986) ‘Fanshen’, The Asian Plays (London: Faber), p.5 
28
 See Govan et al, p.6; Heddon and Milling, p.5 
29
 Govan et al, p.32 
30
 Neelands and Dobson, p.172 
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the way the work developed linked to the outcome.  Activities involving Omar 
Rivabella’s novel Requiem for a Woman’s Soul are discussed. An activity coming 
from a real event involving one of the actors’ own mealtimes functions as a 
springboard for an improvisation.  And although this is stated implicitly rather than 
explicitly, there are clearly traces of the process in the description of the final 
performance: the rehearsal question “what is in the box that comes from the place 
where people are tortured?”31 shows up in the final performance which “begins 
with the arrival [...] of a box that has been smuggled out of the nearby prison”.32  
According to Neelands and Dobson participants “used their work as a way of 
coming to an understanding of some of the major political issues of the day”.33  
How this translates into material that communicates directly or indirectly to an 
audience is less clear, however. 
In the subsequent two case studies, the performance slips still further away 
from view.  In the case of Puppets Against Caste this is perhaps inevitable, since 
the piece was an example of applied theatre where the focus was on children 
learning through devising, with children exploring a theme which formed the basis 
of them creating plays based on their explorations.  There is detailed description 
of the process and the making of the piece.  We learn, for example, that “the 
facilitators began the project by asking the participants to draw pictures 
collectively [...] From this initial drawing activity a number of issues were identified 
[...] Eventually, these key issues formed the content of three plays”.34  However, 
the aesthetic choices the children made when selecting from their research to 
develop the piece which they presented, and the final performance itself, is not 
really described at all.   
                                                          
31
 Ibid, p.186  
32
 Ibid, p.187 
33
 Ibid, p.187 
34
 Ibid, p.189 
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Similarly the third case study, Common Wealth, is discussed in terms of its 
existence as a community project.  We are given considerable information about 
the community itself (“it is a logging community, but the area is also home to the 
Sauk-Suiattle Native American Community [...t]he population of the town is fewer 
than 1,200”) and of how the process was initiated (“Weigler [the practitioner who 
initiated the project] invited elders, adults and children from the town and the 
reservation to relate stories and share local songs that they felt expressed their 
sense of identity and defined who they were”).35  Yet only a tiny percentage of the 
case study is given over to the final performance – we are told briefly about the 
content (“the theme of connection is clearly perceptible in the play’s desire to link 
the present-day Darrington and Sauk-Suiattle communities”) and its form (“an 
original theatre script, with music and song”), but the bulk of the writing is given to 
a description of the process and the performance conditions of the piece. 
What is interesting, in comparing these two books, is how in Govan et al’s 
there is a clear focus on the performance outcome together with some description 
of the process, while in Neelands and Dobson’s book there is a clear focus on the 
process together with some description of the performance outcome, but in neither 
is the link between the making, the devising process, and the aesthetic strategies 
employed in the final performance clear.   I will, however, argue that this link is 
crucial: that in devised theatre there is a relationship between making and 
showing, and furthermore that this relationship exists both within and beyond the 
social frame.   
One of this thesis’ aims is to rearticulate the importance of process in 
devised theatre.  It attempts to argue that far from devised theatre being solely 
about a finished artistic outcome, process is integral to how devised theatre works, 
both artistically and socially.  On the one hand the performers engage in the 
process of creating a work of art which can be seen as a practice, a social act, 
                                                          
35
 Ibid, p.191 
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which leads to a performance to others, also a social act.  Through the act of 
performing and the process of making the performers explore and embody, 
through their own bodies and their own consciousness, ways of behaving and 
speaking in the world.  They play, explore forms, try out words and actions as they 
make, improvising possibilities.  On the other hand, since it is marked as an 
aesthetic process it cannot be wholly contained within conceptions of practice that 
are solely social.  And this notion is furthered when one considers that the 
performance is removed further from everyday life since it is watched consciously 
as aesthetic practice by an audience.   
Like all theatre, devised theatre literally invents ‘sensory experiences’, 
ways of embodying physically and vocally which exist beyond the performers’ 
everyday life.  But in its emphasis on its making in its practice (and its 
terminology), it might also be particularly well positioned to invent new social 
processes.  The “new form of individual and collective life” that the philosopher 
Jacques Rancière sees as being present in some aesthetic forms can be 
glimpsed, not only in what he calls the “autonomy” of the art work itself, but also in 
the processes that bring such an alternative perspective into being.36   
To return to the start of this Introduction, in this thesis I therefore seek to 
challenge the notion that the value of teaching devised performance might be 
seen solely in terms of making students aware of the canon of devising or as a 
practical skill leading to employment in a supposed devised theatre sector.  I want 
to rather argue for devised theatre as an activity which is valuable in itself in a 
myriad of ways that may, as Dixon and Neelands suggest, go beyond what is 
easily quantifiable.  I want to argue for a model of devised theatre which is not 
only about something or which leads to something, but which rather is something; 
which sees the social as linked to the aesthetic and not separate from it, which 
sees people creating their own performances as potentially significant social and 
                                                          
36
 Rancière (2004), p.32 
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political acts which suggest a plethora of possibilities for how life might be lived.  
To quote Claire Colebrook, “when we ask what art or philosophy are for we tend to 
feel they should serve some everyday function: making us better managers or 
communicators.  We fail to see that the purpose or force of art or philosophy goes 
beyond what life is to what it might become”.37  I will also argue that this is only 
possible because of the paradox that devised theatre and indeed art generally 
function in a frame distinct from the everyday.  This frame provides an ability to 
stand outside, see anew, and reflect in a range of ways.  Indeed, it is this duality, I 
argue, that gives it such significance, and I thus suggest that it has much to offer 
its curricula at all levels for the future.   
In the thesis I want to suggest that in this collapsing of binaries – process 
and product, social and aesthetic - devised theatre practice might also be seen as 
a praxis - a “unity of theory and practice”.38  In a conception of devised theatre 
which embraces its aesthetic autonomy alongside its importance as a social 
activity, a conception which sees the practice of creating art as inseparable from a 
theoretical context, devised theatre invokes the potential of a flow of thinking and 
making for its makers, where the discovery of moments in a creative process is 
considered as having a connection to a wider social context.  There is also, I 
argue, the potential of a praxis for an audience who engage with it and then apply 
it to their own lives.  This praxis can thus situate itself theoretically as a socio-
aesthetic creative praxis.   
I also wish to outline how this notion of praxis, this synthesis of theory and 
practice, might be applied to a pedagogy for devised theatre.  In pedagogical 
praxis, artistic discoveries in a pedagogical process feed into the personal and 
social development of the student as they reflect on their own practice, which then 
feed again into their artistic practice.  In such a model teaching can be seen as 
                                                          
37
 Colebrook, pp.13-14.  Original emphasis. 
38
 Bullock et al (eds.), p.676 
18 
 
more than just being about helping students in the production of artworks, but can 
also suggest an ongoing process of engagement with, and development of, the 
world.   
In Part One of the thesis, I seek to unpick and justify the terms ‘devising’ 
and ‘theatre’ in order to justify their use throughout the thesis.  In Chapter One I 
attempt to illustrate that devised theatre, far from being a quantifiable skills set, is 
in fact a term which has meant many different things in different contexts.  
Examples of devised theatre, I will argue, are variously collaborative or 
hierarchical, text based or visually based, improvised or planned, and original or 
traditional.  If the notion of devised theatre suggests anything, I will suggest that it 
is in its opening up of conceptual limitations about what theatre can and should 
be.   
In Chapter Two, I attempt to look at some key approaches to the teaching 
of drama, theatre and performance in schools and universities, particularly but not 
exclusively focusing on the UK.  Within the school context I look at debates 
around process drama and the teaching of drama as part of a wider conception of 
cultural heritage.  To chime with my notion of praxis, I argue that it is essential for 
any understanding of drama, theatre and performance pedagogy to conceive of 
the subject as moving beyond the learning of skills or dramatic literature in 
isolation to a more holistic understanding of developing the whole child.  In the 
university context the debates are connected but different.  There are again 
debates about the function of drama, theatre and performance education, 
including whether or not the subject should be studied as an autonomous art form 
or as connected to literature; and whether or not it should be engaged with as a 
vocation or as an academic discipline.  Here, I argue, across varied historical and 
geographical contexts which emphasise differing aspects of the subject, there has 
often been a failure to consider the subject as a praxis: how process and 
19 
 
performance might link, how theoretical elements might inform practice, or how 
practice might inform understanding in a wider context than the theatre itself.  
What I hope to illustrate through this chapter, as with the history of devised 
theatre in the rest of Part One, is that the disciplines discussed are multifarious 
and not fixed, but open to redefinition.  This notion of definition continues at the 
end of the second chapter, where I discuss the debate within the university 
context around the terms ‘drama’, ‘theatre’ and ‘performance’.  Ultimately I argue 
that theatre is the most useful of the three terms for a notion such as praxis, 
because it foregrounds the art work’s simultaneous existence as an event in the 
moment and as a process, a process that exists both within culture itself and as 
something which exists at a partial remove from the everyday. 
Part Two of the thesis attempts to look at three frames through which 
devised theatre might be conceptualised: contemporary theories of language, 
creativity and social practice.  With a particular focus on the theories of Jacques 
Rancière, I seek to develop the idea from Part One that art exists as a realm at a 
remove from everyday life, whilst still functioning within structures that indicate its 
social basis. The frames each contain a focus on process rather than only 
focusing on a finished artistic product.  They also each suggest simultaneous 
reflection and action, thus linking to the notion of praxis articulated above.  In 
Chapter Three I intend to suggest that through an understanding of how language 
and creativity work, it is possible to conceive of art as a human activity that 
situates itself in a space both within and beyond social constraints.  I aim to 
suggest that whilst language is a pervasive structure which pre-exists us, it is also 
a process which we can creatively participate in; that whilst language constrains it 
can simultaneously liberate.  In Chapter Four, I similarly suggest that whilst 
creativity is often seen as an opportunity to escape from social norms, it is 
important to remember that it is also significantly limited by and influenced by 
social context.  It is my argument that this conception of language and creativity 
20 
 
allows for an understanding of the simultaneously creative yet socially bounded 
space in which culture and art is created.  This leads to the final chapter of Part 
Two, Chapter Five, where I will explore some key ideas around social practice and 
art.  Through an engagement with Kant, Bourdieu and finally Rancière, I argue 
that whilst art generally and devised theatre specifically exist within social 
structures, they can also offer an opportunity for people to work creatively within 
these structures.  Moreover, they function as what Rancière calls a “third thing that 
is owned by no one”,39 a ‘thing’ that exists between people as a means of 
discussion and debate, a thing which is irreducible and which thus creates a 
space for discussion where no one person has sole purchase on what it is.  In 
theatre particularly, I argue, which exists in the moment between performer and 
audience, art can be imagined as a potentially subversive space for dialogue, 
offering the opportunity for new ideas and possibilities for life to be imagined 
through individuals’ and groups’ engagement with it.   
  In Part Three, I move to discuss the notion of praxis in more detail.  
Drawing on Aristotle’s notion of praxis, I use a range of theorists including 
Bourdieu, Freire and Rancière to develop a pedagogy of praxis where students 
think and create simultaneously.  I am particularly interested here in the role of the 
teacher as someone who is facilitating a process for the student, rather than 
teaching them knowledge.  I then move into considering how such a pedagogy 
might be applied to devised theatre in particular.  I suggest that the key to this is 
conceiving of devised theatre as a process in which theory and practice inform 
each other; where the creation of art is a vehicle to new understanding, but where 
the creation of that art is itself the result of a considered set of conceptual and 
theoretical decisions.  In the final chapter, I apply these ideas to the work of the 
Chicago based company Goat Island who made work between 1987 and 2009, 
and suggest that their performance pedagogy, process and performance can be 
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seen as an example of devised theatre that functioned as praxis.  In their work, I 
argue, their process created a space where those involved could learn and grow.  
Their performances, I argue, similarly created a space where the spectator could 
find new perspectives on her life through the unique articulation of disparate 
elements in a new whole.  And in their pedagogy, students engaged with each 
other and with a creative process of learning which saw all elements work in 
reciprocity to develop an ongoing praxis of growth for those involved.  In this work, 
I suggest, lay possibilities for what a pedagogy for devised theatre praxis might be 
like. 
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CHAPTER ONE – TRADITIONS AND HISTORIES OF DEVISED THEATRE 
Before offering my own vision of devised theatre, it is important to 
understand the traditions and histories of devising, and of drama, theatre and 
performance in universities and schools.  As throughout this thesis, I will be 
primarily referring to a UK context, although I hope that the conclusions that I draw 
will have relevance for other contexts.  Indeed, by looking at these traditions and 
histories I hope to illuminate and question assumptions that are often made about 
these two areas in order to be able to articulate alternative ways in which they can 
be conceived, both independently and ultimately together.  
Although in some senses, as Neelands and Dobson identify, elements of 
devised theatre can be seen in the Western traditions of Greek theatre and 
Commedia dell’Arte,1 according to Deirdre Heddon and Jane Milling “many of the 
common conceptions and/or myths of devising that we have inherited arise from 
the specific political and cultural conditions of the 1950s and 1960s in the West”.2  
Although originally a UK term, they trace a history which sees devised theatre as 
part of a wider Western counter-cultural movement, as a challenge to dominant 
theatre.  For example, Heddon and Milling quote Sainer’s The New Radical 
Theatre Notebook in relation to devised theatre and performance: “Everything 
came into question: the place of the performer in the theatre; the place of the 
audience; the function of the playwright and the usefulness of a written script; the 
structure of the playhouse, and later, the need for any kind of playhouse; and 
finally, the continued existence of theatre as a relevant force in a changing 
culture”.3   
However, the assumptions coming into play here are interesting.  It could 
perhaps be argued that devised theatre is in a particularly strong position to 
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‘provide relevance’ because the performers’ involvement in what is spoken and 
done on stage can respond to daily events more immediately than a play written 
several months previously, or that devised theatre can question the function of the 
playwright since work is ‘written’ by the performers (to varying degrees), or that 
the role of the performer may become problematised when they are also creating 
the work.  However, there is no clear argument articulated as to why there is 
anything specific to devised theatre that would inherently link to Sainer’s vision of 
‘radical theatre’; that would question the place of the audience, or the structure or 
existence of the playhouse.  As Heddon and Milling state when discussing a later 
period,  
[t]he rhetoric employed within the political movements of the 1960s and 
1970s was also applied to ideal (and idealised) models of devising [...] A 
number of key terms or ideas that belong to the political rhetoric of this 
period, and which subsequently have an impact on concepts and practices 
of devising, include ‘individual and collective rights’, ‘self-determination’, 
‘community’, ‘participation’ and ‘equality’.4 
 
Yet the process of performers being involved in the making of the work is not 
intrinsically aligned with progressive politics - it could be aligned with them being 
over burdened with tasks from a lazy director, for example.  And even if it was 
ever possible to wholly align it with the counter-culture and subversion that 
Heddon and Milling chart in discussions of its development, devised theatre can 
hardly be seen as a radical new ‘genre’ or term today: indeed, they note that 
“devising companies have been absorbed into mainstream culture and defended 
by government subsidy”, most noticeably for them in the case of Complicite who 
are now regularly seen on the stages of the National Theatre and the Barbican.   
Such assumptions about devised theatre, according to Heddon and Milling 
themselves, can be misplaced.  In a long list they state that devised theatre is 
variously seen as “a social expression of non-hierarchical possibilities; a model of 
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cooperative and non-hierarchical collaboration”,5 and a variety of other things.  Yet 
they go on to state that “it is more than possible to take to task many of the ideals 
embodied in the above”6, since the term encompasses a huge variety of practices 
including companies such as Forced Entertainment who use a director and often a 
writer.   Heddon and Milling identify here, then, histories rather than an ontology of 
devised theatre.  As Alison Oddey has said, there is a “uniqueness of process and 
product for every group concerned”7 which means that generalising about such a 
broad range of practices is difficult.  Therefore, as I continue to discuss devised 
theatre, rather than trying to identify common features that underpin all devised 
theatre, I am going to discuss various tendencies in devised theatre and consider 
key areas within which individual examples may be considered.  This allows for 
the possibility of recognising key areas of concern whilst recognising the plurality 
of practices evident in devised work.   
However, perhaps it is possible to define devised theatre through this 
plurality: through seeing it as an openly impure form which challenges definition.  
Heddon and Milling’s linking of it to political and aesthetic shifts in the 60s and 70s 
reflect the ways in which devised theatre can be seen as a loosening of previous 
certainties.  As I will go on to argue, devised theatre does not fit easily into neat 
definitions based on conventional binaries of process/product, between 
collective/individual, between spontaneous/planned, between original/traditional.  
Ultimately I will argue in this thesis that this blurring reflects a productive blurring 
between art and life itself, which can point to devised theatre as a model of social 
praxis. 
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Devised Theatre, Language and Physicality 
One key aspect often discussed in devised theatre and mentioned above is a shift 
away from the notion of the playtext being the starting point for a theatre work.  
For example, according to Oddey, “[D]evised theatre is an alternative to the 
dominant literary theatre tradition, which is the conventionally accepted form of 
theatre dominated by the often patriarchal, hierarchical relationship of playwright 
and director [...] Devised work challenges the prevailing ideology of one person’s 
text under another person’s direction”.8  Bicât and Baldwin similarly suggest that 
“in a devising process the starting point is not necessarily, indeed not usually, a 
script”.9  Text starts to share significance with other creative elements.  Moving 
away from the primacy of the pre-existing written word of plays also suggests a 
move towards interest in the performer: how something is said, the context in 
which language might originate for a performer, and its coexistence with other 
elements – set, costume, music etc.  Bearing in mind de Saussure’s structuralist 
notion that “far from reflecting an already given social reality, [language] 
constitutes social reality for us”,10  language can be seen as something which 
creates a human being’s conceptual parameters.  And it is something which does 
so unconsciously: it defines the limits of what is sayable.  This shift thus reflects 
an increasing sense of the performer as creator and not just interpreter or re-
creator, as well as an interest in an increasing range of aesthetic aspects of the 
work.   
Artaud was a key thinker in the development of a notion of theatre existing 
beyond the spoken word.  For Artaud, theatre’s ability to move away from words to 
a “concrete language”11 of the stage, incorporating a full range of theatrical 
elements, meant a shift towards appealing “to the senses, instead of being 
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addressed primarily to the mind”.12  Such a move is, for Artaud, moving away from 
the supposed rationality of language towards an acknowledgement of a subjective 
experience for the spectator experienced through their senses.  Similarly for Helen 
Freshwater, citing Ana Sanchez-Colberg, a shift towards the body can be seen to  
represent a “devaluation of language” in a social context where “language can be 
used to control and constrain”, and that from this perspective “moving ‘beyond 
words’ often seems to imply challenging the imposition of authoritarian power”.13  If 
language constitutes our reality, finding subjectivity is difficult.  Moving towards 
other locations of consciousness, like the body, might seem to offer greater 
opportunity for the individual to locate his or her own subjectivity. 
Moreover, since devised theatre often enables the language spoken to be 
embodied in its creator on stage, a shift to the body might also be seen as a shift 
towards embodied subjectivity.  Embodiment as outlined by Maurice Merleau-
Ponty shifts from a sense of objective truth and rather acknowledges the 
individual’s contribution to the making of meaning – the way the “world appears to 
the embodied consciousness and the way in which the world is changed by the 
projections of embodied consciousness”.14  This view of greater subjectivity being 
present through a focus on the body can be seen in Peggy Phelan’s notion that  
[i]n moving from the grammar of words to the grammar of the body, one 
moves from the realm of metaphor to the realm of metonymy [...]  
Metaphor works to secure a vertical hierarchy of value and is reproductive; 
it works by erasing dissimilarity and erasing difference; it turns two into 
one.  Metonymy is additive and associative; it works to secure a horizontal 
axis of contiguity and displacement.15  
 
In this analysis the metaphorical nature of language, which substitutes an 
experience for a word, is replaced by something which is irreducibly itself.  For 
Merleau-Ponty this experience is liberating: “by thus remaking contact with the 
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body and with the world, we shall also rediscover ourself, since perceiving as we 
do with our body, the body is a natural self  and, as it were, the subject of 
perception”.16   
However, I would suggest seeing any shift in emphasis from words to the 
body as unquestionably positive needs to be viewed critically.  In Part Two of this 
thesis I will suggest ways in which language can be seen as a more fluid system 
than is outlined here.  Furthermore, whilst there is an emphasis on personal 
liberation, there is not necessarily an awareness of how such a shift to the body 
might result in any kind of social liberation.  And Foucault’s suggestion in 
Discipline and Punish that “the body is... directly involved in a political field: power 
relations have an immediate hold upon it; they invest it, mark it, train it, torture it, 
force it to carry out tasks, to perform ceremonies, to emit signs”17 would challenge 
any notion that shifting to a focus on the body inherently shifts towards a space 
that is beyond culture.  For example, Slavoj Žižek points out how a focus on the 
body can be aligned with either a notion of ‘proto-Fascism’ or as “a genuine 
working class ideology of youngsters whose only means of success [is...] the 
disciplinary training of their only possession, their bodies”.18  The body is in culture 
as the word is in culture.   
Furthermore, a shift towards a focus on the body and away from language 
is not an abolition of language.  Mermikides and Smart point out that “Artaud, 
Grotowski and Meyerhold, while each espousing the belief that the body was the 
locus of a deeper, more primal truth than language, all worked with playtexts. 
What they rejected was the authority of the word and, by extension, of the 
playwright”.19  In such work the playwright still has a role to play, even if he is no 
longer the main authority.  The textual cannot be simply opposed to the physical, 
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or to devising.  This is also foregrounded in John O’Toole’s description of students 
in schools’ playmaking as “playwriting and acting”20.  Viewed from O’Toole’s 
perspective, playwriting is part of a devising process, even if it is not written down.  
Text may also still be influential on the development of a devised piece: Gerry 
Harris outlines how performance text used as a starting point for two different 
devising processes, and which took up less than a third of the piece in both cases, 
nonetheless led to work that was in some ways similar.21  And Alison Oddey 
outlines the way in which Caryl Churchill worked with Joint Stock on Light Shining 
in Buckinghamshire, where the actors’ contributions to workshops were vital but 
ultimately led to a play that was not improvised and that was clearly written by 
Churchill22 (and which has since been performed by other actors in a more 
conventional context).  One should be mindful of Heddon and Milling’s point that 
any generalisation of what devised theatre is must be aware that it does not apply 
to all work made under this broad term.   There may be a shift in emphasis, a 
tendency, but there is not a complete reversal.  Seeing devised theatre as a 
physical theatre functioning in a purely binary and oppositional relationship to the 
text based theatre that preceded it is over simplistic.   
What this outlines, however, is that despite these qualifications, devised 
theatre opens up the possibility of other theatrical modes potentially loosening the 
grip of the word as the main source of meaning.  Oddey states that “devised 
theatre often uses music, dance or art in an integrated form, or in a new 
relationship […] this kind of performance theatre enables a performer to engage in 
the creation of a visual or physical language, which is not present in conventional 
theatre based on words”,23 and indeed in recent devised work there has arguably 
been a general shift towards embracing more visual and interdisciplinary 
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approaches:24 the work of Complicite, DV8 and Frantic Assembly, to list a few 
current high profile examples in the UK, reflects this.  All these companies use 
text, but work with the body intensively in rehearsal and performance and their 
productions often feature sequences in which physicality takes centre stage.  
Language is simply one mode of communication and does not take inherent 
precedence. 
 
Devised Theatre and the Collaborative Process  
Like the concept of a binary division between language and physicality, I 
will argue that the concept of devised theatre inherently prioritising process more 
than other theatre forms is also a limited way of understanding devised theatre.  
However, I would argue that the increased awareness of process as part of what 
theatre is (explicitly foregrounded in the word devised) suggests theatre becoming 
recognised as something which is not just an event in isolation, but as something 
which is crucially linked to its process.  Heddon and Milling problematise any 
notion that this increased awareness of process necessarily leads to a 
democratisation of the creative process, since historically for some “it led to an 
increased professionalization of the artist, championing and scrutinising the 
aesthetics of the labour of the creative artist, rather than simply the product”.25  
However, they do suggest that the growth in the 1950s and 1960s of devised 
theatre led to a shift in understanding of what performances might be.  In recent 
times the trend towards ‘work-in-progress’ showings which “hope [...] to summon a 
new kind of viewing from the audience”26 can be seen as part of this trend of 
managing to “blur the distinction between process and performance”.27  (I will 
discuss this further in the thesis conclusion).  So rather than needing to present 
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‘finished’ works, in devised theatre there is often a willingness to present work 
“that was ‘unfinished’, expecting and ready to integrate and reflect audience 
response”.28  As in the example of the Living Theatre’s Paradise Now previously 
cited, the notion of the audience influencing the ongoing creation of the work also 
starts to blur the binary between performer/audience.     
Similarly, the shift away from a director/author having sole responsibility for 
the piece and towards performers being involved is frequently discussed by 
writers on devised theatre.  The binary division between performers and 
production team begins to blur.  For some writers, such as Chris Baldwin and Tina 
Bicât, in this model “neither the director nor the producer are at the top of a 
hierarchical power pyramid but rather at the fulcrum of a very particular process”.29  
However, as already stated Heddon and Milling take issue with a simplistic notion 
of devised theatre as “a model of cooperative and non-hierarchical collaboration”, 
and Alison Oddey’s book Devising Theatre also shows an awareness of the 
complexity of the relationship between devised theatre and collaboration.  She 
states that “[i]n the 1970s devising companies chose artistic democracy in favour 
of the hierarchical structures of power linked to text-based theatre, and yet within 
the last twenty years or so there has been a move from this standpoint to more 
hierarchical structures”.30   An example from more recent times is the company 
Red Room, whose director Topher Campbell states that the company has “a 
mission to use performance to state the case for left-wing politics”,31 and who uses 
what Gareth White suggests is an “enlightened hierarchy”.32  Here Topher 
Campbell’s style is “essentially autocratic”, but that for him this is the “best way to 
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do political work: to maintain coherence of thought and to be responsive and 
decisive”.33   
An interesting example of how the collaborative process influences artistic 
outcome is outlined in Heddon and Milling’s, and Oddey’s, discussions of the 
process of Forced Entertainment.  Oddey states that the knowledge the company 
members have of each other, following working together for a long period of time, 
means that they “have developed a full awareness of their strengths and 
weaknesses, and how they can contribute to each other”.34  For example, she 
quotes Tim Etchells, the (clearly delineated) director of the company, as saying 
that in the devising process, “If you’re pleased with an idea you’ll take it to Robin 
(Arthur), because he’ll generally pull it apart, which is good.  You make sure you 
don’t see Robin until you want that to happen to your idea.  You make sure you do 
see him when it’s vital that it happens”.35  For Etchells the idea of Arthur’s voice 
being heard in the piece as well as his own directorial one reflects his vision “of 
theatre or performance as a space in which different visions, different sensibilities, 
different intentions could collide”.36  Indeed, this idea of different voices in a 
process being able to yield a multi-layered text is identified by Heddon and Milling: 
“[A] group devising process is more likely to engender a performance that has 
multiple perspectives, that does not promote one, authoritative, ‘version’ or 
interpretation”.  Importantly, however, they add, “We are not arguing, however, 
that a single author could not, definitively, produce such performances; just that a 
collaborative model makes this outcome more likely, if not inevitable, given the 
multiplicity of voices being added to the pot (assuming that all voices are heard)”.37   
Indeed, Nicolas Whybrow suggests that often in devising processes  
the involvement of several people – and the obvious need to communicate 
– leads to decisions being made as a product of (rational) discussion, prior 
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to finding artistic forms of expression.  This comes about as a 
consequence of failing, or hesitating to recognise the conventions of the art 
form in themselves as the primary media for instituting discoveries, or 
communicating, within the group process.38 
 
For Whybrow the need to discuss through collaboration can mean that the 
potential of art to articulate something that lies beyond rational discussion, that 
“may not yet have surfaced fully in the common consciousness”,39 is eschewed in 
favour of a more rational but less aesthetically interesting product.  In Forced 
Entertainment’s case, however, Whybrow’s fear is not realised.  The collaborative 
process is not aiming to reach a rational consensus.  A multiplicity of voices with 
different intentions and perspectives is embraced in the process and the product; 
the art form is the means through which group discoveries and communications 
occur, and the process is often shown in the performances themselves: what 
Etchells describes as “a messier world – of competing actions, approaches and 
intentions”.40   
In her essay ‘Solo Solo Solo’, Rebecca Schneider defends solo 
performance work – work that does not involve collaboration as it has been 
discussed so far - as in a relationship with other works, not discrete from them.  
The metaphor of jazz is utilised as she states that for her “an artist makes a call 
and another responds and another responds to that response”.41  For her this 
“citational quality” of performance means that ‘solo’ can be conceptualised as 
“becoming ensemble” as much as any other work of art when it recognises its 
relation to other performances and acts.42  Similarly, Alex Mermikides outlines how 
the work of Shunt Lounge combines individual collaborators’ work as a whole in 
performance, resulting in “creative friction between disparate elements and views 
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to spark innovation and novelty”.43  From this perspective it is possible to consider 
that it is not working with others in a devising process per se that will produce 
collaborative work, but rather the approach to process itself and even how the 
work is presented that can dictate a sense of collaboration.  One is always in a 
relationship to other artists, moments, people – the question is how this is 
explored and how much dialogue is invited within the process and the 
performance.  If there is a tendency in devised work towards conversation as a 
group of performers discuss what might end up in the piece, this cannot be 
generalised as an ontological feature of all devised performance.  There are 
different histories, some in which process embraces Etchells’ ‘messiness’ of the 
‘competing’ voices of collaboration (as in the case of Forced Entertainment), and 
some in which process doesn’t (as in the case of Red Room). 
It is interesting that in White’s characterisation of Campbell’s viewpoint on 
collaboration it might lead to a lack of clarity, whereas in Whybrow’s 
characterisation of collaboration there can be clarity at the expense of artistic 
vision.  In this debate there is again a recognition of the plurality of devising 
practices, where collaboration can lead to multiple or singular authorial voices; to 
a didactic political agenda or a messy world where agendas are confused.  
Furthermore, Schneider would argue that in her case individual practice is focused 
on collaboration.  In all three cases, though, despite their differences, there is 
recognition that the process influences the performance.  The dominance of 
performance as the primary focus of interest and enquiry is loosened. 
 
Devised Theatre, Originality and Tradition 
For Bicât and Baldwin, too, the link between process and performance, 
and the difficulty of separating them, is clear: “The sequences of decision-making, 
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and the discoveries that are made in rehearsal, can lead to unexpected outcomes 
in performance”.44  This idea of embracing the unexpected is another frequent 
trope of writing on devised theatre.  Liz LeCompte of the Wooster Group sees 
chance as a crucial element in devised work, stating that a chance occurrence in a 
process “is the text [..] It’s an action-text that may have nothing to do with any 
thematic thing we’re working on.  I cannot alter it”.45  Robin Arthur and Terry 
O’Connor of Forced Entertainment similarly see the “accidents” in a devising 
process as offering opportunities that rational logic cannot offer – “accidents are 
the occurrences that give rise to leaps of logic”, and “Like windows they give you 
the opportunity to see something that you wouldn’t have thought of yourself”.46  
Such an approach avoids Whybrow’s criticism of some devised work’s rational 
discussion being a potential hindrance to genuinely innovative creative work.   
Indeed, another aspect of devised theatre frequently discussed is its use of 
improvisation, both in rehearsal and in performance, with improvisation suggesting 
at least some elements are open to change and thus the planning process is 
loosened.  Julian Beck of the Living Theatre uses the importance of improvisation 
in jazz music again as a metaphor for his work, saying “Jazz is the hero [....Charlie 
Parker] showed us that by becoming engaged and then letting go the great flight 
of the bird could happen”.47   
Again, any simplistic binary division between the freedom of the devised 
text and the rigid structure of text based theatre can be questioned, however.  
Heddon and Milling develop the jazz metaphor but, citing Henry Gates, point out 
that jazz improvisation “’is ‘nothing more’ than repetition and revision”, and for 
them “a structured set of givens, rules of games can limit and contain the 
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‘spontaneous’ input of the performer”.48  Such ‘limitation’ and ‘containment’ need 
not necessarily be seen as inhibiting: rather, from such a perspective, structure 
can be seen as necessary and as providing boundaries within which performers 
can play.  Govan, Nicholson and Normington similarly discuss Clive Barker’s 
comparison of Theatre Workshop with “a jazz combo”, but with this jazz requiring 
more “rigorous investigation of form, structure and style than playing in a 
symphony orchestra”.49  In other words, if devised theatre often utilises 
improvisation techniques in either rehearsal or performance, structure and rules 
may still exist – indeed, in Barker’s example some elements may be more rigidly 
controlled in an improvised work than in a pre-written piece of music.  And in the 
case of script-based theatre, one could apply this notion to the structure of the text 
providing the security for the creators to improvise, or make the text come alive in 
a variety of ways.  Improvisation does not preclude rules or structures.  
So devised theatre, even when emanating from or incorporating 
improvisation, may not be purely ‘spontaneous’ but may in fact exist within 
structures.  Therefore, although Oddey claims that devised theatre is “a process of 
making theatre that enables a group of performers to be physically and practically 
creative in the sharing and shaping of an original product that directly emanates 
from assembling, editing, and re-shaping individuals’ contradictory experiences of 
the world”,50 it is possible to question any assumption that because the work is not 
originating from a playtext it is inherently original, or indeed that it is the 
expression of unfettered collaborative spontaneity on the part of the devisors or 
the performers.   
However, the second part of Oddey’s sentence – that devising entails an 
interrogation of, and expression of, experience – might offer a way of 
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understanding how devisors and performers can contribute through structured 
improvisations and other devising processes.  To start with, one creates from a 
context.  Heddon and Milling point out, via Foucault, that  
intuition functions paradoxically within the improvisation in the devising 
process.  An element of material generated by improvisation is recognised 
by company members as a performance solution and intuition 
authenticates that moment as original and a creative revelation.  Yet, 
improvisation is always already conditioned by the mannerisms, physical 
abilities and training, horizons of expectation and knowledge, patterns of 
learned behaviour of the performers – their habitus, to use Bourdieu’s 
phrase.51  
 
In other words, seeing a moment in a performance, for example, as creative, 
understands its relation to other practices, whether aesthetic and social.  Such an 
approach is distinct from seeing something as being original.  I will discuss this 
later in my chapter on creativity, but it is worth at this point recognising that pure 
originality is a problematic concept.  Even if a thought seems radical and new it 
will contain within it links to previous ideas and the limitations and experiences of 
the originator.  A concept of pure originality can be contrasted with Margaret A. 
Boden’s notion of creativity, which is related to a “generative system”52 and 
involves “exploration, and perhaps tweaking, of a conceptual space, rather than 
radical transformation of it”.53   Something may therefore be embraced as creative 
but may not be wholly original – to be recognised as a creative contribution to a 
discourse it must have some relation to what has gone before, even if it radically 
transforms aspects of it. 
It is this concept of a development of styles and methodologies in devised 
theatre practice, rather than that of total originality, that Heddon and Milling chart 
in their book: “The tradition we explore finds links and coherence in modes of 
devising work.  The devising practitioners examined here saw each other’s work, 
heard about performances or processes they were not part of, participated in 
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workshops, learnt about work in formal education contexts, influenced each 
other”.54 They further quote Simon McBurney of Complicite accepting a level of 
quotation/borrowing/copying: “the pleasure of theatre is impurity, it’s the magpie 
quality of people stealing from everyone else”.55  As with any other history, there is 
a sense of how one thing leads to another.  One can variously see aesthetic, 
formal or conceptual links between futurism and Dada; between the Wooster 
Group and Forced Entertainment; or between LeCoq and Complicite.  And yet 
each of these latter examples can be considered creative, if not wholly original.  
This approach is embraced in the impossibility of pure self-expression described 
by Tim Etchells: “They were always tempted to think about writing (or even 
speaking) as a kind of trying on of other peoples’ clothes – a borrowing of power.  
[…] A writing that’s more like sampling.  Mixing, matching, cutting, pasting.  
Conscious, strategic and sometimes unconscious, out of control.  I’m quoting and I 
don’t even know it”.56   
Gerry Harris distinguishes between different concepts of re-using and 
copying.  Via Derrida’s concept of iteration she outlines the possibility of devised 
work knowingly using an image or idea, understanding where it comes from and 
thinking carefully about how it might be perceived differently in its 
recontextualisation.  In this an image or any other signifying convention can have 
the same status as ‘text’ in a more conventional playtext, and should be 
interrogated in the same way: 
The failure to understand this can lead to a quoting or paraphrasing that is 
either unaware of, or fails to acknowledge and therefore to question, its 
sources, and the reproduction of  images and ideas […]have the 
appearance of clichés, because the imprints of the histories that they carry 
have not been analysed and interrogated, let alone ‘deconstructed’.57 
 
                                                          
54
 Heddon and Milling, p.22 
55
 Quoted in Heddon and Milling, p.24 
56
 Etchells (1999), p.101 
57
 Harris, p.19 
39 
 
For an art form that, as I have argued, has a range of histories, this is a useful 
distinction.  It embraces devised theatre’s capacity to creatively reuse and 
recontextualise images, language and experiences (as Heddon and Milling point 
out, anything else is impossible) whilst sounding a warning note that doing so may 
not always be understood and carefully considered.   
The need for tradition as well as innovation, or at least an understanding of 
the lineage of an art form, is mentioned by cultural critics from a variety of 
backgrounds. In his preface to the book Living Powers: The Arts in Education, 
Peter Fuller states that “The contributors to this volume […] acknowledge that 
aesthetic education ought to involve fostering of intuition and imagination, 
cultivation of the disinterested skills of the particular arts, and a sense of continuity 
with tradition, and with nature”.58  Whilst Fuller’s notion of using “intuition and 
imagination” comes from a very different political and aesthetic place to Etchells’ 
eschewing of pure originality, it is worth noting that the book, whilst often openly 
conservative in outlook, here similarly values innovation as well as tradition.  And 
although Fuller might find it difficult to acknowledge, intuition and imagination may 
well not only develop and understand but ultimately destabilise the certainties of 
tradition.   
What Heddon and Milling suggest above is that there is a need for a 
knowledge of tradition if one is to make work that understands how it will be 
received and understood by an audience, or for that matter fellow devisors, even if 
one’s intention is to subvert that tradition.  Here it is thus possible to question the 
binary of original being seen as oppositional to traditional, or even as them being 
separated.  Rather, any desire to preserve a need for originality or tradition in 
aspic is overturned in favour of a creativity that recognises that everything ‘new’ or 
‘original’ is in relation to ‘traditions’ or what already exists.  Devised theatre offers 
the possibility of a dialogue that keeps both in mind.  Both can be seen as being 
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important as the artist seeks to understand his work’s social place whilst 
articulating something unique.  As Brecht said, “Methods become exhausted; 
stimuli no longer work. New problems appear and demand new methods.  Reality 
changes; in order to represent it, modes of representation must change.  Nothing 
comes of nothing; the new comes from the old, but that is why it is new”.59  
Brecht’s ‘new methods’ understand their context and history.  They come from 
‘new problems’, they come from the old.  They do not exist in a vacuum.   
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have tried to chart a web of concerns around which 
devised theatre can be considered, whilst not trying to reduce its complexity or its 
variety.  As devised theatre has developed it, like any art form or discourse, has 
shifted and changed.  The initial newness has itself given way to a new phase.  As 
with Boden’s tweaking of a conceptual space, Govan et al suggest that innovation 
is taken on an ‘adoption curve’ through which “the ideas of the innovators or 
inventors are initially taken up by ‘early adopters’, and subsequently find a more 
widespread forum as their value becomes recognised and the ideas better 
known”.60  I have tried to suggest that the plurality of histories of practice that 
come under the umbrella term ‘devised theatre’ make it difficult to define or pin 
down, make orthodoxies hard to create.  The tradition of devised theatre can still 
innovate, and have the potential to change conventions and shift ideas.  It is a 
fluid form that can contain a multiplicity of elements.  Devised theatre is an 
inclusive term.  Devised theatre may not only be collaborative, spontaneous, 
original, physical or radical, but can also be individual, planned, traditional, verbal 
and conservative.  As such, it threatens attempts to create monolithic and clearly 
defined notions of theatre, such as those of ‘improvised theatre’, ‘scripted theatre’, 
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or ‘physical theatre’.  Devised theatre can embrace aspects of all of these 
elements within itself.  And if devised theatre is slippery in the sense of it 
containing a multiplicity of potential features, perhaps there are ways in which all 
theatre can be said to have elements of devising.  Conceptually, this notion of 
devised theatre which eludes definition chimes with Claire Colebrook’s 
characterisation of the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze, for whom “art is the very 
opposite of method; art is not a form we impose on experience.  Art is allowing the 
anarchy of experience to free itself from form and methods”.61  As in the notion of 
praxis I outlined above, with its ‘unity of theory and practice’, conventional 
terminology proves insufficient.  Devised theatre is not reducible to a simple 
definition, it stands as itself in a myriad of guises.   
For example, Oddey notes an artistic shift “away from devising issue-
based or politically orientated work as in the 1970s to theatre that is more visually, 
physically, or performance based”.62  I would contend that this shift can be seen 
not only as devised theatre losing its oppositional edge, but also as a reflection of 
the complexity of this shifting art form.  This is an art form which articulates itself 
anew as society changes, an art form which is difficult to define and clearly 
delineate from other artistic practices, an art form which creates an ongoing 
stream of work which engages with society and culture in a myriad of fascinating 
and important, if not necessarily always explicit or even desirable, ways.   
A further social significance can be elicited from Schneider’s essay 
discussed above.  She considers how theatre, or performance, relates to other 
performances, but I would suggest that one could extend this to how they relate to 
the wider world as well – in a dialogue.  Like the metaphor of jazz which is used by 
three different writers on devised theatre above, an artist responds to and initiates; 
one creates a dialogue with other individuals and with groups.  In devised theatre 
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this dialogue is not abstracted from the artist but is embodied in live performers.  
In this sense the work of art functions within a social context and as a social 
process – a process in both the making and the showing of the work.  In both the 
making and the showing activities are undertaken which relate to, and which can 
be placed in, a ‘real world’ context.  If devised theatre blurs boundaries between 
planned and spontaneous, between process and product, it thus also blurs 
boundaries between art and life.  As this thesis continues I wish to consider how 
one might understand devised theatre’s relation to this wider context: what its 
significance is and what it might be.  
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CHAPTER TWO – TRADITIONS AND HISTORIES OF THE PEDAGOGY OF 
DRAMA, THEATRE AND PERFORMANCE IN SCHOOLS AND UNIVERSITIES 
 
In this chapter I am going to outline some key areas of historical debate in 
the pedagogy of drama, theatre and performance, particularly as it pertains to 
devising, in both schools and universities.  I will principally be focusing on the UK 
context, although I will occasionally be referring to other countries’ traditions as 
well in order to explore other paradigms.  By doing so I hope to outline some of 
the assumptions that underpin the terminologies employed in different educational 
contexts as well as outlining some key debates around the epistemology of the 
subject(s).  I seek to justify my choice of the term ‘theatre’ as the focus of my 
thesis over the original term used in schools, ‘drama’, and the increasingly popular 
term (particularly in universities) of ‘performance’, illustrated by publications such 
as Harding and Rosenthal’s edited collection The Rise of Performance Studies.1 
 
PEDAGOGY OF DRAMA, THEATRE AND PERFORMANCE IN 
SCHOOLS 
Having stated my intention to ultimately use the term ‘theatre’ to describe 
the discipline I am discussing, in this section I am going to use the broad term 
‘drama’ at the outset to include ‘process drama’ as well as more conventional 
notions of ‘theatre’ teaching, before moving to a discussion of theatre specifically.  
‘Drama’ is also historically the term most often used in writing about 
drama/theatre/performance in schools.  Furthermore, it is my contention that the 
shift towards recognising process as a vital component of the devising process 
means that ‘process drama’, and indeed the term drama itself, as well as the more 
contemporary ‘performance’, have much light to shed on how devised theatre 
might be conceived. 
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Drama and Play 
As I will suggest has been the case in universities, drama in schools has 
been through a vast range of historical shifts.  As John O’Toole states, “when 
drama and theatre do make an appearance in schools, it is for a bewilderingly 
knotty diversity of purposes, knotty because some of these threads of purpose 
blend into each other, while others appear contradictory”.2  However, he suggests 
that the relationship between drama and education “is probably at its richest, most 
universal and least noticed in dramatic play”.3  
From playing early games with a parent, “the child builds [...] structures of 
dramatic play of increasing sophistication and artistry”.4  O’Toole states that “From 
the moment when a child plays ‘peekaboo’ with its parent or another adult, three 
of the foundations of drama are being laid: the (1) shared agreement to (2) 
pretend that produces (3) pleasure”.5  The link to the ‘pretending’ of acting is clear.  
Piaget discussed how play could help develop a child’s understanding of symbols, 
rules and social structures, and Vygotsky wrote extensively about how play can 
help children to develop language.6  (I will discuss the significance of language 
development further in both Chapter Three, when I explore language as a system, 
and in Chapter Six when I discuss the significance of language development in the 
work of Jacques Rancière’s The Ignorant Schoolmaster).  Notions of play have 
been developed further by writers such as Clifford Geertz and Richard Schechner 
into a discussion of adult behaviour in ‘deep play’ and ‘dark play’.  For example, 
Schechner states that “Both child and adult play involve exploration, learning and 
risk with a payoff in the pleasurable experience of “flow” or total involvement in the 
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activity for its own sake”.7  The ‘learning’ here suggests the possibility of education 
through play.   
Since play has been linked with drama and education it is hardly surprising 
that it has been of interest to drama educationalists.  In the UK Peter Slade was a 
leading exponent of this, and articulated it in his 1954 book Child Drama.  He 
“focused attention on children as they engaged in spontaneous dramatic play and 
saw this as a natural way of discovery”.8  For example, he asked his children’s 
company to act in the round as a means of ensuring that student ‘performers’ had 
“a quality of expression and creation which the child seems to me to do naturally”9, 
and this ‘natural’ quality would mean that they would be “expressing themes from 
their collective unconscious”.10  Here, for Slade, drama exists to reflect what 
happens within ordinary child development; furthermore, Slade here seems to 
invoke an ahistorical paradigm where ‘natural’ is seen as a free expression rather 
than as varying in different historical contexts.  He developed a “kind of loose 
performative pedagogy, based on dramatic play, dance drama and what he called 
‘polished improvisation’”.11  The links to devised theatre as I have discussed it 
above are apparent here.  Improvisation, often an element of devised theatre, is 
evident.  The performers create the work, and do so at least partly from their own 
experiences.  The process is intrinsically linked to, indeed often is, the 
performance. 
Another key aspect often discussed in drama in schools is its ability to 
support language development.  Improvisation is again specifically mentioned in 
the Bullock Report of 1975, which states that “drama has an obvious and 
substantial contribution to make to the development of children’s language [...I]t is 
improvisation [...] which seems to us to have particular value for language 
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development”.12  The learning that occurs through such an improvisation, as 
students select words in their drama making, is reflected in Chomsky’s argument 
that “the normal use of language is innovative”.13  And it is deepened further by 
Neelands’ proposal of a “view of language learning which goes beyond the 
superficial acquisition of skills and linguistic conventions and terminology to 
consider the context of learning and thought, language and social context and 
language and identity”, concluding that such a view “recognises the centrality of 
language to all human activity”.14  Here the concept of language learning is not 
about learning language in itself, but learning the ability to use it in a variety of 
contexts: for example, how language might limit or liberate a person (or character 
in a drama), or how speech might be used in a variety of ways by different people.   
However, O’Toole states that as a result of such language focused work 
sometimes “the concentration of the students became directed to negotiating the 
dramatic action and meaning; meaning took precedence over action; in 
experiential role-play, meaning was mainly made manifest in words”15 – indeed, in 
his own definition of child playmaking as “playwriting and acting”16 it is notable that 
playwriting is the first term used.  To focus children on remembering the 
importance of physicality and movement when they are negotiating a structure as 
vital and as consuming as language might therefore require intervention from the 
teacher.  Indeed, in such school drama, as with devised theatre, according to 
some there was a need for structure to be brought to this work: O’Toole for 
example claims that “the classroom often descended within minutes into mayhem.  
Children were as unused to this kind of freedom as their teachers”.17  One way in 
which such structure was brought to this ‘child-centred’ approach was by the use 
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of teacher-in-role, pioneered by Dorothy Heathcote.  Teachers could provide 
structure to children’s work by being in role with them, but could also stop their 
improvisation, provide opportunities for reflection, and suggest dramatic forms for 
their work.  The task for the teacher would be to maintain Slade’s eliciting of the 
students’ creativity but to also “sense the collective meaning that was emerging 
from the drama”18 and, as Gavin Bolton put it, to “help [...] focus meaning for the 
children”.19  Drama here can do what Slade’s notion of supporting ‘natural’ child 
development couldn’t: reflect on what is supposedly natural, and enable the 
students to reflect upon what they have done.   
 
 
Drama, Art and Power 
At this point of school drama’s historical development the terminology 
started to shift towards ‘process drama’ – indicating a shift towards the importance 
of making the work rather than performing a finished product.  As I outlined in my 
Introduction, this shift is also reflected in much writing about devised theatre.  In 
such work there was an enthusiasm for embracing students’ contributions.  
According to David Hornbrook “the unwillingness of teachers to make judgements 
about students’ work […] helped to foster the impression that students in drama 
have more control over their learning than in other lessons”.20  However for 
Hornbrook this was a chimera: the power relationships endemic in any teaching 
situation render this view naïve and inaccurate.  Furthermore, quoting Helen 
Nicholson, Hornbrook states that by putting the teacher at the centre of the work 
through devices such as teacher-in-role “drama becomes not about empowerment 
but about power; […] it is ethically problematic if the main aim is not to explore 
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different cultural, artistic or historical practices, but to colonise the wisdom of the 
practitioner”.21   
For Hornbrook the drawing out of the existing beliefs of students rather 
than of drawing their attention to new styles, concepts and ideas meant that far 
from being an empowering methodology drama-in-education “denied itself access 
to culturally endowed systems of judgement, and thus to the means whereby this 
strictly local experience may be held up against other wisdoms”.22  Such ‘other 
wisdoms’ might, for Hornbrook, offer illumination for the student.  By not 
encouraging students to consider a range of perspectives, his argument goes, 
lessons appeared to be, but were not really, creative.  Hornbrook goes on to 
propose the now relatively commonplace concept of “dramatic literacy”23, of 
developing a curriculum that is not focused on a nebulous concept of students 
developing themselves but rather on celebrating the vast historical, international 
and multicultural dimensions of theatre.  He describes how the “‘moment of 
significance’ which was previously born ‘spontaneously’ from hours of workshop 
preparation, can now be turned to in the cultural lexicon”24, citing powerful 
moments from The Cherry Orchard and Romeo and Juliet that can be analysed, 
discussed and “re-created”, and he is dismissive of what he sees as the desire of 
some teachers to not allow students access to the rich treasure trove of theatre 
history.  (He cites the example of teachers seeing Hamlet at the Royal National 
Theatre whilst students “must be content with role-playing and improvisation”).25  
Role-playing is of course part of ‘re-creating’ Chekhov and Shakespeare, but what 
Hornbrook is meaning here is roles determined by the student and teacher 
themselves.  This shift, along with the dismissive attitude to improvisation, echoes 
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an attempt to shift away from the areas of concern of devised theatre I have 
outlined above.   
This shift away from drama being about the participant’s personal or social 
development and more about the art form of theatre is reflected in the writing of 
Peter Abbs.  He suggests that  
[t]he word ‘self-expression’ [came...] to falsely characterise the 
quintessential purpose of the aesthetic curriculum.  Yet art is embodied 
symbolic-expression and demands knowledge and skill, a formal context 
and a continuous culture and, while having certain structural similarities 
with play, has a variety of other functions that childhood play does not 
possess.  Above all, art belongs to a cultural continuum and a public world; 
it simultaneously includes and transcends the creative play of the growing 
child.26 
 
For Abbs and Hornbrook then, there is a need to recognise the history of an art 
form as having educational potential.  For Hornbrook all students deserved to be 
introduced to quality art.  In contrast, Abbs claims, educational drama is “devoid of 
art, devoid of the practices of theatre”.27  Helen Nicholson points out an interesting 
contestation of the radical ground here.  For Hornbrook, she suggests, 
generations of young people were culturally disenfranchised.  Hornbrook’s 
argument was based on a cultural materialist analysis of society and drew 
heavily on Marxist social theory, but it is interesting that, in the educational 
climate of the time, his work was read as endorsing the elitism of 
mainstream theatre and encouraging politically conservative teaching 
methods.28 
 
This reflects the complexity of the debate and reflects again a contestation of 
binary thinking.  Radical, student-led and non-canonical as opposed to 
conservative, teacher-led and canonical is too simplistic here.  Hornbrook’s idea of 
using a canon to radically empower students through an understanding of the 
diversity of artistic heritage rethinks such a binary.  Yet he himself does not 
question what is in the ‘cultural lexicon’ - who authorises what is artistically 
valued?  To quote Jonothan Neelands, “When critics of educational drama talk of 
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‘commonly-held views of theatre’ we need to ask by whom are these views 
commonly held?  When they talk of ‘aesthetics’ we need to ask whose 
aesthetics?”29  Artistic value-judgements are not neutral: as Bourdieu suggests in 
Distinction, a refined sense of an ‘aesthetic disposition’ is “constituted within an 
experience of the world freed from urgency and through the practice of activities 
which are an end in themselves, such as scholastic exercises or the 
contemplation of works of art”.30  For Bourdieu this is an activity distanced from the 
everyday concerns of the working class, and is thus far distanced from an 
unproblematised ‘Marxist’ desire to promote inclusivity.   
Similarly in The Politics of Performance, Baz Kershaw outlines a debate in 
the mid 1980s in the UK between the “democratization of culture” and “cultural 
democracy”.31  According to Owen Kelly, he says, the notion of the 
democratisation of culture which brings ‘high art’ to ‘working people’ is actually a 
“legitimising an “agreed hierarchy of values [...an] imposition, on society at large, 
of the values of one particularly powerful group [...which] is poisonous”.32  In 
contrast, Kershaw outlines cultural democracy, which according to Roy Shaw 
involves “encouraging working people to develop their own creativity”,33 and to 
Kelly is “an idea which revolves around the notion of plurality, and around equality 
of access to the means of cultural production and distribution”.34  Whilst Kershaw 
describes the accounts of Kelly and Shaw’s notion of ‘cultural democracy’ as 
being “couched in entirely different language”,35 in both these quotations there is a 
sense of moving away from a canon defined by others and towards self-
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determination and realisation of a broader range of art than can be supplied in 
Hornbrook’s limited canon. 
Neelands identifies the ways in which Hornbrook’s supposedly ‘Marxist’ 
ideas were taken up by the Right because of their promise of learning that can be 
more easily assessed than the vagaries and varieties of process drama - an 
“economic needs” curriculum over a “child-centred” curriculum.36  From such a 
viewpoint, observing a ‘cultural lexicon’ might ensure that the hegemony of 
teaching practice and limited learning and assessment outcomes are not diverged 
from, but not be particularly useful for teaching and learning practices seeking to 
emphasise creativity or independent thinking.  The term ‘child-centred learning’ 
has itself been criticised by Andy Kempe, since “To be at the centre of something 
suggests a stationary position.  Things happen around you and to you.  You might 
well be transformed in some ways [,..] but you’d still be in the same place after the 
experience”.37  Nonetheless, the notion of child-centred learning does allow for the 
possibility of individual teachers and students negotiating their own relationships 
and curriculum in a way which can respond to specific circumstances rather than 
impose specific aims on them. 
An interesting point arises when Hornbrook quotes Bernstein to shore up 
his argument.  Bernstein distinguishes between a focus on classification and a 
focus on frame in teaching: “Classification…refers to the degree of boundary 
maintenance between contents…‘frame’ refers to the degree of control teacher 
and pupil possess over the selection, organization, pacing and timing of the 
knowledge transmitted and received in the pedagogical relationship”.38  He goes 
on,  
Strong frames reduce the power of the pupil over what, when and how he 
receives knowledge, and increases the teacher’s power in the pedagogical 
relationship.  However, strong classification reduces the power of the 
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teacher over what he transmits, as he may not overstep the boundary 
between contents, and strong classification reduces the power of the 
teacher vis-à-vis the boundary maintainers.39 
 
Hornbrook uses this to defend a strong classification/weak frame teaching style, 
sensing a pejorative tone to Bernstein’s comment that “strong frames reduce the 
power of the pupil”.  But this is not clearly implied in the context of Bernstein’s 
comment.  And it could be argued, as Bolton does above, that there are instances 
in the pedagogical process where it is appropriate for a teacher to assume control, 
to provide structure.  Indeed, a teacher keen to take on Hornbrook’s ideas and 
introduce a text from the canon might need to assume power in order to impart 
knowledge in a clear and direct way.   
The second part of this quotation about classification is tellingly not quoted 
by Hornbrook, but reveals the truth of a strong classification/weak frame teaching 
style – that the teacher “may not overstep the boundary between contents”, that 
the possibility of playing with the classification between contents, of creatively 
exploring the edges of the discipline, is ignored.  Indeed, teaching the ‘cultural 
lexicon’ during this period often meant, O’Toole suggests, “dull learning, sterile 
and fascistic directing, demeaning or incomprehensible scripts and coarse acting 
practice”.40  To “overstep the boundary between contents” in the manner that 
Slade and Heathcote required, O’Toole claims, “entailed both mastering a new 
pedagogy and inventing a new kind of artistry”.41  There is an interesting similarity 
here with the fusion of process and product which I discussed in Chapter One.  In 
both cases, process and product are thought of as constituent parts of the whole: 
the performance is more than just the presentation to an audience.   
O'Toole further wryly notes, “It is no wonder that Hornbrook’s 
swashbuckling call to arms ironically provided a refuge for many teachers who had 
tried drama process and found that they could not make it work for them, and 
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many more who had only seen it used ineffectually”.42  This drama process 
required students to devise – thinking from another’s perspective, making their 
own creative responses to a given stimulus, a text, a news story, or indeed their 
own experiences – but it also required their teachers to incorporate flexibility into 
their teaching since it embraced an organic rather than a prescriptive approach to 
tuition. 
However, O’Toole suggests that there was also bad teaching practice in the 
tradition of Slade and Heathcote – “crass, mindless, limp, trivial and disorganised 
exercises and process work were no less evident as teachers lacking the mastery, 
organisational flair, child-centred generosity and charisma of Slade, Way or 
Heathcote struggled to master these new activities and relationships that were so 
different from the curriculum they were used to”.43  Such teaching notably fails to 
address what Heathcote and Bolton recognised: the need for structure and to 
“focus meaning”.  In their work, forms and structures are created that move 
students beyond the merely mimetic towards the symbolic: in fact, they create 
what could be widely recognised as an artistic practice that can reflect on the 
world it is made in, whether directly or indirectly.  As such, their work allowed for a 
shift towards neither the child-centred learning of Slade nor the knowledge-
centred learning of Hornbrook, but rather society-centred learning: learning which 
is understood as taking place in a social context. 
 
Drama as Art and Reflection  
This creation of symbolic action through a social process is articulated by 
Jonothan Neelands, who uses Darko Suvin’s paper ‘The Mirror and the Dynamo’ 
to argue for a Brechtian approach which “penetrates Nature’s possibilities, which 
finds out the ‘co-variant’ laws of its processes and makes it possible for critical 
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understanding to intervene into them”.44  Rather than a mirror which merely 
reflects a particular construction of the surface of life, drama can provide 
structures which help to provide a “reflection on, not of, nature”.45  Such a 
reflection for Neelands can function as a dynamo which helps to develop 
understanding of the world in order to build towards a new future.  Neelands 
extends Suvin’s metaphor to suggest the notion of drama as a lens: if a mirror is a 
means of reflecting reality, and a dynamo a means of investigating reality in order 
to discover it, a lens is “a window for looking into ‘nature’”.46  The inverted commas 
around ‘nature’ are key here.  Drama is the means through which what is 
perceived as natural can be viewed anew, and reappraised as a contingent 
version of reality.  It can be an active process through which students devise 
outcomes that help them to think about the world, and this can be extended to a 
wider view of the role of theatre.  Similarly, O’Toole notes the influence of Brecht 
on Heathcote, “particularly in her use of distancing and framing techniques”.47  
Here it is possible to distinguish between the mere doing and the doing with 
reflection, reflection not in the ‘mirror’ sense but in a deeper, illuminating sense 
such as Neelands sees in Brecht’s reflection on ‘nature’. Peter O’Connor notes the 
importance in Neelands’ own practice of “slow[ing] the drama down”.48  
Techniques which allow the teacher to interrupt the process of action for its own 
sake can encourage thought about and reflection on the connection between the 
aesthetic creation and the world it exists in.   
This is where Hornbrook’s idea that students of process drama do not have 
an opportunity for their “local experience [to...] be held up against other 
wisdoms”49 can be challenged.  In the supply of structures and conventions the 
teacher can mould the creative process in a way that does not merely encourage 
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the student to repeat what they already think, but to challenge it.  As O’Toole puts 
it, practitioners such as Heathcote and Bolton started to ask “What is the artistry in 
drama process and can process drama be considered a genre of the art form?”50  
Indeed, as he earlier notes, both stressed their “theatrical roots” and Heathcote’s 
teaching was not in opposition to theatre but was rather “consciously theatrical”.51  
In this their work is a development from Slade’s work, a shift identified by 
Christopher Havell (even though he is writing in Abbs’ edited book Living Powers 
which largely promotes a Hornbrookian line): “In neither of them do we find a 
consistent emphasis on the aesthetic medium of drama in an arts context but we 
do find a great shift from self-expression to structural meaning, from individual to 
communal significance, from symptomatic action to symbolic form”.52  There is a 
shift towards recognising that drama does more than just develop the individual.  
In the process of working with others, including the teacher, social understandings 
are developed and Hornbrook’s call for “strictly local experience [to...] be held up 
against other wisdoms”53 is addressed.   
Hornbrook’s notion that process drama is devoid of artistic tradition is also 
challenged by Neelands.  In ‘Theatre Without Walls’ he “maintains that 
educational drama has its genesis in an alternative, globalised, aesthetic 
performance tradition”.54  He cites as evidence companies such as La Mama, 
Squat, the Performance Group, and directors such as Brook and Marowitz: 
practitioners who saw their practice as having various theoretical, and sometimes 
ideological, underpinnings.55  In such work practice and theory were not distinct, 
but were interdependent.  In such work, even when director led, the doing of the 
performance was about more than an aesthetic experience for an audience.  The 
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‘process’ of process drama can be seen as being as important as it was in some 
forms of experimental theatre. 
Despite such challenges to Hornbrook et al’s attempt to focus on the 
“cultural lexicon”, the tradition of process drama has struggled with recent shifts in 
British educational policy.  O’Connor argues that 
[t]he received wisdom of recent years is that the war ended with both sides 
agreeing that mistakes were made and that process drama now took on 
theatre forms more deliberately.  It wasn’t that simple.  The Hornbrook 
devotees had enormous influence over curriculums around the globe.  In 
reality, most classrooms around the world reverted to teaching drama 
skills, to preparing actors for the stage, [and...] students now learn 
individual decontextualised conventions as the content of drama lessons.56 
 
In O’Connor’s view, whilst the structures and frames outlined by Bolton, Heathcote 
and specifically Neelands have become widely accepted, the wider context of their 
application and their centrality to the students both having freedom to create, or 
devise, and to teachers providing structure in a flexible way which responds to 
individual groups of students, has been largely forgotten.  The introduction of the 
National Curriculum in the UK in 1988 places drama as a subject within English; 
GCSE and other syllabi seek clarity in their assessment regimes in order to 
comply with curriculum-wide approaches to assessment.  The simplicity of a 
dramatic curriculum such as that proposed by Hornbrook may be easier to 
quantify than the “induction into society through cultural involvement”57 proposed 
by writers such as Neelands.  As Whitehead states, “the practising teacher with 
his eye upon the children rather than upon the mark-sheets will know well enough 
that the benefits which accrue from drama lessons are by no means marginal, 
even if they are not always readily or accurately measurable”.58  Such lessons are 
also illustrated in O’Connor’s statement that “All drama education involves people 
learning how to act.  It would be a very limited view of drama education to suggest 
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this was only about acting on the stage.  A wider view is that in drama in education 
students learn how to be actors in and for the real world”.59   
As such, the need for a notion of students making theatre as a praxis returns 
again.  The activity of making meaning through devising can be conceived as part 
of a social activity that can impact on the world.  This notion of the link between 
drama and society is one that I will return to in Part Two when I consider devised 
theatre as social practice, and in Part Three when I discuss the notion of praxis in 
more detail and how it might impact upon pedagogy. 
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PEDAGOGY OF DRAMA, THEATRE AND PERFORMANCE IN 
UNIVERSITIES 
In my writing on drama in schools, I have mostly focused on the debate 
around process drama as a means of drawing out some key issues around 
devised theatre.  Devised theatre itself, however, as I alluded to in my last section, 
is now widely taught in schools and universities.  In universities the term devising 
is particularly common, at least in the UK: indeed, for Heddon and Milling the 
growth of devised theatre has come about partly as a result of the support from 
universities: “The hidden patronage of the university sector is one that we can also 
trace in the UK and Australia through the provision of spaces, venues, audiences 
and technical support, the commissioning of residencies and workshops, and the 
marketing, discussion and dissemination of many devising companies’ 
performances”.60   
If the focus within the school curriculum has been a shift towards seeing 
theatre as a product without a corresponding focus on process drama, and that 
process is limited to being seen as a stage towards a (more important) finished 
product, such as I have suggested above, Heddon and Milling claim a similar shift 
in the conceptualisation of devised theatre.  They furthermore see universities as 
partly responsible: a “key component in the introduction of devising practices into 
mainstream culture, and the professionalisation of alternative devised theatre into 
a commercially viable sphere of work, has been the intervention of the universities 
and colleges”.61  Such a shift can be seen in Gill Lamden’s Devising: A Handbook 
for Drama and Theatre Students, aimed at students below university level, which 
studies artistic directors under the heading ‘Devising as a profession’.62  This 
suggests a shift away from drama/theatre/performance education being seen as 
useful in itself, such as is actually proposed by both sides in the Hornbrook debate 
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I mentioned above.  Indeed, within the school curriculum in the UK at present the 
GCSE subject ‘Drama’ leads at A level to ‘Drama and Theatre Studies’ or in BTEC 
to ‘Performing Arts’: in both cases indicating a shift away from a focus on process 
towards an art form as a distinct realm, bringing the discipline more clearly into 
line with a vocational and commercial perspective.  As Heddon and Milling ask, 
“As processes of devising are now so firmly embedded in our training and 
educational institutions, can we really continue to claim for devising any ‘marginal’ 
or ‘alternative’ status?  And why should we wish to do so?”63 
Devised theatre is a discourse and is thus open to manipulation and 
development over time (as discussed, for example, with the discourse of the body 
mentioned in Chapter One).  However I do wish to claim a status for a specific 
model of devising away from such a shift towards commercialism and 
vocationality, and will propose that the process drama model can offer something 
valuable to the teaching of devised theatre at university level.  Before doing so, 
however, I will consider how the academy and academics have conceptualised 
the field of drama, theatre and performance.   
In her book Professing Performance, which attempts a history of the 
teaching of drama, theatre and performance, primarily in the American academy, 
Shannon Jackson suggests that as with devised theatre and drama in schools, 
drama, theatre and performance have been seen in many different ways.  She 
summarises thus: 
In sum, performance is about doing and it is about seeing; it is about 
image, embodiment, space, collectivity, and/or orality; it makes community 
and it breaks community; it repeats endlessly and it never repeats; it is 
intentional and unintentional, innovative and derivative, more fake and 
more real.  Performance’s many connotations and its varied intellectual 
kinships ensure that an interdisciplinary conversation about this 
interdisciplinary site rarely will be neat and straightforward.  Perhaps it is 
time to stop assuming that it should.64 
 
                                                          
63
 Heddon and Milling, p.6 
64
 Jackson (2004), p.15 
60 
 
With such a variety of views, I will aim here to once more avoid generalisations in 
favour of an historical awareness of how the discourse has changed over time in 
relation to what I have termed devised theatre.   
Such an historical approach is Jackson’s own aim.  She states  
Our understanding of disciplinary and interdisciplinary operations should 
shift with historical perspective and institutional location, a slipperiness that 
might in turn unsettle easy alliances and convenient oppositions in our 
current ways of talking about ourselves.  The challenge is to make the 
harder alliances and to devise new types of self-description.65 
 
The notion of discipline itself is a historically and culturally specific one.  Jon 
McKenzie notes, for example, the distinction between the “Eastern” and 
“Midwestern” strains of performance studies in the USA.66  And Bruce Kuklick 
states, again in relation to the American context, that  
during the late nineteenth century the university as we understand it, the 
social organisation defining the modern professoriate – came into 
existence [...] Various areas of study hived off from older and vaguer 
‘departments’ of inquiry, and scholarly disciplines were established as 
limited fields of knowledge in the university, distinguished by special 
techniques and an accepted set of doctrines.67 
 
There is immediately an interesting connection with the narrow concept of 
devising conceived of in contemporary curricula I outlined above.  From Kuklick’s 
perspective the notion of teaching any subject as a distinct phenomenon from any 
wider social significance is not a natural state of affairs but a specific socio-
historical construction aligned with developments elsewhere. 
 
The British Context 
In terms of the UK, Simon Shepherd and Mick Wallis similarly note links 
between the shifting nature of drama, theatre and performance to wider social 
factors.  They outline how in the seventeenth century Dryden saw the poetic 
nature of tragedy, because tragedy “is the representation of nature, but ‘tis nature 
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wrought up to a higher pitch”.68  As Shepherd and Wallis suggest, for Dryden this 
formulation is paradoxical: “being like nature by being set above it”.  For Dryden, 
the poetic heightening evident in tragedy is seen as a beneficial lens through 
which to view nature: “the process of looking has a range of distortions in it [...] 
The statue will not look like nature from below if you make it like nature”.69  The 
heightening is justified as a means of more accurately portraying reality.   
In the puritanical period initiated by the Protestant revolution of 1694, 
however, Samuel Johnson criticised tragedy’s formalism, seeing it as becoming 
“crush’d by Rules, and weaken’d as refin’d”.70  The job of drama was now to return 
to reality and not to distract itself with unnecessary dilettantism.  The subversive 
nature of theatre, recognised by the closing of the theatre after the Jacobean 
period, was best controlled by an adherence to reality.   
Despite such an interest in the purpose of drama, Shepherd and Wallis 
note the relatively late emergence of drama as a discipline in itself in UK 
universities.  For them, this is partly due to the focus in the UK on play texts over 
theatrical productions.  Any notion of theatre as an art form separate from its 
status as literature, let alone devising, was conspicuously absent.  Indeed, they 
suggest that when drama “emerged as a university subject it was in tension with 
the textual analysis that was then fashionable in English departments and with the 
training done in acting schools”.71  Drama sat uncomfortably between stools, being 
clearly concerned with issues of performance as well of the text itself.  This duality 
was evident in the formation of the first undergraduate degree at Bristol in 1947.  
Its first professor Glynne Wickham said that the subject was to be studied “not 
only as literature but also in terms of the arts, architecture and social conditions, of 
the theatre”. Another thing was clear in the formation of the degree, however: a 
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commitment to drama as a social art form: “to tackle social problems created by 
rapid developments in popular dramatic entertainment”.72  For Shepherd and 
Wallis this, like the previous conceptions of drama outlined above, could be clearly 
mapped on to social factors: “there was a sense that, in the mid-1940s, drama 
was something on a larger social agenda, and the formation of a university 
department was meeting a social need”.73  As with process drama and devised 
theatre, there was a sense of theatre as both an art form in itself and as 
something that would and could be analysed and carefully considered in relation 
to a wider social perspective.   
In 1951 Neville Coghill attempted to formulate a view of drama that placed 
it more clearly within university conventions.  He stated that the study of drama 
must “involve a greater number of subjective judgements not amenable to the 
discipline of thought in any convincing way” and that it provides “a less rigorous 
training than literature”.74  It is interesting to consider the similarities between this 
perspective and that of David Hornbrook outlined in the previous sections.   The 
canon of dramatic literature is again seen as the key to the subject, rather than 
any kind of analysis of performance or non-linguistic factors.  This is because the 
text is seen to be more closely aligned to rationality and thought than the physical, 
in a similar philosophy to that offered by Artaud, as I outlined in the previous 
chapter. 
What Glynne Wickham saw Bristol as offering, however, was a duality of 
both the practical and the theoretical, of text and performance.  And the social was 
key to this.  Rather than attempting to focus on producing either practitioners or 
academics, he said, “we are meeting face to face that fragmentation of 
knowledge, that artificial divorcing of one aspect of a subject from another, implicit 
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in specialisation, that division of a society against itself that results in anarchy”.75  
Here Wickham sees drama as part of a wider educational project, a project that 
educates the whole person.  Drama is the key to an exploration of a range of 
issues and concepts, and it is explored both in terms of its literature and its 
artistry.  This has links to the notions of process drama, where the whole person is 
educated through drama in schools, and of devised theatre where participants are 
active in developing culture which reflects experiences.  In all three cases art is 
seen as functioning within a social context. 
 
The American Context 
 Shannon Jackson’s history of the American academy similarly notes an 
intriguing range of perspectives to the journey of drama, theatre and performance 
as a discipline that finds connections with social trends beyond both the academy 
and the theatre.  One strand, before the creation of discipline as Kuklick defines it, 
is a rhetorical one.  Such a tradition “drew from a classical tradition in oral poetry 
to argue for the role of performance in the analysis and dissemination of cultural 
texts”.76  This approach sat alongside a desire to preserve existing art forms but 
nonetheless to celebrate the aesthetic skill of speech.  Yet in 1884 James Morgan 
Hart, displaying no little rhetorical skill himself, criticised the notion of rhetoric: 
“[R]hetoric always savours to me of the school bench... It is little more than verbal 
jugglery... Rhetoric exercises are, of course, useful.  So are the parallel bars and 
the dumb-bells of a gymnasium”.77  In such a move, Jackson argues, Hart equates 
performance in education with “the vocational, the technical, and even with the 
manual”,78 dismissing its power in terms which distance it from the academy.  She 
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also notes its associations with the feminine in more recent criticism of the period, 
where rhetoric is equated with “a pretty way of talking” or the rhetorician as a 
“belletrist”.79  For her such “associations with the feminine, the primitive, and the 
commercial [...] threatened the profession of literature’s redefined story about itself 
as a masculine, hard science”.80  What the tradition of rhetoric recognises, 
however, is similar to that which was recognised in process drama: the importance 
of learning how to speak, and the importance of language in constructing a reality.  
It also recognises the ‘devising’ implicit as the speaker constructs a speech, 
considering not just the words but emphasis, climax, volume, and other extra-
linguistic features. 
Counteracting such a view, Brander Matthews in 1903 attempted to secure 
a space for theatre which fitted with turn of the century “conventions of historical 
singularity and progressive continuity” in order to “give the same kind of spine, 
unity, categorisation, and evolution to drama that their departmental colleagues 
were doing in literature”.81  For such professors, the origins of theatre 
anthropology could be identified – locating and specifying theatre’s place in the 
world and thus simultaneously justifying its existence as a discipline.  It is 
interesting to note how this shift echoes the attempt of Hornbrook and Abbs in the 
UK schools context to move from the unpredictable nature of process drama or 
rhetoric to the more secure territory of a prescribed curriculum, a curriculum that 
knows itself and its subject, a curriculum that knows its “cultural lexicon”,82 to use 
Hornbrook’s phrase once more.  In such a conception there is not a focus on 
creating original material in the way that the ‘rhetorical’ strand could offer. 
The economic reality of the contemporary world of this period, though, 
intruded into these conceptions.  For all the creative process implicit within the 
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teaching of rhetoric, it “could be construed as a training ground for professional 
competence in law and business, [whereas] theatre’s model of ‘practice’ did not 
come with the clear capitalist promise of economic advancement”.83  And nor did 
Matthews’ vision with its focus on discipline but not vocation.  According to Anne 
Berkeley, there was a shift from justifying the subject in aesthetic terms in the first 
decade of the twentieth century (in opposition to the “crass, materialist 
democratisation of industrial society”)84 to a skills based approach in the second 
decade.  This shift towards a market-oriented curriculum was in line with social 
developments and a more highly marketised society.  According to Berkeley there 
was a struggle between these two positions right through to the 1970s.  There was 
a perhaps inevitable tension with “practical production [...spawning] a fettered and 
cumbersome method of knowledge making, one that did not match the pure and 
ascetic conventions of scholarly research”.85   
Interestingly, in Germany between 1780 and 1860, however, the economic 
context dictated a different conceptualisation of the discipline.  State funding which 
emphasised the research career of the professors led to “a resolutely anti-
professional pedagogy.  Preprofessional studies were ridiculed as Brotstudium 
(literally, bread studies).   The professors executed their assault on 
professionalism with vigour”.86  By doing so, by separating their work from 
technical or skills based work, the German approach created a sense of their 
difference from and superiority over the technical.  As Bourdieu argues in Homo 
Academicus, such an approach helps to provide security for the elite academic, 
however much they may feel outside the economic base of mainstream society: 
[U]niversity professors are situated rather on the side of the subordinate 
pole of the field of power and are clearly opposed in this respect to the 
managers of industry and business.  But, as holders of an institutionalised 
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form of cultural capital, which guarantees them a bureaucratic career and a 
regular income, they are opposed to writers and artists.87 
 
In contrast the American system’s strand of study which needed to supply a 
market with labour resulted in an attempt to justify itself economically, 
distinguishing itself from an academic curriculum.  In both cases the conception of 
the subject justified itself by becoming clearly delineated, easier to define, and 
thus having a clearer sense of its own identity.  Jackson argues that the subject 
has often manifested such tensions between the academic and the artist, with the 
artist caricatured as crude, unintellectual and compromised by the market; the 
academic caricatured as living in an ivory tower blissfully ignorant of the realities 
of the art form which s/he purports to teach.   
However, as I have attempted to outline above, such characterisations are 
actually part of a bigger social picture and have shifted over time.  Cultural and 
political contexts have influenced conceptualisations of the subject.  In the 
Hornbrook debate in schools, both sides created a sense of an opposition to the 
academic for different reasons.  Hornbrook positioned himself as a radical 
attempting to oppose any intellectual attempt to socially engineer art; Slade, 
Heathcote and Bolton positioned themselves as progressives attempting to 
oppose any intellectual project that would limit opening up the aesthetic and social 
opportunities that were available to children.  And the shift towards the perspective 
offered by Heathcote and Bolton was itself in line with wider social shifts: in the 
late twentieth century the humanities shifted to be part of, Jackson suggests, an 
“acculturating curriculum [which] was responsible for exposing students to a realm 
of philosophical, imaginative and moral reflection”,88 which for her is linked to “the 
increasingly radical decade of the 1960s”.89 
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As such, a notion of the intellectual and the practical as being in an 
inherent binary opposition can be challenged.  Rather, it is possible to see both as 
different perspectives on the subject significantly influenced by economic and 
political contexts.  The importance of theoretical discussion (in the English and the 
German case where the academic has greater social import), or of practical 
creation (in the American case where the professional is key) is variously 
paramount.  The notion of praxis, where the two co-exist, is ignored in favour of an 
approach which prioritises what is historically expedient.  Instead, as I outlined in 
the Introduction and at the end of the section on schools, the separation of the two 
elements from being thought together, of developing a sense in which theory and 
practice can be conceived of as two sides of the same coin, is missing.  What is 
missing in the vocational model is a sense of how the activity of drama or theatre 
can be considered as a social activity to be thought about; or in the academic 
model how the theory involved in literature studies might find a practical outlet.  In 
both, what is missing is what Wickham visualised back in 1961: education as 
being about creating thinking students who are developing a holistic practice, or 
where what they do is analysed in relation to its wider social significance. 
 
Drama, Theatre or Performance? 
 
In tracing this varied history I have tried to outline a materialist approach 
that acknowledges the importance of historical context in influencing how subjects 
are conceptualised and how disciplines shift over time.  Such an approach will 
also reflect the importance of the title used for the subject itself at any specific time 
as it seeks to articulate itself in different social contexts.  As I have already 
suggested, following the work of Richard Schechner in particular, in academia 
there is currently a shift towards the term ‘Performance’ and ‘Performance 
Studies’ over ‘Theatre Studies’ and, even more markedly, ‘Drama’.  Jackson 
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summarises a teleological view of this shift from drama to theatre to performance 
thus: “The plot begins with “drama” as a discrete literary text, posits “theatre” as a 
larger production event, and defines performance as an even larger event of 
culture”.90  From such a perspective the term ‘performance’ is seen as being 
broader and more inclusive than the specific ‘theatre’, which requires (at least for 
the vast majority of work considered under this term) conscious performers and 
audience: Richard Schechner, who was primary in introducing this new term, sees 
theatre as a “very small piece of the performance pie”.91  For Schechner, in 
contrast, “anything and everything can be studied ‘as’ performance”92 and with 
similar boldness he claims that “Before performance studies, Western thinkers 
believed they knew exactly what was and what was not ‘performance’.  But in fact, 
there is no historically or culturally fixable limit to what is or is not performance”.93  
Performance Studies is framed here as a new and unique perspective, a prism 
through which a range of events can be analysed in order to reveal how they 
function culturally.  It positions itself radically, as being able to challenge existing 
notions (things have changed since its invention, Schechner is claiming).  He is 
aligning the field with cultural studies, anthropology and sociology in its ability to 
reflect on not just art but also how people live and indeed society itself,94 meaning 
that the discourse is therefore pitched well to respond to any claim of it 
naturalising itself as a discourse since ‘Performance Studies’ can embrace self-
reflexivity through studying itself as performance.   
The broad perspective that Performance Studies appears to offer might, 
therefore, seem in line with my argument for a conception of devised theatre 
rooted in praxis, where theatre is part of a social picture.  And like the term 
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‘performance’, devised theatre has grown in popularity in the last twenty years.95  
And the link can be mapped further:  Alison Oddey’s book, published in 1994, is 
titled Devising Theatre; Heddon and Milling’s book, published in 2006, is titled 
Devising Performance.  Janelle Reinelt discusses how ‘performance’ has often 
been conceptualised as an opposition to ‘theatre’, as part of “a general history of 
the avant-garde or of anti-theatre, taking its meanings from a rejection of aspects 
of traditional theatre practice that emphasised plot, character and referentiality”,96 
and as I have indicated above such a history has been aligned with devised 
theatre.  To quote Govan et al, 
In this [Reinelt’s] conceptualisation, devised performance shows 
practitioners’ interest in exploring physicality before textuality, and in 
experimental ways of working that emphasise the creative freedom and 
spontaneity of both performers and spectators.  This approach draws 
attention to the actual experiences of performers and audiences in the 
moment of performance where conventional boundaries between them are 
broken down.  Theatre, by contrast, is concerned with representational 
space rather than everyday places, in creating imaginary characters and 
fictional worlds.97 
 
However, the notion of Performance Studies as inherently allowing for a fuller, 
more materialist analysis can, I will argue, be viewed in other ways.  If, as Jackson 
asserts, there is a move to align Performance Studies with “the marginal, with the 
anti-canonical, and with disciplinary multiplicity”98 whilst ‘drama’ and ‘theatre’ are 
posited in binary opposition to these terms, such moves “conveniently ignore the 
fact that oral interpretation and dramatic literature have had marginal canonical 
status in the humanities [and] effectively treat [...] a relatively subordinate field as 
dominant”.99  She goes on to cite an example of an African playwright (from a 
theatrical tradition) who is far from being in any canonical position.  She also notes 
the irony, as Bourdieu does in the quotation above, of Performance Studies 
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professors who seek to define themselves as subversive within a university 
institution but enjoy professional security.100  
For both Shannon Jackson, and for Simon Shepherd and Mick Wallis in 
their book Drama/Theatre/Performance, there is a more complex history to be 
written than one which posits Performance Studies as the ultimate endgame of the 
discipline, the term which is broadest in scope.  Jackson notes how Francis 
Fergusson integrated anthropology into his early writings on Drama, seeing how it 
could be linked to ritual.101  Drama for Fergusson is not merely about text but also 
about a social activity.  Both books also note the importance of the British cultural 
critic Raymond Williams in articulating drama as a discourse.  His notion of 
“structures of feeling” was crucial to his work.  It is defined in his book on Drama 
from Ibsen to Brecht as follows:  
It is as firm and definite as ‘structure’ suggests, yet it is based in the 
deepest and least tangible elements of our experience.  It is a way of 
responding to a particular world which in practice is not... a ‘conscious’ way 
– but is, in experience, the only way possible.  Its means, its elements are 
not propositions or techniques, they are embodied, related feelings.102 
 
For Fred Inglis the concept of structures of feeling could “grasp a cultural history 
as experience; that is to say, to interpret the movement of change caught and held 
in the peculiar lenses of art”.103  There is a clear link here to Schechner’s 
Performance Studies project which seeks to explore the intersection between a 
performance and its culture.  Far from the simplistic notion of drama as merely 
being ‘text’ that Jackson identifies, drama is here seen as a term rooted in social 
analysis.  In this sense it can be linked to process drama in schools – human 
behaviour being explored through drama in complex ways.  Making meanings 
through drama is a human activity that enables humans to reflect on their world.  
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And it is also about the future: as the historical HMI document Drama 5-16 quoted 
by Neelands suggests, “Through drama we recreate and examine people’s 
actions, including our own, and see both how they might have come about and 
where they might lead”.104  If initially challenging, in time this drama can chime 
with its audience as, in Williams’ words, “offered meanings [become. . .] 
composed into new common meanings”.105   
‘Theatre’, like ‘drama’, can be seen in a light other than that of it being a 
subset of the larger ‘performance pie’ of ‘performance’.  According to Carlson, the 
kind of avant-garde activities often described as ‘performance’ also have a lineage 
from theatre “cognate with performances in ‘the marketplace, the fairground, the 
circus’ or ‘private court entertainments, aristocratic salons and soirees”.106  For 
Jackson, this link can be lost in the admiration of experimental tropes of 
performance art that are linked to the theoretical approaches espoused by 
Schechner and others, and it is lost because of a valorising of theory over practice 
which is similar to criticisms of Drama : 
Some performance studies scholars might associate a “literary” method 
with an elite, textualist, anti-materialist study of modern drama.  However, 
when some of the same performance studies scholars engage in de-
contextualised analyses of the tropes of avant-garde performance art, it is 
not entirely clear who is being less materialist, which analyses are more 
text-based, or which performance forms are actually less “high”.107  
 
Bottoms notes that playwrights can and often do contribute more than just words 
on a page: theatre is “a three-dimensional event in which [...] language is one 
component part”.108  Furthermore, the notion of a ‘text’ being present in a broader 
sense in both the terms ‘drama’ and ‘performance’ is taken up by Vanden Heuvel.  
He suggests that although ‘performance’ claims to move away from the text to a 
broader perspective which takes into account all aspects of the performance, 
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when it “privileges ‘the spontaneous and physical activity of performing as an 
autonomous form of artistic expression’, it merely ‘substitutes one authoritarian 
locus of power for its opposite’.  The Presence of the author is simply replaced by 
that of the performer”.109  The prism of ‘performance’ may appear to offer a 
broader perspective, but in its focus on the event/performer itself, it may actually 
reinforce the centrality of the artist/author over the audience. 
It is necessary, Vanden Heuvel seems to be suggesting, to recognise the 
need to see beyond both the written text and the performance event itself.  
Schechner seems to do this when he states that “[p]erformance isn’t “in” anything, 
but “between”, and he continues, “To treat any object, work, or product “as” 
performance [...] means to investigate what the object does, how it interacts with 
other objects or beings, and how it relates to other objects or beings”.110  In this he 
would seem to recognise the importance of the spectator in any analysis of the 
performance process.  Yet this is perhaps even more explicitly foregrounded in the 
term ‘theatre’, which is usually defined in terms of the co-existence of conscious 
performers and conscious spectators.  Indeed, it was this focus on the audience 
that caused Michael Fried to use the term “theatrical” to criticise contemporary 
(1960s) minimalist art.  For Fried such art “introduced the concept of presence”111 
to an analysis of art, whereas modernist art, conceived by Greenberg as “self-
legitimating, totally self-contained and timeless, independent of the circumstances 
of it being witnessed”,112 had value in itself.  Minimalist art as conceived by Fried, 
on the other hand, only came into being when it was given presence, requiring a 
“special complicity” which is “extort[ed] from the beholder”.113  Such work for Fried 
lost its sense of relation to other artworks, depending instead on the specific 
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relationship between the spectator’s look at the artwork and the artwork itself.  The 
necessity for the spectator’s complicity in the art was for Fried a sign that the art 
had lost its intrinsic quality, and meant for him, in a now notorious statement, that 
“art degenerates as it approaches the condition of theatre”.114  If theatricality is 
viewed as a degeneration of art, it is also refused the status of being a proper art 
form in itself: Fried states that “what lies between the arts is theatre”.115       
For Josette Féral, “theatricality can therefore be seen as composed of two 
different parts: one highlights performance and is made up of the realities of the 
imaginary; and the other highlights the theatrical and is made up of specific 
symbolic structures […] Theatricality arises from the play between these two 
realities”.116  She suggests that while both ‘performance’ and ‘theatre’ “deal with 
the imaginary, theatre freezes its objects because it is tied to the symbolic order”, 
and instead suggests a form of performance which “sets them into play”.117  For 
her theatre “was built upon the semiotic, built of representation, of signs of an 
absent grounding reality, while performance deconstructed the semiotic codes of 
theatre, creating a dynamic of “flows of desire” operating in a living present”.118  
Theatre here is seen as conventional, aligned with hegemony.  Yet for Fried 
theatricality was a symbol of art moving away from convention; from quality art 
towards trite sensationalism.  Whilst there is a distinction here between theatre 
and theatricality, the former being tied to a specific socio-historical conception of 
an art form and the latter an enactment, a quality, present in aspects of human 
behaviour in various ways, there is nonetheless an interesting contrast arising 
between these views of theatre and theatre-like behaviour.  Philip Auslander 
comments on these different uses of the term as being discipline-specific: 
That the term ‘theatre’ can function as a figure for an emerging 
postmodernism for Fried and as a figure of desiccated modernism for Féral 
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is symptomatic of the medium-specificity of both arguments.   In the 
context of the visual arts, Fried’s theatricality is a postmodernism 
threatening to an established modernism; in the context of performance, 
theatricality is the modernism against which an emergent postmodernism 
defines itself.119 
 
However, beyond discipline specificity the theatrical, for Jackson, has often been 
used as a term of criticism: “When being representational had been a bad thing in 
Western intellectual thought, it was theatrical.  When being representational 
became a good thing, it was pictorial and textual – anything but theatrical”.120  Or, 
as Bottoms outlines in his essay ‘The Efficacy/Effeminacy Braid’, there has been a 
“repulsion from theatre [...which] goes at least as far back as Plato”.121  As 
Jackson says, “We might want to ask what we can learn about the fact that 
theatrical performance so often ends up on the negative side of a critical 
paradigm”.122   
For Bottoms, this is partly because the ‘fakeness’ inherent in theatre is 
aligned with a lack of efficacy.  It is seen as an unhelpful distraction from reality.  
Theatre generally knows where its walls are, and that what happens within its 
walls are “for show”.123  Schechner’s vision, on the other hand, emphasises the 
dynamic, efficacious qualities of ‘performance’, as Jon Mackenzie echoes in his 
book Perform or Else (the title reflecting the use of the word ‘perform’ as an 
imperative in contemporary culture).  Despite its inherent ‘fakeness’, if you can 
‘perform’ on stage, just as if you can perform in the bedroom or in the boardroom, 
you are doing it “for real”, not “for show”.  The term suggests an ability to achieve 
in reality.  In comparison, the notion of ‘theatre’, which foregrounds the fictional 
rather than the actual qualities of the enactment, can be portrayed as impotent.124   
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Sometimes even theatre artists themselves are reluctant to embrace the 
term.  For example, in an interview Julian Maynard Smith from Station House 
Opera describes them as “nearly a theatre company.  We definitely wanted to 
make a distinction between what we were doing and theatre as we perceived it”125 
– he later states “theatre has always been very conservative”.126  And yet 
conversely he rejects the term ‘performance art’: “A lot of performance art does 
not really accept that as soon as you stand up as a performer in front of an 
audience, you’re kind of acting.  It doesn’t really deal with the fakeness of it”.127  In 
this Maynard Smith identifies a discomfort with any notion of ‘pure’ theatre or 
‘pure’ performance (or performance art, to use his terminology), suggesting that 
there is an inherent theatricality in all performance.   
Janelle Reinelt also sees the two as closely linked.  She discusses how the 
concept of performance “makes visible the micro-processes of iteration and the 
non-commensurability of repetition […] in order that we might stage 
theatricality”.128  In other words, she suggests that the concept of performance 
embraces a self-consciousness, but that this self-consciousness is fused with the 
suspension of disbelief implicit in the theatrical attempt to represent a signified 
with a live signifier that is unerasable, irreducible.  Referring to Derrida’s concept 
of iteration, she notes that a repetition is never a pure copy but is also unique, 
itself, physically present.129  Reinelt is, however, wary of dismissing theatricality.  
And Féral states that theatricality serves a useful function “whereby the artist uses 
rhetoric (signs, codes, conventions, processes) that is then identified by the 
spectator.  This perspective calls for a critical and analytical dimension, a certain 
distance from the object analysed, which allows for the processes of ostension, 
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foregrounding, etc.”130  This process of identification for the spectator is done 
through three “cleavages”, as Féral puts it: the spectator’s gaze which separates 
the event from the everyday, the presence of a real body with the fictional nature 
of what that body is doing, and the co-presence of the actor and the role.131  It is 
the ambiguous relation of theatre to reality that means it can reflect on it and allow 
the spectator to see the familiar through new eyes, acknowledging its “fakeness”, 
to quote Maynard Smith.  However, the focus in ‘performance’ on a “physical 
present”-ness simultaneously suggests a recognition and embracing of each 
performance as an irreducible and unrepeatable event, an unrepeatability a 
considerable distance away from the contemporary trend towards West End 
shows which continue their runs for many years and franchise themselves across 
continents.   
Both theatre and performance, then, are useful terms and both co-exist 
within the performance/theatrical event.  To quote Féral, 
Theatricality does not exist as a pure form, nor does performativity.  If 
“pure theatricality” existed, it would be a repetitive, dead form of art, where 
all signs would be identifiable, decidable and meaningful […] On the other 
hand, a performance based on performativity alone would be carried away 
by the action itself, without any possibility for the spectator to understand it 
as a meaningful process linked to signs, codes and references.132 
 
As with the distinction I mention above between theatre and theatricality, 
performativity is a complex term that, as Elin Diamond has pointed out, is not the 
same as performance.133  The term ‘performative’ has roots in J.L. Austin’s How to 
Do Things With Words, which discussed performative speech as a dynamic 
utterance “to refer to the act-like character of language”,134 as opposed to the 
‘constative’ nature of most language based on statements.  For Austin, 
performative speech did something, was efficacious: it “does not simply make a 
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statement [...] but also performs an action”.135  Despite his use of the word ‘act-
like’, Austin quite explicitly excludes speeches in staged performances from this, 
because they are “hollow or void”,136 containing no efficacy in reality.  However, 
after Judith Butler’s definition of a ‘performative act’ as one which “produces reality 
not by virtue of will or intention, but precisely because it derives from conventions 
that it repeats and actualises”,137 performative acts which exist wholly outside the 
theatrical frame can be seen as only rooted in reality – as lacking the subversive 
potential of an act created in the slippery space of theatrical frame, beyond the 
limitations of the frame of everyday social meaning.  As von Hantelmann puts it, 
“While Performance Art, at least in its own constitutive self-understanding, was 
linked to the individual performer and the singular, autonomous act; performativity 
(in Butler’s sense) refers to a non-autonomous and non-subjectivist idea of 
acting”.138  Theatricality is able to celebrate its fakeness, but in doing so it remains 
bounded within its theatrical frame. 
 In this debate one can see the limitations of both theatricality and 
performativity as concepts.  Féral’s quotation on the ‘impurity’ of both is also 
useful in understanding both the potential and frustrations of work tending towards 
a pure notion of ‘theatre’ or ‘performance’ – the need for both signification and an 
awareness of the inevitable failure of the signification, the need to avoid the dull 
play repeated night after night without a sense of its unique ‘event-ness’, or of the 
performance that lacks contextualisation or a ‘way in’ for a spectator.  It also helps 
to theorise Maynard Smith’s discomfort with being described as a company who 
make either theatre or performance art.   
A similar ambiguity to Maynard Smith’s of the term ‘theatre’ can be noted in 
Tim Etchells’ description of Forced Entertainment’s work: 
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We were, in the start of things, what is called a theatre company.  But we 
were not very willing actors, stage-struck, or especially glad of centre 
stage. 
 
You might say that we accepted the burden of liveness with some 
reluctance, or even with embarrassment, since liveness always seemed to 
involve some aspect of exposure.  We accepted the burden of liveness – 
submitting to its economy of humiliations – its signs, its labels, its gazes, its 
routines and expectations […] 
 
We abandoned the rhetorical power of the stage, refusing the shelter 
afforded by theatre, preferring simply to be there, under the gaze.139 
 
What I think is interesting here is both the attraction to theatre and the desire to 
question it.  Interestingly, this ambiguity reflects the frequent moving between the 
terms theatre and performance in Etchells’ own writing (the company were 
originally called a theatre company, the subtitle to his book Certain Fragments on 
the company’s work is “Contemporary Performance and Forced Entertainment”, 
he uses both terms at different times in the book).  Etchells’ writing acknowledges 
theatre as being at the root of the company’s work (“being centre stage”, 
“exposure”, “under the gaze”) through an acknowledgement of the co-presence of 
the audience, despite resisting other aspects of it, particularly of the conventions 
of acting (“not willing actors”, “abandoned the rhetorical power of the stage”).  This 
centrality of the audience is what Fried resists in his writing about art (“the work 
extorts from the beholder”) but in it dialogue is created between performer, 
audience and indeed amongst other audience members.  This does not 
necessarily require interaction in a direct sense: as the artist Thomas Hirschhorn 
states “I do not want to do an interactive work.  I want to do an active work.  To me 
the most important activity that an art work can provoke is the activity of 
thinking”.140  (I shall discuss this further in Chapter Five, when I discuss Jacques 
Rancière’s essay ‘The Emancipated Spectator’). 
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This emphasis on the ‘between’ may make the theatre seem less ‘pure’ 
compared to other art forms, hence Fried’s “What lies between the arts is 
theatre”.141  Yet it is notable that Fried does not say that theatre lies beyond the 
arts, but between.  The criticism is of theatre’s transitory nature which lacks a 
clear identity, which shifts from one reality to another, which combines other purer 
forms within itself.  Shepherd and Wallace write, discussing Féral’s work, that 
‘performance’ “lays bare theatricality”, which is characterised as “an endless play 
of positions and desire”.142  Like the term ‘devising’, which I explored in the 
previous chapter, theatricality here is seen as a fluid, shifting form.   It is both real 
– really there in front of you, happening in real time - and not real.  A similar notion 
is outlined in Laura Cull’s introduction to Deleuze and Performance.  She slips 
from the term ‘performance’ to ‘theatre’ within three pages without clearly 
signalling the shift.  In doing so, she identifies links between each to the Deleuzian 
real (where the human is involved in an ongoing quest to “expand the notion of 
experience”).143  She sees Schechner’s shift “from thinking in terms of discrete 
objects and subjects, towards a concern with processes, relations and 
happenings”144 in both performance and in theatrical presence’s live encounter, 
which allows for a possibility of “apprehend[ing] ontological presence as 
becoming”.145  Theatre is never quite one thing or the other.  It is representational, 
staging the attempt to become real, but also ‘really’ there in front of the spectator.  
Even Schechner recognises a distinction between the performances of everyday 
life (“restored behaviour”) from conscious performances (“restored restored 
behaviour”, to use his terminology).146   
Shepherd and Wallis state that 
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[t]here is a distinction between ‘drama’ as art – aesthetic drama - and the 
performance of social interactions in everyday life.  But the distinction 
tends to get blurred.  When it happens, the slippage between aesthetic 
drama and social performance creates a sense that drama is important 
and powerful because it can express the ‘make-up of our species’.147   
 
The co-existence of theatre and performance is also acknowledged in Sara Jane 
Bailes’ use of the term ‘performance theatre’ to indicate a sphere “which 
demonstrates an intrinsic concern with presence [...] whilst acknowledging its 
parallels within a theatre tradition”.148  I would argue that what is being discussed 
here is theatre – to cite Shepherd and Wallis, aesthetic drama – and the ways in 
which it both lives within and beyond everyday life.  This is what Baz Kershaw, 
citing Victor Turner, describes as a “liminal role” for the participant who is “‘betwixt 
and between’ more permanent roles and modes of awareness” and the spectator 
who is allowed to “accept that the events of the production are both real and not 
real.  Hence it is a ludic role (or frame of mind) in the sense that it enables the 
spectator to participate in playing around with the norms, customs, regulations, 
laws, which govern her life in society”.149  Both ‘liminal’ and ‘ludic’ roles contain 
ambivalences and ambiguities that allow for reflection on one’s own sense of 
personal and social reality.   
But the frame of ‘theatre’, rather than the more all-encompassing 
‘performance’, enables this to be foregrounded as the event can be perceived as 
distinct from social behaviour; as part of social reality but not a full account of all 
reality, as the ‘real’.  Theatre knows it is not reality, that it is ‘for show’. (I will 
discuss the distinction between the ‘real’ and reality further in Chapter Three).  
And the frame of devised theatre allows further for just such a distinction, whilst 
also offering the possibility of performers engaging in a process of creating their 
own roles and redefining the possibilities of what their body does, what words they 
might speak, how they might behave.  Such a possibility cannot help but be 
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political.  Via a circuitous route it is also here that both process drama and devised 
theatre can be glimpsed again, an approach in which both process and product 
are important; where participants can be both inside and outside the fiction of the 
work, where they could be variously engaged in, to cite Neelands and Goode, 
“reflective action” or “context-building action”, “narrative action” or “poetic action”.   
In theatre some people do and others watch.  It tends towards a collective 
experience, like the classroom in process drama.  As students in process drama 
shift from discussion to performer to spectator in a classroom, they are negotiating 
meanings through theatre, taking on both the role of performer and spectator, and 
exploring the “between-ness” that I have tried to articulate as a specific feature of 
theatre.  It is also here that devised theatre rears its head in its ambiguous relation 
towards ownership; where the performers might seem to have created the work 
but have only done so within a history and a tradition; where an understanding of 
the work needs to understand both the process and the performance event.  
Performers create perspectives that will inevitably be based on their own 
experiences and embody them in performance, but these are nonetheless framed 
as not real through the theatrical frame.  As participants in devised theatre 
develop a performance, they develop work in which they are more likely to have a 
stake than in conventional notions of theatre where their role is reduced to a 
singular activity: actor, director, writer.  In devised theatre boundaries between 
process and the performance start to dissolve, there is more likely to be the 
opportunity to define roles, language and physicalities than in more formalised 
models, and participants can explore the boundaries between the life they 
participate in and the art they participate in. 
If, ultimately however, it may seem that I am still holding on to the ‘drama’ 
of process drama and the awareness of the performance event in ‘performance’, 
then it is because I, like Féral and Reinelt discussing theatre and performance, do 
not believe that it is an either/or between these three terms.  I have tried in this 
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section to illustrate how each term can contribute to an understanding of what 
happens when human beings do something that we might call consciously 
perform.  In the rest of this thesis I will seek to define my own model of theatre, a 
model which I believe can maintain both artistic integrity and a social function.  I 
will try to articulate how this model can be conceived of as praxis, a human 
practice that is intrinsically linked to a theoretical perspective. 
 
Conclusion – Part One 
In Part One I have tried to unpick some of the assumptions about the 
discourses of devised theatre and theatre pedagogy through an overview of their 
traditions and histories, in order to demonstrate that the concepts of both are not 
fixed but fluid, and have shown considerable shifts over time.  This shifting reflects 
the contingent nature of the discourses and suggests the possibility of articulating 
a variety of pedagogies for devised theatre.  I further attempted to suggest that 
devised theatre is a discourse that particularly resists definition, being able to 
incorporate a huge range of practices under its umbrella.  
As such, I want to propose that pedagogy and devised theatre are open to 
a wider range of conceptualisation than is often considered.  In Part Two I will 
explore three frames through which to conceptualise devised theatre: language, 
creativity, and finally as a social practice. 
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CHAPTER THREE - LANGUAGE AND ART  
 
In Part Two I aim to consider three perspectives through which artistic 
practice, including devised theatre, might fruitfully be viewed: language, creativity, 
and finally as a social practice.  Although I will attempt to link these to devised 
theatre practice in the chapters, I will often situate devised theatre within a more 
general conception of artistic creation.  By doing so I hope to question and 
illustrate potential conceptions of the purpose and function of art.  In the final 
section of the third chapter in particular, however, I aim to demonstrate why I 
believe devised theatre to be an artistic frame where the perspectives offered in 
this part of the thesis can be explored particularly fruitfully.   
 
Language As Structure, Language As Liberation 
Many contemporary critics from a range of differing perspectives agree that 
language is central to the experience of being alive.  Lacan suggests that “our 
language ‘stands in’ for objects: all language is in a way ‘metaphorical’, in that it 
substitutes itself for some direct, wordless possession of the object itself” in “an 
endless process of difference and absence”.1  This substitution was also noted by 
Hegel, who said that language “has the divine nature of directly reversing the 
meaning of what is said, of making it into something else, and thus not letting what 
is meant get into words at all”.2  Language cannot grasp the thing itself.  It is how 
humans try to express and evoke things and concepts, but it can never be 
totalising.  According to Terry Eagleton, this means that for Lacan “we can never 
mean precisely what we say and never say precisely what we mean”.3  In this 
ambiguity, according to Derrida, language offers “an endless deferral of meaning, 
                                                          
1
 Eagleton (1983), p.166-7 
2
 Hegel, G.W.F. (1977) Phenomenology of Spirit (trans. A. V. Miller) (Oxford: University Press) 
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3
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and any search for an essential, absolutely stable meaning must therefore be 
considered metaphysical”.4 
This deferral of meaning is developed further when one considers that in 
language the speaker is not the sole creator of meaning: the listener also bears 
part of the responsibility.  If this shifts the emphasis away from the idea of the 
speaker being able to always be understood, then it also suggests, as Roland 
Barthes’ famous essay argues, that ‘The Death of the Author’ offers “the birth of 
the reader”.5   As Stanley Fish suggested, “what the text does to us [...] is actually 
a matter of what we do to it, a question of interpretation”.6  From such a 
perspective language is a process of communication between two people, and 
sometimes between a person and themselves, which is trying to make sense of 
the world.  This means that, to quote Toril Moi’s discussion of Julia Kristeva, 
language “is a complex signifying process rather than a monolithic system”:7 like 
Derrida’s “endless deferral of meaning”, it is never finite but constantly open to 
negotiation.   Lacan’s idea of language ‘standing in’ is similarly premised on the 
difference between the word and the object, but it also reflects an inherent 
ambiguity in language, where the word represents different things to different 
people. 
The sorts of definitions that prevail in any given climate are thus open to 
change and challenge.  Chris Weedon summarises a range of poststructuralist 
critics by saying that language “is the place where actual and possible forms of 
social organisation and their likely social and political consequences are defined 
and contested”.8  And de Saussure’s suggestion that “far from reflecting an 
already given social reality, [language] constitutes social reality for us”9  
importantly suggests the centrality of language to how we perceive.  If it is not a 
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neutral signifying system but something which at least partly constructs a human 
being’s perception, changing it will change how we understand.  From this 
perspective language has a dual nature: it both pre-exists us and is also used by 
us.  Language can be seen as a creative act, creating concrete words for objects 
and also more abstract concepts such as emotions, which thus creates our 
reality/realities.  Heidegger outlined this conception of language doing more than 
just deal with objects and things when he stated that “while it indicates what is 
sayable, language also brings the unsayable into the world”.10  In a different 
context (a book aimed at organisational development The Three Laws of 
Performance), Steve Zaffron and Dave Logan summarise this: “Language is the 
means through which your future is already written.  It is also the means through 
which it can be rewritten”.11  Like de Saussure, they recognise that the way 
language is used can determine the reality of the world experienced by those who 
speak and those who listen.  What they call “descriptive language” – “using 
language to depict or represent things as they are or have been”12 is “what binds 
and constrains us”.13  They contrast this with “future based language” or 
“generative language”,14 the “most fundamental” example of which “is a 
declaration, which brings a possible future into existence.  A declared future is not 
a dream of a hope, but a future to which you commit yourself”.15  For Zaffron and 
Logan the act of declaring is an act that does something, like Austin’s notion of a 
“performative” utterance outlined in the previous chapter, which “does not simply 
make a statement [...] but also performs an action”.16  Through such utterances 
language does not just create meaning but can also make things happen. 
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For the speaker who is trying to make herself understood or the listener 
who is trying to understand, such a view has the attraction of offering agency.  As 
Chris Weedon puts it, the subject “speaks or thinks as if she were in control of 
meaning.  She ‘imagines’ that she is indeed the type of subject which humanism 
proposes – rational, unified, the source rather than the effect of language”.17  For 
this subject “experience is what [she] think[s] and feel[s] in any particular situation 
and it is expressed in language”.18  Yet as de Saussure realised, language also 
constrains.  Words exist before us and if we are trying to communicate we have to 
use words that are already in currency.  We speak to express our subjectivity and 
yet simultaneously participate in a language process which precedes us.  As 
Catherine Belsey puts it, from this perspective “participating in culture as we do, 
we lose our individuality in a form of cultural determinism that has in the end, no 
way of accounting for dissent”.19   
Language, then, limits us and yet it is how we express ourselves.  This 
paradox, or at least duality, is illustrated in Derrida’s discussion of the work of 
Antonin Artaud.  In Artaud’s work, particularly The Theatre and Its Double, Artaud 
seeks to theorise a theatre that moves away from language.  In Derrida’s 
understanding of Artaud, Artaud “sought a theatre that was no longer governed by 
speech in the discursive sense, seeking instead a metaphysical brand of 
speaking”.20  For Artaud, like Belsey above, “language, discursive thought, and 
indeed traditional symbolic systems in general” function “as structures of repetition 
deriving their power and authority ultimately from some originary essence or 
event”.21  This ‘repetitive’ nature of language (similar to Derrida’s notion of the 
“endless deferral of meaning” in language) is something Artaud resists and in 
contrast he, according to Derrida, posits a Theatre of Cruelty which is “life itself, in 
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the extent to which life is unrepresentable.  Life is the nonrepresentable origin of a 
representation ... Theatrical art should be the primordial and privileged site of this 
destruction of imitation”.22  According to Shepherd and Wallis he calls “for a 
theatre of pure presence to defeat representation”,23 shifting from the abstraction 
of language to the presence of bodies.  In doing so, however, Derrida illustrates a 
problem: that Artaud here assumes that there is something which lies beyond 
language.  Artaud’s desire for the stage to show the present, “the principle of 
immediacy [which] is aligned with Life”,24 itself assumes an origin, a time before 
language.   
However Derrida recognises, according to Marvin Carlson, that “escape 
from repetition (and thus theatre) is impossible, that consciousness itself is always 
already involved in repetition”.25  For Derrida, language functions through a 
process of iterability.  Each time a word is spoken it repeats previous articulations 
of that word, it references its history.  At the same time, however, it is a unique 
iteration.  Every repetition is different.  In this uniqueness, a “power to act, 
however small, presents itself”.26  We act and perceive in relation to previous 
experience, by distinguishing one event or thing from another.  There is no such 
thing as original speech: language is a structure that precedes us.   At the same 
time, however, it is a structure in a constant process of negotiation, as Moi 
recognises above.  This notion is taken further by Judith Butler.  Recognising the 
structuring of experience through not only language but through other signifying 
systems such as the performance of gender, Butler “extends this model to action 
in general”.27  All aspects of human behaviour and interaction are involved in 
iterative processes that both potentially constrain and liberate.  As von 
Hantelmann writes, “In view of the individual ability to act, the necessity of the 
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repetition of, and integration into, particular conventional structures is both 
restrictive and constitutive here”.28    
Artaud’s notion of language as being different to other signifying systems is 
challenged here.  As noted in the previous chapter, the body is in culture just as 
language is in culture.  And language, like the body, can function as a creative act 
as well as a limiting one. 
 
Language As Creative Act 
The paradox of language as both constricting and creative is illustrated in 
Artaud’s own practice.  Although Artaud is articulating the possibility of a theatre 
beyond language as it is conventionally understood, he articulates this possibility 
in language.  And ironically, his own practice was at best partially successful29 and 
he is best known for his abstract theories which are constructed in language, 
albeit theories which are difficult to pin down.  Artaud’s own ideas exist as a 
challenge to language within language; they illustrate language as a site of 
contestation whilst also being a site of imprisonment.  And this struggle is clear in 
Artaud’s own poems where language is stretched to its poetic limits and at least 
partly used for its sound qualities rather than to convey meaning in a direct way.30   
A notion of language as a creative act is foregrounded by several writers.  
The playwright and theatre theorist Howard Barker, for example, writes about “the 
performer grinding on the complexity of text”,31 suggesting that an actor coming 
into collision with a character’s speech in a playtext can find ways of articulating 
and discovering the self.  He gives the example of the actor Nigel Terry who when 
performing in Barker’s The Bite of the Night  
contended with the most complex motivations that were not always explicit 
in the text.  He found these by excavating himself, by going deeper into 
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self than actors are required to go [...] He controlled the language without 
being controlled by it [...he] showed the character Savage employing 
rhetoric as part of his own creative and imaginative world.32 
 
For Barker, in this example the actor is liberated by the language he is given: it 
offers the actor an opportunity to explore the self, and to attempt to create the 
world around him.  The actor Ian McDiarmid explains this thus: “In [Barker’s] work, 
each word is an action.  He writes with performance energy at the forefront of his 
consciousness”.33  Here Austin’s notion of a performative utterance on stage as an 
“etiolation”34 of language is challenged.    The words do something: their poetry 
enables the actor to explore through performance rather than reproduce, to bring 
something into being.   
For the French theorist Jacques Rancière, speech acts such as “political 
statements and literary locutions [...] take hold of bodies and divert them from their 
end or purpose [...] they introduce lines of fracture and disincorporation into 
imaginary collective bodies”.35  In his book The Ignorant Schoolmaster Rancière 
gives another example of creative language offering something – in his words, the 
possibility of “emancipation”.36  He outlines the work of Joseph Jacotot, a French 
teacher who had to teach Flemish students who spoke no French the novel 
Télémaque.  Jacotot’s own ignorance of Flemish meant that his ability to do this 
was limited, but he discovered that the students taught themselves a complex text 
despite these handicaps because of their will to learn.  For Rancière the 
“intelligence of the book [...] was also the thing in common, the egalitarian 
intellectual link between master and student”.37  Exploring and trying to understand 
the book, Rancière suggests, “seal[ed] a new relation between two ignorant 
people who recognise each other from that point on as intelligent beings”.38  The 
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conventional hierarchical relationship of teacher and student was reconceived as 
an emancipatory mutual journey of discovery where “a pure relationship of will to 
will had been established between master and student”.39  The student’s will to go 
on this journey was aroused because of their desire, to use Barker’s words, to 
“grind on the complexity of the text”.   
For Rancière this equality is not something to be achieved; rather it is an 
assumption, a point of departure.  Rancière himself uses language here to create 
something – not a truth, but an opinion.  He says, “We grant you that an opinion is 
not a truth [...] The only mistake would be to take our opinion for the truth.  
Admittedly, this happens all the time.  But this is precisely the one way that we 
want to distinguish ourselves (we others, the followers of the madman): we think 
that our opinions are opinions and nothing more”.40  Reminding his reader that 
languages are an “arbitrary”41 attempt to communicate experience that can never 
tell the truth, he states that truth “exists independently from us and does not 
submit itself to our piecemeal sentences”.42  In this sense all communicative 
language is an act of translation from one person’s experience to another person’s 
understanding: “the relation between two ignorant people confronting the book 
they don’t know how to read is simply a radical form of the effort one brings every 
minute to translating and counter-translating thoughts into words and words into 
thoughts”.43  Any human’s ability to communicate experience is partial, and bears 
no relation to the quality of the ideas or feelings the communication springs from.  
Indeed, Rancière gives the example of a mother whose son returns from a war 
whose complexity and depth of emotion is exactly what makes the experience 
difficult to communicate.44  It is in such situations that one is most present to both 
the richness of human experience and the equality of intelligence implicit in the 
                                                          
39
 Ibid, p.13 
40
 Ibid, p.45 
41
 Ibid, p.60 
42
 Ibid, p.58 
43
 Ibid, p.63 
44
 Ibid, p.68 
92 
 
universal impossibility of full comprehension of another: he states that “one must 
learn near those who have worked in the gap between feeling and expression, 
between the silent language of emotion and the arbitrariness of the spoken 
tongue, near those who have tried to give voice to the silent dialogue the soul has 
with itself, who have gambled all their credibility on the bet of the similarity of 
minds”.45  In such an approach the limitations of language are embraced in an 
understanding of language as a process.  The subject attempts to apprehend the 
universe, both what is perceivable and often what is not, but recognises the limited 
tools at their disposal.  According to Terry Eagleton, “[t]o enter language is to be 
severed from what Lacan calls the ‘real’, that inaccessible realm which is always 
beyond the reach of signification, always outside the symbolic order”.46  This 
concept of the ‘real’ is to be distinguished from ‘reality’: what we see around us 
every day which is a subjective and contingent reality limited to our perceptions.  
Belsey puts it thus: “[T]he real is there, but precisely not-there-for-a-subject, not 
accessible to human beings who are subject to the intervention of language”.47  
And Zaffron and Logan pithily state that “We are not saying that there is nothing 
“out there” beyond our language.  But whatever is beyond our language is not 
accessible to us”.48  Like Artaud, one might attempt to access it, but this can never 
be fully possible.  This notion of the real “is not nature [...] nor a fact [...,] still less 
is it a truth [...] On the contrary, the real is a question, not an answer”.49  There is 
always something in the real that the subject cannot know, even when attempting 
to use language to understand something, since language itself cannot fully 
contain the real. 
Language, in fact, does not really contain anything, but is a signifying 
system.  It is 
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 ‘empty’ because it is just an endless process of difference and absence: 
instead of being able to possess anything in its fullness, the child [or 
indeed adult] will now simply move from one signifier to another, along a 
linguistic chain which is potentially infinite [...] This potentially endless 
movement from one signifier to another is what Lacan means by desire.  
All desire springs from a lack, which it strives continuously to fill.50 
 
We will sometimes sense a lack of ability to say what we mean or to understand 
what we perceive, but in the attempt to speak or understand lives desire.  For 
Belsey, “When the little human animal becomes a symbolising subject, something 
is left out of what language permits it to say.  Its demands, in other words, belong 
to the alien language not to the organism, and the gap between the two 
constitutes the location of unconscious desire”.51  Like Rancière’s notion of the 
importance of will for the student confronting Télémaque, this desire is productive; 
the desire creates a need to address the gap, what is lacked, even if the nature of 
that lack is not clear.  
For Belsey this gap of desire is filled with “human culture” – it is “the only 
hope of a rapprochement between the symbolic and the real”.52  It is in the desire 
to grasp the real – which as I shall discuss later is doomed to fail - that human 
beings create culture, to try and understand, master it: in Belsey’s concise 
comment, “make things”.53  She states, “We might even want to say that the 
absence of the real is the motive for culture”,54 noting examples such as Freud’s 
renowned notion of civilised discontent.  In the struggle to recover the real lies the 
possibility of agency for the subject – even though any agency is within the 
constraints of the signifying systems that exist.  The poet Robert Frost describes 
the genesis of art thus: “A poem begins as a lump in the throat, a homesickness, a 
lovesickness.   It finds the thought and the thought finds the words”.55  This “lump 
in the throat” can be seen as a symptom of the desire Belsey is discussing – the 
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sense of not being able to fully express oneself.  Yet in the desire to express 
themselves the poet forges a poetic attempt, an attempt which paradoxically 
conveys their agency through the difficulty of expressing themselves clearly 
through the limited language available to them. 
 
Language As Social Act 
Another artist who sought to find creative ways of engaging with this gap 
was Brecht.  He sought to both embrace the reality (in the broadest sense) of 
human existence, whilst recognising the need to creatively explore modes of 
representation in order to avoid reproducing, or as Artaud might have put it, 
repeating, what already culturally exists: “We must not derive realism as such from 
particular existing works, but we shall use every means, old and new, tried and 
untried, derived from art and derived from other sources to render reality to men in 
a form they can master”.56  The desire to understand reality is channelled into art.  
For Brecht this was a political mission – part of his ‘scientific’ project which “tr[ies] 
to understand [...] tries to bring [something] into some relationship with the other 
things that he has seen” as a precursor to political change.57  For Brecht artistic 
abstraction is not a shift away from reality but a means of understanding reality: 
If art reflects life it does so with special mirrors.  Art does not become 
unrealistic by changing the proportions but by changing them in such a 
way that if the audience took its representations as a practical guide to 
insights and impulses it would go astray in real life.  It is of course essential 
that stylization should not remove the natural element but should heighten 
it.58 
 
By exploring new possibilities of communication, art fills the inevitable gap which 
exists as a result of the impossibility of grasping the ‘real’, and by doing so reflects 
on what can be known in ways that can bring new understanding.  The experience 
for the participants – maker or viewer – can be significant.  To quote Kate Love, 
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art can offer an experience which is akin to a “negotiation with language”, 59 again 
emphasising language as a process.  If one accepts Bakhtin’s definition of 
language as “a field of ideological contention” where indeed there is “no language 
which [is] not caught up in definite social relationships, and that these social 
relationships were in turn part of broader political, ideological and economic 
systems”,60 this process can be seen as a political act, an act that functions as a 
creation of new possible meanings.  From this perspective, creating culture or art 
in the gap between what can and can’t be said, developing and creating new ways 
of behaving and speaking and making, can develop new ways of understanding 
and thinking about what is currently not known.  As I have already suggested, 
devised theatre may be a particularly potent vehicle for such a creation, offering 
as it does not just the creation of objects (as in painting or sculpture) or the 
speaking of someone else’s words (as in a conventional playscript) but rather a 
tendency towards an embodied articulation of possibilities by human beings of 
moving, speaking and relating to others in ways beyond current signifying 
systems. 
When a work of art cannot be readily explained in existing linguistic terms, 
it may then be difficult to comprehend.  As Susan Sontag suggests in Against 
Interpretation, there may be a distinction between manifest content on the surface 
and the latent content which lies beneath - “the true meaning”.61  For Sontag this 
meaning is subjective and for her, as for Barker, “art is a problem of 
understanding”62 rather than a journey to understanding.  The role is not to decode 
and understand, but “to recover our senses.  We must learn to see more, to hear 
more, to feel more”.   For Sontag this means that “in place of a hermeneutics we 
need an erotics of art”.63  In this ‘erotic recovery’ lies a process of shifting existing 
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limits of what is understood, felt and sensed.  A process is undertaken which 
doesn’t have a clear end.  Like Belsey’s notion of culture in which the real is 
attempted to be reached, there is no end point.  The endlessness of desire 
inherent in the endless inability to comprehend the real is embraced.  Similarly, 
Lyotard invokes Kant’s term “sublime”  to propose art that does not seek to tell us 
something about the world (Sontag’s ‘manifest’ content) but “instead asks, ‘Is it 
happening?’”64  For Lyotard this is the question that totalitarian regimes seek to 
avert, and for him sublime art which provokes reactions, and works on what it is 
not possible to currently speak in language, is socially important.65 
For Raymond Williams, a critic from a different social context, the artist’s 
role is also crucial for society.  He states that “the special nature of the artist’s 
work is his use of a learned skill in a particular kind of transmission of 
experience”.66.  The arts function as “developments from general 
communication”67 as the artist channels responses to contemporary experience 
into artistic media with a “substantial number of the offered meanings 
[becoming…] composed into new common meanings, though after initial 
disturbance and with a time-lag that again makes us conscious of the fact of 
change”.68  Here the artist’s new creative act which “develops [...] general 
communication”, which expands existing possibilities of what it is possible to say, 
is seen as being in the vanguard of the creation of new meanings and potential 
methods of social organisation.  Although at first there may be a time when the 
artist’s work is not part of “common meanings”, it may become that over time after, 
to use Williams’ words, a “time-lag” and even “disturbance”.  
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It is important, however, to consider the possibility of art working on the 
unconscious in a way that is not progressive, or of creating meanings and 
potential methods of organisation that are not healthy, socially benevolent or 
democratic.  Terry Eagleton outlines, for example, the ways in which the poet 
T.S.Eliot’s “bypass[ing] the deadly abstractions of rationalist thought” resulted in 
the poem going “stealthily to work on [the reader] in more physical and 
unconscious ways”.  His attempt to “select words with ‘a network of tentacular 
roots reaching down to the deepest terrors and desires’”69 would, for Eagleton, 
engage with mythology at the expense of a materialistic awareness of historical 
reality.  Whilst I personally find Eliot’s poetry an evocative and haunting depiction 
of a broken world which functions as a call to arms to create a more purposeful 
existence, it is essential to be aware that the ambiguities which I am suggesting 
may exist in art will be perceived differently by different people; to consider how it 
is communicating, to whom, and in what context.  As with language, interpreting 
art can be seen as a process.  As Sandra Kemp notes, citing Walter Benjamin, 
“the art-object [is] a temporal matter, a becoming-object rather than a being-
object.   Interpretation is always a process of bringing-into-being”.70  She points 
out that music and dance problematise a notion of art as being about “finding the 
meaning”: “[N]either music nor dance is in any simple way a language; neither is 
necessarily about anything’ neither clearly ‘represents’ or ‘imitates’.  In the making 
of musical or dance meaning the immediate ‘mystified’ response of the 
viewer/listener is the reader response that matters”.71  I would however suggest 
that if music and dance are not in a “simple” way a language, they can be seen as 
a form of language: for Jack Mezirow, “Art, dance and music are alternative 
languages”.72  They employ signs, but signs which are less easily decoded than 
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words; signs that are inherently ambiguous.  Their abstraction may be what can 
engage more closely with what it is difficult to say – Belsey’s ‘real’.  In the same 
way that Eliot can be perceived differently by different people in different social 
contexts, that Télémaque causes the student and the master to struggle to 
understand, or that Artaud’s poetry or Barker’s language explore what it is 
possible to say, they exist as objects or products in the gap between the subject 
and the real that Belsey characterises as culture, but are experienced as part of a 
process.  As I suggested in the previous chapter, process and product might not 
be separate but something to examine together.  The work of art and the process 
of perception, like the word and the way it is perceived, both need to be taken into 
account when attempting to understand what is happening in any example of 
communication.   
Theatre, the subject of this thesis, is inherently temporary and difficult to 
construct as a “being-object” precisely because it is never still; there is no tangible 
object.  It is perhaps easier to imagine theatre as a “becoming-object”, where it 
exists in a constantly becoming moment between performer and audience.  
Theatre, then, might be an art form particularly well suited to reflecting the slippery 
process of language where meaning is never totalising, and where both speaker 
and listener are foregrounded in an awareness of the importance of process.  
In this chapter I have tried to suggest that art exists in the gap of desire 
created through the impossibility of language ever being able to fully contain the 
real.  I have outlined language as both a structure and as a creative process within 
which lies a potential for creative agency that is potentially socially significant.  In 
the next section I will discuss creativity itself as reflecting, like language, that 
human beings both exist in structures and have the opportunity for agency within 
those structures.  I will attempt to explore how human beings might create within 
the limitations available to them. 
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CHAPTER FOUR - CREATIVITY AND ART 
Definitions 
In the previous chapter, I explored how language can offer a prism through 
which art can be understood.  I suggested that art is created in the human desire 
to grasp the real, in the creative attempt to communicate with other human beings 
and to understand the self.  In this chapter I attempt to explore creativity itself.  As 
in the previous chapter with language, I will explore theories pertaining to creativity 
generally before applying these theories more specifically to art.  I also want to 
problematise assumptions that are often made about the term, and seek to outline 
and justify the approaches that I find most convincing and useful for my thesis.  I 
will then go on to discuss the significance of concepts of creativity for art and 
theatre more specifically. 
If, as I outlined in Chapter One, Catherine Belsey suggests we “lose our 
individuality” as we “participat[e] in culture”1, then this participation is nonetheless 
a creative act: “creativity is the project of culture”2, she claims.  She points out that 
that the Cartesian notion that “I think therefore I am” is a paradox: the self may be 
“free to have personal opinions, make choices, follow its own logic”, but it can only 
do so within the “prison” 3 of the self which cannot know everything that exists.  
Creative acts for her, then, are not purely liberational but also limited, caught as all 
human behaviour is within what it is possible to see and say in any particular 
society.  Indeed, a central idea underpinning this chapter is that creativity is not 
something that happens in a vacuum, but something that exists within social 
structures.  Nonetheless, how people participate in language and in culture, 
however limited it may be, is still something about which they are “free to have 
personal opinions, make choices, follow [their] own logic”.4  Creativity, like 
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language, is a complex concept involving both individual and society, freedom and 
constraint.    
The term creativity is currently of great interest, with critics from a variety of 
traditions staking claims to the term.  According to the publication Rhetorics of 
Creativity, these  
emerge from different theories of learning, different contexts (artistic, 
bureaucratic, pedagogic, political), different artistic traditions (fine arts, 
popular arts, different art forms, commercial art), different academic or 
quasi-academic traditions (liberal-humanist literary theory; aesthetics; 
philosophy; psychology; communication and media studies; cultural 
studies) and different policy contexts (social inclusion; vocational 
education; gifted and talented).5 
 
This range of perspectives brings Banaji et al to a deliberate choice of the term 
“Rhetorics of Creativity”.  For them “creativity is to be seen more productively 
through these rhetorics than through narrow and unchanging characterisations 
that seek to endorse particular definitions [and which make] different stances more 
entrenched and more difficult to reconcile and debate”.6  Seeing creativity as a 
rhetoric confirms the term as being “mobilised, or ready to be mobilised, in the 
interests of intervention in practice or policy”:7 like any concept, it is open to 
redefinition by different people in different contexts.  Coupled with Raymond 
Williams’ warning that “the width of the reference [‘creative’] involves not only 
difficulties of meaning, but also, through habit, a kind of unthinking repetition which 
at times makes the word seem useless”8 leads me to want to be precise about 
how I wish to “mobilise” the term in my own writing. 
Rhetorics of Creativity states that it aims to consider four key questions as 
a means of exploring the term ‘creativity’:  
whether creativity is an internal cognitive function or an external cultural 
phenomenon; whether it is a ubiquitous human activity or a special faculty; 
whether it is inevitably ‘pro-social’ (oriented towards social conformity 
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and/or culturally specific, accepted definitions of collective well-being) or 
can be dissident or even anti-social; and what the implications are for a 
creative model of teaching and learning.9   
 
It is worth considering at the outset how assumptions about creativity are implicit 
even in the formulation of these questions.  Banaji et al imply that they propose to 
discover, in three out of four of these questions, where to place creativity between 
two opposing binaries.  In contrast, Paul Kleiman’s definition of creativity as “a 
creative product produced by a creative person engaged in a creative process 
within a creative environment”10, whilst being a highly partial definition,11 is 
interesting in that it re-imagines Banaji et al’s conception of a binary opposition 
between individual/social context.  It also re-imagines the oft-cited opposition, or at 
least distinction, between process/product (which I will return to later), instead 
seeing all four aspects as part of the creative process.12 
I will seek to address these first three questions within this chapter, 
particularly focusing on the link between the social and the individual.  I will also 
pay particular attention to the interface between process and product, and 
between the arts and creativity.  In Chapter One of this thesis I suggested that 
devised theatre is an art form in which both a performance event and creative 
process can be seen as vital determinants of the final work.  These aspects 
therefore seem particularly pertinent.  The implications of these theoretical 
discussions on devised theatre and pedagogy I will address at length in the next 
chapter when I explore art as a social practice. 
In her essay ‘What Is Creativity?’ Margaret A. Boden distinguishes 
between first-time novelty and radical originality.  She states, “a merely novel idea 
is one that can be described and/or produced by the same generative rules as are 
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other, familiar, ideas.  A genuinely original or radically creative idea is one that 
cannot”.13  In this she emphasises the significance of creativity being something 
that significantly transforms existing concepts beyond existing conceptions of what 
is likely or possible.  This relates to her distinction between ‘H’ and ‘P’ creativity, 
‘H’ being something historically recognised as creative, ‘P’ being something that is 
new and creative for the person who has had the potentially creative idea or done 
the potentially creative act, but would not be considered creative from a broader 
cultural perspective.14   
In both these ideas she emphasises the significance of creativity 
challenging existing norms; in her ‘H and P’ concept she emphasises the 
significance of challenging norms from a social and a personal perspective 
respectively.  For Boden, then, something may be creative for the individual that is 
doing it, but for it to be widely recognised as creative – or to be radically original - 
it will have to be recognised as such by others.   
In this analysis creativity is a universal concept accessible to all, at least as 
conceived by ‘P-creativity’.  Someone thinks of something in a way that challenges 
their existing rationality, discovers something that is new to them, thinks of a new 
way of doing something or sees something in a new way.  However, for something 
to be widely recognised as creative it must not challenge just one’s own existing 
understanding but also that of others: to quote Jonothan Neelands et al, “the 
further away in space and time the creative act moves from its locus of production 
and reception the more difficult and exceptional it becomes to establish ‘newness’, 
‘originality’, ‘value’ and ‘significance’ unless you are exceptionally gifted and 
knowledgeable”.15  This move away in time and space means that knowledge of 
the specific context of a creative act, which focuses on the individual having the 
idea, shifts to a broader assessment by experts of whether the idea is creative 
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when placed against an increasing number of other ideas, thus making the 
judgement as to whether the act is truly creative increasingly stringent. 
The idea that creativity can be experienced by everyone existing within a 
social context is also set out by Raymond Williams.  He states 
We see in certain ways […] But these ways – these rules and 
interpretations – are, as a whole, neither fixed nor constant.  We can learn 
new rules and new interpretations, as a result of which we shall literally see 
in new ways.  There are thus two senses in which we can speak of this 
activity as ‘creative’. [….]  In each individual, the learning of these rules, 
through inheritance and culture, is a kind of creation, in that the 
distinctively human world, the ordinary ‘reality’ that his culture defines, 
forms only as the rules are learned […] But, further, there is not only 
variation between cultures, but the individuals who bear these particular 
cultural rules are capable of altering and extending them, bringing in new 
or modified rules by which an extended or different reality can be 
experienced.16 
 
Williams’ first type of creativity links to Boden’s ‘P’ creativity in being specific to the 
individual.  The second more developed form of creativity requires the individual to 
do something that works on a larger social level – which can perhaps be mapped 
on to Boden’s ‘H’ creativity.  What is interesting here is that even the first type 
identifies the individual negotiating between herself and her own experiences and 
her culture in a process that can be described as potentially creative – creating a 
new way of connecting the two, a new way of seeing or acting, a shifting of 
conceptual boundaries.  In this Williams identifies an active mental processing as 
being at the heart of creativity.   
Many of the definitions of creativity outline that a social perspective is 
crucial: that creativity does not exist in a personal vacuum but within a social 
context.  In the conception of creativity outlined in Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi’s book 
Creativity: Flow and the Psychology of Discovery and Invention, creativity is 
dependent on a negotiation between both the individual and their society: 
“creativity does not happen inside people’s heads, but in the interaction between a 
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person’s thoughts and a sociocultural context”.17   Whilst it may appear to the 
individual who has a creative thought that they are operating from a subconscious 
impulse, that the idea has “just come to them”, the truth is that this is still in 
relation to a broader social and cultural context: “even in the unconscious the 
symbol system and the social environment play important roles […] Even though 
subconscious thinking may not follow rational lines, it still follows patterns that 
were established during conscious learning”.18 
However, although everyone has the capacity for creativity, this is not to 
say that everyone is capable of being equally creative.  To put it another way, if 
everyone is capable of ‘P’-creativity, the opportunity to be ‘H’-creative is 
dependent on many factors, including knowing what others will consider creative, 
and not everyone has access to this wider context of knowledge.  Whilst there 
may be an attraction to the idea that all have the capacity to do something that is 
widely recognised as creative, the truth is that it is impossible to ignore the 
benefits offered to those brought up in a particular educational system, to those 
who have the luxury of certain securities.  For example, Csikszentmihalyi suggests 
that “such centres of creativity as Greece in the fifth century B.C., Florence in the 
fifteenth century and Paris in the nineteenth century tended to be places where 
wealth allowed individuals to learn and to experiment above and beyond what was 
necessary for survival”.19   Conversely, Rancière outlines how for Plato artisans 
“do not have the time to devote themselves to anything other than their work”.20  
Whilst it is possible to accept that for some people limitations may provide their 
own creative opportunity, as I outlined with the need for structure in improvised art 
in Chapter One, it is important to recognise the importance of social context in 
determining who has the time and opportunity to be creative.  Security, health and 
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time can all offer the creator the ability to focus on the act in hand.  For example, 
to ignore the significance of social background which underlies knowledge, to 
quote Neelands et al, “whilst being eminently egalitarian actually works against the 
interests of highly intelligent young people from disadvantaged backgrounds by 
reinforcing the idea that the social gifts which distinguished […] high achievers are 
in fact natural gifts”.21  This is not to say that one has to be affluent to be creative, 
but, to quote Csikszentmihalyi,  
It does no good to be extremely intelligent and curious if I cannot learn 
what it takes to operate in a given symbolic system.  The ownership of […] 
“cultural capital” is a great resource.  Those who have it provide their 
children with the advantage of an environment full of interesting books, 
stimulating conversation, expectations for educational advancement, role 
models, tutors, useful connections, and so on.22 
 
In this, the question as formulated by Banaji et al as to whether creativity “is a 
ubiquitous human activity or a special faculty” is addressed.  It is, in this analysis, 
a ubiquitous human activity - but it is not equally available to all.   
Csikszentmihalyi further addresses the significance as to why certain 
historical periods or places may be considered particularly creative when he states 
“centres of creativity tend to be at the intersection of different cultures, where 
beliefs, lifestyles, and knowledge mingle and allow individuals to see new 
combinations of ideas with greater ease”.23  In this conceptualisation, colliding a 
variety of thoughts that come from different traditions allows for a crossing of 
conventional conceptual boundaries, a development of new approaches that may 
be described as creative.   
All of the points above suggest that it is logical to conceive of creativity as 
a culturally specific construction.24   In this sense, Arthur Cropley’s comment that 
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“creativity is that which creativity tests test”25 is not a flippant aside but a 
recognition that those who are socially sanctioned to do so, in this case who are 
given the power to set tests, determine what is or is not perceived as creative.  As 
Csikszentmihalyi suggests, “even in Einstein’s case, the broader society had a 
voice in deciding that his work deserved a central place in our culture”.26   
However, this voice may come from a variety of perspectives and, for Boden, 
“whether an idea survives, whether it is lost for a while and resurfaces later, and 
whether historians at a given point in time happen to have evidence of it, depend 
on a wide variety of unrelated factors.  These include fashion, rivalries, illness, 
trade patterns, economics, war, flood, and fire”.27  It may be difficult to predict in 
advance what will be socially defined as ‘creative’, and as Csikszentmihalyi 
suggests in the case of Van Gogh, it may not happen until some time after the 
original act.28   
It is important to be aware of the value judgements that come into play in 
each context.  Neelands et al outline the different ways in which different societies 
have valued different modes of creativity, Eastern philosophies seeing “creation 
[as] more concerned with redistribution than origination, a bringing of order to 
chaos […] a fragmentary rather than a sequential process [where] man is part of 
its outcome, not the culmination of it” whereas “at the heart of the Western 
construction of creativity is the idea that through human agency we can outwit 
both gods and nature”.29  Creativity is here, as elsewhere, open to redefinition in 
different contexts. 
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Individual, Field and Domain 
In the definitions above, despite their different emphases, there is 
recognition that all creativity contains both an individual and a social element.  In 
terms of creativity consistent with Boden’s ‘H’ creativity, Csikszentmihalyi is 
interested in those acts that fit with “what the term [creativity] originally was 
supposed to mean – namely, to bring into existence something genuinely new that 
is valued enough to be added to the culture”.30  He suggests that such creativity 
“results from the interaction of a system composed of three elements: a culture 
that contains symbolic rules, a person who brings novelty into the symbolic 
domain, and a field of experts who recognise and validate the innovation.  All 
three are necessary for a creative idea, product or discovery to take place”.31  
Later he states that 
Creativity is any act, idea or product that changes an existing domain, or 
that transforms an existing domain into a new one.  And the definition of a 
creative person is: someone whose thoughts or actions change a domain, 
or establish a new domain.  It is important to remember, however, that a 
domain cannot be changed without the explicit or implicit consent of a field 
responsible for it.32 
 
This analysis, which has proved influential in writings on creativity, also 
emphasises the importance of social factors in creativity.  The individual’s act, 
influenced by social factors, must be sanctioned by the social factor of a field of 
experts.  The domain, too, is a symbolic realm inextricably linked to social factors 
– for example, what would constitute creativity in any field three hundred years 
ago would differ from now.  Furthermore, access to both a field and a domain for 
the individual is essential, and this access is not equally open to all.  The time to 
study in a domain, the money to travel to places where the domain is particularly 
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vibrant, the knowledge of who the people in the field to contact are, and the ability 
to make contact with them are all more available to some than to others.33 
In stressing the significance of the domain as well as the field, 
Csikszentmihalyi suggests that a field’s definition of something as creative is not 
arbitrary, but rather is the result of linking that idea or act to similar ones.  This can 
be related to Boden’s notion of creativity as a “generative system”34 - a system 
that is being generated can, by definition, change and shift its boundaries.  In 
addition, her statement that creativity involves “exploration, and perhaps tweaking, 
of a conceptual space, rather than radical transformation of it”35 can be linked to 
Csikszentmihalyi’s argument.  Her ‘generative system’ cannot be ignored, like the 
domain.  It has a set of rules and constraints; these constraints “make creativity 
possible.  To throw away all constraints would be to destroy the capacity for 
creative thinking”.36  Like the improviser in Chapter One who needs structure, or 
Belsey’s notion of the self outlined in Chapter Three who is simultaneously 
liberated through language whilst being constrained by its parameters, the person 
who creates in a particular domain does so within its constraints.  For something 
to be embraced as creative rather than merely aberrant, it must have some 
relation to what has gone before, even if it transforms aspects of it.  This idea 
chimes with Colin Martindale’s argument that poets who introduce radical style will 
regress in terms of the radicalism of their content, so that the work is not so novel 
that it appears incomprehensible: “an audience should find aversive not only 
works of art with too little arousal potential but also those with too much arousal 
potential”.37  To gain the approval of the field, the creative act must still contain 
enough familiar elements to be recognisable within its domain. 
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The importance of knowing the domain in which a creative act operates is 
crucial.  Indeed, Csikszentmihalyi states, “a quantifiable domain with sharp 
boundaries and well-defined rules is taken more seriously”.38  If one knows the 
context within which the creative act operates, it is easier to have some 
understanding of how the act functions in relation to it.  He suggests further that 
“novelty is more obvious in domains that are often relatively trivial but easy to 
measure”,39 whereas discussing creativity in fundamental but loosely defined 
domains such as wisdom or nurturing is very difficult.   
In this analysis the domain is crucial.  It allows the creative act or idea to 
be placed in a context.  Since legitimisation of an idea as creative can only occur 
from the field that controls the domain, there is a necessity for the individual who 
seeks to be approved of on a ‘H-creativity’ level to familiarise herself with the 
domain in which her idea functions.  This may explain why Avril Loveless identifies 
how children who worked on a digital media project wanted their finished pieces to 
“not look like ‘children’s work’, [so that they ...] would hence be taken more 
seriously by adults evaluating and appreciating them”.40  Children who know they 
are in the early stages of expertise in a particular medium feel the necessity for 
wider approval of their mastery of the basic rules of the domain before they can be 
comfortable with starting to bend them.  
This challenges the notion that rules are oppositional to being creative, a 
notion based on the assumption that the creative individual is principally out to 
break new ground.  In fact, the importance of knowing the structure of a domain, 
of understanding its rules and its history, is emphasised by several writers on 
creativity.  Csikszentmihalyi utilises the idea of “memes, or units of information 
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that we must learn if culture is to continue” in his writing.41  It is these memes, he 
argues, that a creative person changes, but they “must be learned before they can 
be changed: a musician must learn the musical tradition, the notation system, the 
way instruments are played before she can think of writing a new song; before an 
inventor can improve on airplane design he has to learn physics, aerodynamics, 
and why birds don’t fall from the sky”.42  Another way of looking at this is David 
Best’s point that “to count as creative an achievement must go beyond simply 
following rules or conventional practices, yet it cannot be merely subjective: it is 
not sufficient only to be divergent or different in any way whatsoever”.  He goes on 
to give the example of a figure drawn in his book that could be interpreted in 
several ways, as either a duck or a rabbit, for example, but for someone to see it 
as the Eiffel Tower “cannot count as creative since it goes beyond the limits of 
intelligibility”.43 
Taylor also emphasises the importance of initial training, proposing five 
levels of creative engagement, starting with primitive and intuitive expression, 
moving to skills at an academic and technical level, followed by an inventive level 
where experimentation happens and boundaries are pushed, moving to an 
innovative level where boundaries are broken, before finally moving to the level of 
genius – where ideas defy explanation.44  It is essential, however, that the first four 
four stages are gone through first: the domain must be understood before it can 
be transformed.  Csikszentmihalyi is convinced that this is the case in any 
discipline.45  
This challenges cultural conservatives in any sphere who see radical 
changes as being potentially damaging to the traditions of a domain, and who 
want to maintain the domain as it is.  If one accepts, as I have tried to illustrate 
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above, that creativity is intrinsically linked to social factors, a cultural shift within a 
domain over time is inevitable as society and culture changes.  At the same time, 
the domain will not allow for any change to be valued as creative unless it shows a 
grasp of the domain in which it is working.  To quote Banaji et al, “’progressive’ 
commentators [and conservative commentators…] often share an emphasis on 
tradition, conventions and rules, as well as on originality and novelty”.46  The 
significance of this is expressed in Neelands et al’s point that the NESTA definition 
of creativity as “seeing what no-one else has seen, thinking what no-one else has 
thought and doing what no-one else has dared” does not imply a “scorched earth” 
approach to what has gone before, because “you cannot see what no-one else 
has seen unless you know what everyone else has already seen; you cannot think 
what no-one else has thought unless you have knowledge of what has already 
been thought”.47 
However, creative breakthroughs can also occur in dialogue between 
domains.  Csikszentmihalyi suggests that “some of the most creative 
breakthroughs occur when an idea that works well in one domain gets grafted to 
another and revitalises it”, citing the example of applying “physics’ quantum theory 
to neighbouring disciplines like chemistry and astronomy”.48  An established 
domain that has a complexity of ideas and perspectives may be able to shed new 
light on another, and Csikszentmihalyi further documents the number of creative 
individuals who are proficient in more than one domain, with their knowledge 
cross-fertilising in a highly productive way.49  Banaji et al characterise this by 
saying that “it is in crossing such divisions […] that children (and adults) stand the 
greatest chance of being independently creative”.50  Being able to see the 
conceptual boundaries not just of one domain but of others too enables the 
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individual to see more objectively what a domain may take for granted, and to be 
able to identify ways in which it can be altered. 
A key concept which follows from this emphasis on the social basis of 
creativity is the notion of creativity as a process.  It is not a thing that happens only 
in the making of creative objects, but is rather part of a broader historical journey 
as domains change.  This emphasis on process is emphasised throughout this 
thesis and will be discussed further below in the section on creativity and social 
context, as well as in Chapter Six when I explore the notion of creative praxis. 
 
The Creative Individual 
If the above suggests an emphasis on creativity as an “external cultural 
phenomenon” rather than an “internal cognitive function”, to reference Banaji et 
al’s question, this does not necessarily mean that there are not internal factors to 
consider when discussing creativity. Indeed, these are, as I have tried to suggest 
above, linked: I would rather adopt Kleiman’s formulation of a creative product 
being produced by “a creative person engaged in a creative process within a 
creative environment”, in an approach which validates both aspects.  Indeed, 
Csikszentmihalyi’s formulation of the creative process sees the importance of 
both, since it contains not only the field and the domain but also the individual - 
who is, of course, influenced by his society just as society is made up of 
individuals. 
In terms of the skills employed by creative individuals, Norman Jackson 
and Christine Sinclair suggest “being imaginative […] being original […] exploring, 
experimenting and taking risks […] skills in creative thinking and synthesis […and] 
communication”.51  The QCA states that creativity involves “questioning and 
challenging; making connections, seeing relationships; envisaging what might be; 
exploring ideas and keeping options open; reflecting critically on ideas, actions 
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and outcomes”.52  In both these lists we can see a focus on being confident 
enough not to fear failure, being able to see in new ways which stretch the 
conceptual boundaries of the domain, being able to connect ideas and 
discoveries, and being able to express oneself in language so that others may 
legitimise the idea, action or product.   
However, these lists do not help to break down what would characterise an 
individual who has these tools, essential if one is to try to identify and/or develop 
such traits.  Csikszentmihalyi suggests that what characterises creative 
personalities is complexity, “by which I mean that they show tendencies of 
thoughts and actions that in most people are segregated.  They contain 
contradictory extremes – instead of being an “individual”, each of them is a 
“multitude””.53  For him this multitude has developed through flexibility and a 
variety of perspectives that allows for thinking the previously unthinkable.  He 
outlines a series of binary oppositions which he suggests are both often present in 
creative individuals, co-existing in a state of productive tension: energy/ability to 
rest, intelligence/naivety, discipline/playfulness, the capacity for imagination and 
fantasy/a rooted sense of reality, extroversion/introversion, pride in 
themselves/humility, masculine/feminine traits, tradition/rebellion, 
passion/objectivity, a capacity for enjoyment/a resilience to and capacity to endure 
pain.54   
For my ultimate desire to suggest a pedagogy that embraces the creative 
act of devising theatre, this is a much more useful list than that outlined by the 
QCA or Sinclair and Jackson because it is more specific, and rather than trying to 
identify and push a student in the vague direction such as to “be more original”, it 
outlines the possibility of developing a variety of skills and traits that are useful in 
developing creative individuals.   It develops a flexibility that eschews any notion 
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of being at a point between two binary opposites.  Instead, it emphasises the 
ability to keep things in co-existence, to keep a balance; for example, a balance 
between what might be interesting to oneself and what might be interesting to 
others, a balance between what might be perceived as a ridiculous idea and what 
might be a convincing one.  The co-presence of two alternating perspectives also 
allows for a constant process of self-evaluation necessary for someone who is 
working at the edge of a field – as Csikszentmihalyi says, “Those individuals who 
keep doing creative work are those who succeed in internalising the field’s criteria 
of judgement to the extent that they can give feedback to themselves, without 
having to hear from experts”.55  Jackson and Sinclair also support this idea when 
they state “the creative individual uses analytic ability to work out the implications 
of a creative idea and to test it”.56 
Alongside this idea is something fundamental for Csikszentmihalyi that is 
instrumental in developing any dynamic individual.  The concept of ‘flow’ which he 
outlined in his book of the same title which preceded Creativity is, he claims, 
pertinent here.  For him flow is a description of “optimal experience” – an almost 
automatic, effortless, yet highly focused state of consciousness”.57   This is 
dependent on a high level of motivation that can be seen in professional 
musicians or sportspeople – people who are so immersed in an activity that for its 
duration it pushes other concerns aside so that the activity becomes “autotelic”.  
Csikszentmihalyi’s formulation of flow, which he suggests can exist across 
a range of human activities, again stresses a co-existence of what might often be 
seen as oppositional - or at least self-contradictory – features.  (My comments are 
in italics):  
 There are clear goals every step of the way - despite the not-knowing 
that is inherently at the heart of creativity 
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 There is immediate feedback to one’s actions - that tempers ideas on 
an instinctive and ongoing basis despite their constant generation, 
ensuring that original ideas are both constantly generated and able to 
be thought about 
 There is a balance between challenge and skills - both are kept in a 
balance that enable both stimulation and a feeling of 
control/competence 
 Action and awareness are merged - in a constant process as 
discussed in “immediate feedback” above 
 Distractions are excluded from consciousness   
 There is no worry of failure – despite the presence of risk; failure is 
embraced as part of the process 
 Self-consciousness disappears 
 The sense of time becomes distorted 
 The activity becomes autotelic58 
The importance of motivation here has an important lesson to teach those that are 
keen to promote creative theatre devisors.  If a truly flourishing creative culture is 
to be developed, the devisors must see what they are doing not just as an end in 
itself but as something that feeds them and which will impact on their own lives.  It 
must not just be a product, but a process which impacts on the lives of those 
participating in it.  And this must be borne in mind by those who teach such 
theatre makers.  Indeed, the importance of motivation is emphasised throughout 
writings on creativity and education. For example, Covey writes “Between stimulus 
and response there is a space.  In the space lies our freedom and power to 
choose our response.  In those choices lie our growth and happiness”.59  And 
Barnett and Coate write: 
We resort unashamedly to a language that is barely heard in higher 
education.  It is a language of ‘self’ and ‘becoming’… It is a language that 
speaks to a students’ developing inner self; a self that has to be developed 
if students are going to acquire durable capacities for flourishing in a world 
that is, to a significant degree, unknowable.60 
 
Csikszentmihalyi suggests further that “it seems perfectly reasonable that at least 
some people should enjoy discovering and creating above all else” because for 
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our species to have coped with change through history the Darwinian process 
would favour those most able to cope with it.61  In these analyses creativity is 
something which often goes hand in hand with personal fulfilment, happiness and 
joy.  Furthermore, when one considers the importance of both being aware of and 
sensitive to the field, let alone the need for the complexity characterised by 
Csikszentmihalyi, the “stereotype of the tortured genius”62 separated from society 
and angst-ridden by his creativity is revealed as just that.  Rather, flexibility and a 
self-critical attitude as well as imagination and a willingness to embrace risk are 
crucial in the creative individual; happiness and self-actualisation can often be 
found through creativity. 
Neelands et al characterise this stereotype as follows:  
the eccentric scientist, never out of his white coat, working alone in his 
laboratory, puzzling over and solving chemical problems well beyond the 
understanding or capacities of common humanity is a powerful cultural 
icon, as is the emotionally unstable artist, eking out a lonely existence and 
suffering in order to realise some deep, artistic truth. 
 
They suggest that this is a “socio-cultural construct that has its origins in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and still powerfully influences educational 
assumptions today”.63  For example, Colin Martindale states, “To maximize 
creativity, a society must also maximize psychoticism, individualism, or egotism 
[…] The abhorrence of creative people for rules, control and inhibition suggests 
that the creative society must minimize rules and control and maximize freedom 
and individuality”.64  He further proposes that  
’lawless’ individualism could be confined to the upper and middle classes – 
this producing a social Darwinist’s utopia or an egalitarian’s nightmare – as 
well as a creative society.  Of course, egotism and disregard – or absence 
– of laws and rules could not be carried too far or the society would 
collapse into a “war of all against all” - hardly conducive to creativity.65 
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It is difficult to be clear about the level of Martindale’s irony here, but he does 
identify a social perspective to the myth of the creative individual.  A fear of 
creativity’s ability to challenge social norms may ensure that creativity remains in 
the hands of the few, and is, as Pierre Bourdieu has suggested, actually about 
perpetuating the restricted taste of a particular bourgeois social class.66  (Although 
(Although Bourdieu is talking principally about art, one could equally apply the 
formulation to scientific developments – which scientific ideas are followed up are 
arguably socially determined decisions just as artistic decisions are).   
There is a further political edge here.  To quote Adam Smith, “Our senses 
never did and never can carry us beyond our own persons and it is by the 
imagination only that we can form any conception of what are the other’s 
sensations”.67  Creativity may help the individual to understand others more 
clearly.   Neelands et al suggest that the individual creative act can be theorised in 
Marxist terms as “inherent to social justice”.68  As I have attempted to demonstrate 
demonstrate in this thesis so far, cultural activity is intrinsically linked to and 
influenced by its social context.  Yet through the powerful fusion of understanding 
situations and oneself through the imagination, of creativity’s ability to expand 
existing domains, shift existing boundaries, collapse existing binaries and discover 
new possibilities in oneself, others and one’s society, Martindale’s awareness that 
creativity offers the potential for change may be justified.  However, whilst 
Martindale appears to fear its subversive potential, through creative acts 
influenced by and taking place in the social conditions of the present it may be 
possible to glimpse change for the good of all.   
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Creativity and Social Context 
However, much contemporary usage of the term creativity invokes the 
word in capitalistic terms.  Seltzer and Bentley’s harnessing of the term ‘creativity’ 
in The Creative Age can arguably be linked to this shift.  For them creativity is a 
means to deal with what they have termed a “weightless economy” in which 
“intangible resources such as information, organisational networks and human 
capital have become the primary sources of productivity and competitiveness”.  
For them, creativity is a means for workers to deal with a “more fluid and unstable 
organizational environment”; the cost of not doing so is joining the “new patterns 
of marginalisation among those who lack the means or motivation to acquire 
marketable knowledge.  Developing new kinds of skills are central to their future 
prospects”.69  This type of approach to creativity is indicative of the approach from 
policy analysts such as Charles Leadbeater, cited by Seltzer and Bentley, who 
see “the engine of growth [as] the process through which an economy creates, 
applies and extracts value from knowledge”.70   
Seltzer and Bentley’s “weightless” and “fluid” are tellingly linguistically 
similar to the “liquid” modernity which Bauman characterises as that which  
ought to be a (possibly unending) series of new beginnings, yet precisely 
for that reason it is full of worries about swift and painless endings […and 
is] “haunted” by […] fears of being caught napping, of failing to catch up 
with fast moving events, of overlooking the ‘use by’ dates and being 
saddled with worthless possessions, of missing the moment calling for a 
change of tack and being left behind.71  
 
In this one can see the way in which creativity might create a stressful pressure for 
the individual to innovate, or to keep up with other innovations.  Such a notion of 
creativity as a potentially negative force is rare: Raymond Williams suggests that 
“no word in English carries a more positive reference than ‘creative’”.  However, 
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his subsequent warning that this involves “a kind of unthinking repetition that at 
times makes the word seem useless”72  emphasizes the need to interrogate 
carefully any assumptions about the term.  Whether creativity is “inevitably pro-
social […] or can also be dissident or even anti-social”,73 to quote Banaji et al, is 
open to debate.  And whether ‘dissident’ creativity is helpful or unhelpful for a 
society is in turn open to debate and demands an interrogation of each specific 
example.  As Neelands et al suggest, “just as the imagination is the cradle of 
creative invention – all new ideas begin in imaginative activity – so also in its 
empathetic sensibility it can be the necessary check on the kinds of creativity that 
resulted in the horrors of slavery, environmental destruction and the worst 
excesses of colonialism”.74  Anna Craft states that 
[t]he creativity we are experiencing [at present] is marketised […] Wants 
are substituted for needs, convenience lifestyles and image are 
increasingly seen as significant and form part of a ‘throw-away’ culture 
where make-do-and-mend are old speak, and short shelf-life and built-in 
obsolescence is seen to be positive.  The drive to innovate further 
becomes an end in itself.75 
 
Homer-Dixon suggests that “the people who succeed in this technologically hyper-
charged environment [of contemporary society] make up a narrow elite that thrives 
on constant stimulus… they don’t usually think a lot about who they are, about 
what their ultimate aims are, or about the wider consequences of what they are 
doing”.76  A similar point is identified by Neelands et al’s analysis of the creativity 
evident in Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe, whose creativity allowed him to rise to the 
challenges of the new world whilst culminating in him making a fortune from his 
cargo of opium and of subjugating Man Friday: both highly creative acts which 
were, nonetheless, acts that might now be viewed very negatively.  The need to 
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consider the consequences of a creative act from as critical a perspective as 
possible is further emphasised by both Anna Craft’s comment that “[t]he human 
imagination is capable of immense destruction as well as infinitely constructive 
possibilities”77 and Csikszentmihalyi’s point that “the main threats to our survival 
as a species, the very problems we hope creativity will solve, were brought about 
by yesterday’s creative solutions”.78   
Csikszentmihalyi suggests that neither a field nor the market can 
necessarily be expected to operate in the interests of the greater good.  Both are 
motivated to work to their own interests, to maintaining the field and the market, 
and it is possible that any creative act may shift the boundaries of either to an 
extent that renders it fundamentally changed, compromised or irrelevant.79  
Instead, Norman Jackson’s notion of the need for “creativity in an ethical 
framework”80 or Neelands et al’s description of “enterprise tempered by criticality, 
humanity and ethicality”81 might be more useful, emphasising the need to evaluate 
evaluate each specific example of creativity carefully in relation to its social and 
ethical context.  An obvious example would be to evaluate the environmental 
damage caused by it, for example.   
However I would suggest that a formulation of “creativity in an ethical 
framework” would not only need to define whose ethics are being considered, but 
would also again suggest the need for a focus on elements of the creative process 
as well as the product, a focus often marginalised in the capitalistic notion of 
creativity mentioned above.  In the Introduction of this thesis I similarly outlined the 
extent to which analyses of devised theatre often focus on the product that is 
easier to document and define than the ephemeral, subjective nature of process; 
and that when process is discussed it is often separated from product.  To quote 
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Banaji et al, “in some formulations, process and product are set up as being in 
opposition to each other, rather than as interdependent”.82  I suggested further that 
that this opposition could run the risk of overlooking the potential for process and 
product to co-exist, to influence each other.  As mentioned above, Kleiman 
postulates the co-existence of the two concepts.  Indeed, this interdependence 
has often been recognised in descriptions of the creative process.  The NACCCE 
report into creativity All Our Futures describes “a process of generating something 
original”,83 in a comment that simultaneously emphasises the object of creativity 
and the generative process leading to that object.  Furthermore, Csikszentmihalyi 
suggests that creativity has traditionally been seen as a five-step process: 
preparation, incubation, insight, evaluation and elaboration.84  This elaboration 
recognises exploration – preparation and incubation before insight, evaluation of 
this insight before elaboration – as crucial.  Such notions of ‘incubation’ and 
‘evaluation’ allow for ethical reflection in a way that a pure focus on creating 
product cannot.   
This process of exploration is a tricky one, both in terms of how one 
assesses it and in terms of its variety and complexity.  According to John Cowan, 
however, it is vital: 
[t]hat which appears a brilliantly original and creative product may simply 
(and quite legitimately) be something which was recycled (not plagiarised) 
from a piece of prior creativity generated either by this person, or by 
someone else […] To make a considered and comprehensive judgement 
of the extent to which a product is creative, the judge of that potential 
creativity surely needs some awareness of how the innovatory product was 
conceived.85 
 
The need for this process to be exploratory, allowing for blind alleys and mistakes 
is emphasised by several commentators on creativity: “Creativity isn’t a street that 
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is bramble-free”,86 “By perceiving mistakes as opportunities for, and proof of, 
learning instead of failure, we begin to change the paradigm to one that is more 
enabling and valuing of creative effort”,87 “creativity has to be a profoundly 
wasteful process”,88 “the ability to take risks without fear of failure is one of the 
cornerstones of creative endeavour”.89     
Despite the attempt to harness creativity for capitalism, to embrace 
process as part of creativity as I have posited it requires a willingness to embrace 
that which may not fit with current capitalistic conceptions of what work is: as 
Banaji et al ask, “Would time for playful testing of ideas be built into the working 
days of ‘knowledge workers’ or would they have to accommodate such necessary, 
but peripheral, business in their own personal time by giving up leisure?”90  A 
world that sees play as the opposite to work may find an embracing of play within 
work as being challenging.  Neelands et al suggest that  
play is socially and psychically ‘bracketed off’ from everyday activity – it is 
useless in itself but closely associated with the kinds of intelligent 
exploration of new alternatives, which are ‘creative’ […A]rguing for the 
importance of forms of play which may not lead to any outcome or 
immediately effect standards is pragmatically awkward.91 
 
This may particularly be the case within an economic model which posits 
production and its profit as its primary aim (although an entrepreneurial model 
might embrace such activity as part of a journey towards new thought and ideas).  
Whilst it may be easier to “identif[y...] a thought process as creative [by...] the fruit 
of that process – a product or response”,92 the process itself has its own 
significance and the creative product is not all that can be taken into account when 
considering the significance, relevance or effect of any example of creativity.  How 
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it was arrived at, and what it has created for those people involved can also be 
part of an analysis.  In the making of art generally, or devised theatre specifically, 
which sees the activity of making art as valuable in itself, as a way of exploring the 
‘real’ outlined in Chapter Three, this may be easier to imagine.  
 
Creativity and the Arts 
Csikszentmihalyi’s interviews with creative individuals cover the arts but 
also “the sciences […], business, government, or human well-being in general”.93  
Indeed, Seltzer and Bentley claim that “the most common misconception about 
creativity is that it involves artistic sensibility”.94  The National Curriculum has 
defined creativity as “a cross-curricular thinking skill”95 and Anna Craft has defined 
defined it as “possibility thinking”.96  Although the distinction between cultural and 
creative learning identified by Banaji et al emphasises both that creativity can be 
identified in any domain and that cultural learning – in the arts, for example - can 
be uncreative,97 the arts arguably have a particular relevance to creativity.  In 
Raymond Williams’ ‘The Creative Mind’, mentioned in the previous chapter, 
Williams agrees that creativity is not the sole preserve of artists but is undertaken 
by everyone.98  He does, however, see something unique about the arts, which he 
he defines as “developments from general communication”.99  In this analysis, the 
arts function at a slight remove from everyday life, have the capacity to develop 
conventional ideas, and therefore have a unique opportunity to be at the vanguard 
of new ideas and social meanings.  This has obvious links to  Csikszentmihalyi’s 
notion of a domain in which creativity exists, but whose boundaries it shifts. 
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Indeed, for Neelands et al, “the arts are the most obvious, popular and 
attractive way of both stimulating and nurturing creative imaginations”.100  
Everyone can experience the creativity of painting, singing and dancing, within 
their own limitations, and this creativity may be seen in terms that go beyond a 
notion of “the cultural industries”.  Rather, they are seen as an ongoing activity, 
part of everyday life whilst simultaneously being distinguished from it,101 which 
nourishes society on an ongoing basis.  This approach links to the Eastern notion 
of creativity mentioned earlier, where “creation [is] more concerned with 
redistribution than origination, a bringing of order to chaos […] a fragmentary 
rather than a sequential process [where] man is part of its outcome, not the 
culmination of it”.102  Here the arts function as a creative redistribution of the 
domain of experience, and in doing so “can be seen as a necessary irritant to the 
creative conscience and as the pro-social counter-balance in a social-market 
paradigm of creativity”.103  They can offer a model of creativity that embraces 
process as well as product, an inspiring process for the individual that can 
simultaneously feed society.     
Discussing theatre specifically, Neelands discusses the difference between 
craft and art.  For him, writers such as Hornbrook cited in Chapter Two focus on 
learning the craft of theatre (“the skills, knowledge and techniques used in the 
making and appreciation of theatre”)104 rather than the art, which is “the effective 
application of craft in order to realise meanings”.105  The creativity is seen as an 
end in itself rather than as something that is embedded in a social context, that is 
a process of communication.  For him, the arts allow all children “to apply symbolic 
form to those areas of curricular, cultural and social content which have 
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significance for them”.106  In this conception, the creative process of the arts has a 
content, whether latent or explicit, that can be overlooked in the rush to focus on 
aesthetic creativity.  There is a need, then, for Neelands, for creativity to apply to 
thinking about content as well as how that content is expressed, and solely 
focusing on the craft “avoids the issue of content”.107  Interestingly Hornbrook 
himself, despite his own criticism of drama in education for putting the exploration 
of issues in a creative process at its centre, is also critical of “aesthetic awareness 
as unconscious and de-contextualised consumption”, stating that “we can only 
meaningfully create within the critical parameters of a culture”.108  In their different 
ways both writers are arguing for the creative process to be recognised as a social 
as well as an individual activity.  
As well as something that can influence society it is important to recognise 
that the form of arts practised, as in any domain, is subject to social influence.  For 
example, Paul Willis claims that in Britain the “institutions and practices, genres 
and terms of ‘high’ art are currently categories of exclusion more than of inclusion.  
[…] They may encourage some artistic specialisations but they certainly 
discourage much wider and more symbolic creativity”.109  From this perspective 
there is a danger that some forms of the arts will alienate many people.  The 
larger domain of the arts contains subsets of different domains; art forms and 
styles that differ in their relevance to different people.  Furthermore, Willis 
suggests that, for some, creativity lies outside the arts.  If Banaji et al note that not 
all culture is equally creative, it follows that not all art is equally creative.   
It is, however, possible to encourage people to work in forms that do 
express their experiences, and I have tried to suggest throughout this thesis that 
devised theatre is a form particularly suited to this.  This need not mean slavish 
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adherence to the most obvious references to peoples’ experience, or with the 
most obvious commercial aspects of popular culture.  It can mean a creative 
engagement with popular forms in a way that reinvigorates them, shifting the 
boundaries of their domain.  It can bring out the contradictions identified by 
Andrew Ross: “Popular culture is far from being a straightforward or unified 
expression of popular interests.  It contains elements of disrespect and even 
opposition to structures of authority, but it also contains “explanations” [...] for the 
maintenance of respect for those structures of authority”.110  In addition, whilst 
noting Willis’ points about ‘high’ culture, it is not contradictory to suggest that its 
history may have some valuable lessons for those seeking to express themselves, 
since it is a highly sophisticated domain that can reflect on the ways in which 
individuals and groups engage with their social context and their own 
subjectivities.  Art can “embody known as well as new experiences […and] much 
of what we recognise as great art has done exactly that”.111 
As I have outlined above creative thinkers, by definition, both work within a 
domain and attempt to shift the domain.  They can collapse binary oppositions that 
structure existing wisdom in a way that can be considered potentially subversive.   
Thomson et al set out an illuminating artistic example of this: 
When a successful primary school engaged a writer to work with children 
on an arts project, they thought that the result would be a lively, 
publishable project.  When the writer worked with the children, he thought 
that he should use the children’s experiences and ideas as a basis for 
meaningful and engaged composition.  However, the result was a text 
which the headteacher and her staff felt was inappropriate.  They were 
concerned that it could bring disapproval from parents and possible 
adverse publicity.  The head refused to publish but continues to worry 
about the decision.  The writer describes the project as censored.112 
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Whatever the relative merits of this case, what is clear is that the creative process 
caused a subversive stir in the school.  Indeed, I suggest that the arts are posed 
well to mount such a subversive challenge.   
Jacques Rancière outlines a notion of the aesthetic regime of art that 
“strictly identifies art in the singular and frees it from any specific rule, from any 
hierarchy of the arts, subject matter, and genres”.113  The arts collapse the binary 
between something within and outside everyday life, existing in both at the same 
time.  They have the potential to imagine – to quote Maxine Greene, “the cognitive 
capacity that summons up the ‘as-if’, the possible, the what is not and yet might 
be”114 - and to reflect.  It is this duality that provides both its escape from a 
utilitarian link to life and its mirror up to it, allowing it to shift perception, offer new 
possibilities of expression, and create change.  
Indeed, the notion of creativity, like the notion of language outlined in the 
previous chapter, suggests an ongoing process for the human subject in which 
change is inevitable.  Such a process allows for a view of what Neelands 
describes as “human becomings” rather than “human beings”.115  Shannon 
Jackson’s notion of performance as linguistically coming from the Greek root 
meaning “bringing into being”116 is intriguingly similar.  In both there is an implicit 
notion of process that suggests that creating art, including devised theatre, can 
function as a means of furthering the potential of the human being, both 
individually and collectively.   
In the final chapter of Part Two I seek to further this discussion, considering 
ways in which the notions of language and creativity outlined in the first two 
chapters might link with theories of art as a social practice.  I will specifically focus 
on devised theatre as a means of developing this notion. 
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 CHAPTER FIVE – SOCIAL PRACTICE, ART AND THEATRE 
 
In this chapter I am going to consider the concept of art as a social practice 
before going on to look more specifically at theatre.  Issues around the notion of 
art making as a social practice have inevitably reared their head in the first two 
chapters of Part Two.  Here, however, I aim to focus specifically on debates 
around the relationship between art and society, considering how making art might 
function as a practice within a society.  This is an ongoing debate which I cannot 
hope to outline in full.  Rather, I will discuss a range of theories which consider 
contrasting notions of art, particularly focusing on different views as to where art 
sits on a continuum between being an autonomous realm and as being subsumed 
within the culture of a society.  In particular, I will use Kant’s ideas on aesthetics, 
Bourdieu’s challenging of Kant’s approach, and ultimately the theories of Jacques 
Rancière to offer both a fruitful and convincing argument for how the relationship 
between art and society might be conceived.  
 
Kant and Aesthetics 
I am going to begin this chapter by looking at the arguments Kant 
advanced in his Critique of Judgement.  Although Kant discussed both nature and 
art, for him nature was the epitome of beauty and supersedes what any human 
being can comprehend or create: in “the immeasurableness of nature and the 
inadequacy of our faculty for adopting a standard proportionate to the aesthetic 
estimation of the magnitude of its realm, we found our own limitation”.1  But in this 
realm of nature, according to Scruton, Kant thought that “we recognize that our 
own ends might be realised there”.2  For Kant, when an artist tries to create 
something, the most beautiful thing she can try to do is to imitate this beauty, and 
her aim is to do so by erasing any sign of the human construction of the work: 
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“intentional though it be, [it] must not have the appearance of being intentional; i.e. 
we must be able to look upon fine art as nature”.3  Human activity in fields such as 
art making is thus seen as a human attempt to equal the essence of nature, with 
nature posited as an aesthetic truth that is irreducibly itself.   
Indeed, for Kant the beauty of nature is open to all; it is universal, 
transcending boundaries of culture and experience, and “a person who can feel 
neither the solemnity nor the awesomeness of nature lacks in our eyes the 
necessary sense of his own limitations”.4  It is, therefore, not subjective but 
objective: based on judgements all should feel; rooted in rationality.  The Kantian 
attempt to define “judgements of taste”5 is thus ultimately an attempt to define 
“universal judgements of taste”.6  Kant, however, was more complex than this 
might seem to at first suggest. He also recognised that whilst the subject finding 
beauty did so by reference to what seems like objective rationality, in the moment 
of recognition she is also expressing what feels to be “an expression of subjective 
experience”.7  The pleasure is immediate and instinctive. It is not possible to make 
someone else sense beauty through reference to objective truths.  At the same 
time, it is only possible to grasp it (or, indeed, anything else) through reference to 
other things.  The comment “Look at the beautiful colour of the sky” requires an 
understanding that the colour looked at is a colour that is beautiful as opposed to 
a colour that is not.  There is, therefore, a Kantian antinomy in aesthetic 
appreciation.  It is simultaneously objective and subjective.  It occurs to the viewer 
or listener as true, but it cannot be proven as true.  Kant uses the term “subjective 
universality” to define this paradox.8 
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There are several distinctions made by Kant about aesthetics.  He 
distinguishes between sensory and contemplative pleasures.  For Kant, the pure 
judgement of taste combines “delight or aversion apart from any interest”.9  In 
addition to the pleasure afforded, there is space to acknowledge the object for 
what it is in itself.  Scruton suggests that this means, for example, that for Kant 
“[a]esthetic pleasures must therefore be distinguished from the purely sensuous 
pleasures of food and drink”.10  After Burke, Kant distinguishes further between the 
beautiful and the sublime in aesthetic appreciation: “In beauty we discover the 
purposiveness of nature; in the sublime we have intimations of its transcendental 
origins”.11  The distinction posits the beauty as the delight of the object, and the 
sublime as pointing to the part of the aesthetic that is beyond what is conceivable: 
God.  For Kant they fuse in nature.  In cases of both beauty and the sublime, man 
is the recipient of the subject of appreciation.  Even when he is the producer, the 
work takes on its own life when it is perceived. It is a transcendent object true to 
itself rather than its maker.  This leads Rancière to state that  
[f]rom Kant's viewpoint, the very idea of an art of the sublime would seem 
contradictory.  With Kant, the sublime does not designate the products of 
artistic practice [...T]he feeling of the sublime does not point either to the 
work of Michelangelo or to that of an Egyptian architect.  It simply 
translates the incapacity of the imagination to grasp the monument as a 
totality.12 
 
In the moment of perception, the subject is the one to designate something as 
beautiful or sublime.  The thing perceived cannot be understood in an everyday 
way.  It supersedes utility.  The subjectivity is evident when Kant acknowledges 
that it is possible that some may not appreciate the aesthetically beautiful/sublime 
object (if they do not have a “necessary sense of their own limitations”),13 but the 
divine origin of aesthetics still posits a universality – it is potentially available to all.  
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Kant’s ideas may initially seem to have little relevance to a contemporary 
world.  His teleological certainty in the idea of God is at least called into question 
by the plurality of viewpoints in contemporary culture.  And it may be difficult to 
propose a clear distinction between nature and culture when the pervasiveness of 
culture in all aspects of life is evident: it is difficult to look at a park or even a 
shoreline today and not be able to find ways in which economics and politics have 
influenced its geography and appearance.  Nonetheless, Kant’s ideas about the 
aesthetic are still frequently discussed14 and have been taken up by some 
contemporary thinkers.  A key development, as mentioned in Chapter Three, is 
Lyotard’s late 20th century notion of the sublime which takes up Kant’s ideas and 
applies them to postmodern culture.  Here, though, I am going to focus on the way 
in which Kant’s ideas were challenged by Pierre Bourdieu in his 1979 book 
Distinction, and the ways in which Bourdieu’s ideas in turn were challenged by 
Jacques Rancière. 
  
Pierre Bourdieu and Distinction 
In Distinction, Bourdieu suggests that despite Kant’s pretence of equality, 
the type of aesthetic appreciation he is talking about has a class origin.  Bourdieu 
says “Kant strove to distinguish [...] disinterestedness”, which “may take the form 
of moral agnosticism”,15 from “the interest of reason” which drives the working-
class approach to evaluating culture.  He claims that the working class, whose 
popular aesthetic “appears as the negative opposite of the Kantian aesthetic”,16 
expect “every image to explicitly perform a function” and that the working class’ 
“appreciation always has an ethical basis”.17  He also notes that Kant’s prioritising 
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of contemplative over sensational pleasures means that Kant is arguing for a 
“pleasure purified of pleasure”.18   
For Bourdieu this approach is linked to the status of bourgeois art, which 
consists of moving beyond the purely sensational to something more supposedly 
cultivated.  So whilst the working class are stuck with pleasure for its own sake, 
having neither the education nor the time necessary to enjoy it, the privileged 
classes are able to transcend this limitation to find an appreciation of apparently 
greater profundity.  (The choice of Bourdieu’s language, emphasising the “ethical” 
basis of working class appreciation, suggests where his own sympathies lie).  This 
distinction is reproduced throughout society; for example, “to the socially 
recognised hierarchy of the arts [...] corresponds a social hierarchy of the 
consumers”.19  These hierarchies are linked in turn to social status, involving 
“practices which emphasise and exhibit cultural distinctions and differences which 
are a crucial feature of all social stratification”.20  For Bourdieu, aesthetics as 
imagined by Kant are thus part of the construction of a culture predicated on class 
distinctions:    
[T]he privileged classes of bourgeois society replace the difference 
between two cultures, products of history reproduced by education, with 
the basic difference between two natures, one nature naturally cultivated, 
and, another nature naturally natural ... Thus the sanctification of culture 
and art ... fulfils a vital function by contributing to the consecration of the 
social order.21 
 
The aesthetic “‘eye’ is a product of history reproduced by [formal and informal] 
education [...T]he aesthetic disposition, the capacity to consider in and for 
themselves, as form rather than function, [applies to] not only the works designed 
for such apprehension, i.e. legitimate works of art, but everything in the world”.22  
Yet it passes itself off as having its own independent criteria, beyond class 
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stratification and thus appears neutral – hence Rancière characterises Bourdieu’s 
conception of aesthetic’s “denegation of the social”.23   
Bourdieu further argues that the power relations in this structure mean that 
the status of the art work dominates the spectator, since to grasp the art work 
properly from a Kantian perspective requires the spectator to be in thrall to it and 
to be able to appreciate its beauty.  The bourgeois spectator who has acquired 
such “cultural competence” can be pitted against the “naive [working class] 
spectator [...] who cannot attain a specific grasp of works of art which only have 
meaning – or value – in relation to the specific history of an artistic tradition”.24  For 
Bourdieu, in the tradition of aesthetic art the image or art work’s relation to reality 
is unclear.  (The supposedly ‘open’ work is, for him, one example of such a 
tradition).25  It posits itself in its own terms – as independent from social influence 
and as only relatable to its own field.  Learning how to appreciate aesthetically 
therefore requires knowledge of the field of aesthetics, enables the viewer to 
demonstrate the cultural capital of understanding, and legitimises itself through an 
ongoing cyclical process of education in aesthetics and subsequent appreciation 
of them.   Understanding art thus associates the spectator with the dominating 
power of the bourgeoisie and simultaneously reinforces a notion of the inferiority 
of the working class who are unable to appreciate the unique discourse of art.   
Whilst Bourdieu’s argument is supported by his research, a survey 
conducted in France which proved a strong correspondence between class and 
artistic taste (at least during the period he wrote in), I want to contend that his 
arguments fail to grasp a full understanding of how art relates to society.  For 
example, his assumption of form and function as two poles of a binary are 
undermined by his own point about representation for the bourgeois classes.  He 
states that “the most frequent and most spectacular way to shock the bourgeois 
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[...] is to transgress ever more radically the ethical censorships (e.g. in matters of 
sex) which the other classes accept even within the area which the dominant 
disposition defines as aesthetic”.26  Here, in outlining that the content of an art 
work can mount a challenge to bourgeois limits on what can and cannot be 
represented, he suggests a potential link between bourgeois attitudes within life 
itself and bourgeois attitudes within art.  This therefore contradicts any argument 
that the aesthetic will inevitably exist at a remove from reality.   The notion that 
reality is not represented in aesthetic art is also problematic.  The concepts of 
reality and art are not constant but shift.  (To once more quote Brecht, “Reality 
changes; in order to represent it, modes of representation must also change”).27  
And advances in technology, for example, shift how reality can be shown through 
art.  Whilst reality and art may appear to exist as two independent realms, there 
must be times when the two interconnect – even if this is not what the artist or the 
spectator or the culture wants.  Bourgeois (and indeed non-bourgeois) art may 
sometimes fail to fit neatly into its own field, and slip into a space beyond it.  As 
Richard Jenkins says, “In Bourdieu’s scheme of things it is difficult to understand 
the relatively modest innovation of Seurat, let alone the subsequent pace and 
profundity of change represented, say, by Cézanne or Picasso [...] There is 
something profoundly social going on here”.28  One could also suggest a similar 
problem with Bourdieu’s analysis in relation to the effect of the mid-1970s UK 
punk movement, for example, which had a huge impact on society but which was 
born from Malcolm McLaren’s art school beginnings, moving from what Bourdieu 
might characterise as the bourgeois world of art education into a broader cultural 
phenomenon .29  
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Indeed, music is an art form which illustrates several key problems with 
Bourdieu’s argument and where it is possible to find a surprising alliance with 
Kant.  For Bourdieu, music is the art form which is most susceptible to bourgeois 
appropriation because it is the form least allied to a notion of ‘reality’: “Music 
represents the most radical and most absolute form of the negation of the world, 
and especially the social world, which the bourgeois ethos tends to demand of all 
forms of art”.30  He states that the “least inadequate evocations of musical 
pleasure are  those which can replicate the peculiar forms of an experience as 
deeply rooted in the body and in primitive bodily experiences as the tastes of 
food”31 because the ontology of music makes it “the most corporeal”32 of the arts.   
In saying this Bourdieu is seeing some music as more ‘real’ because it is more 
‘corporeal’.  Yet, to revisit Chapter One, the body is culturally marked just as 
language is culturally marked.  And, to revisit Belsey’s distinction from Chapter 
Three, the ‘real’ is beyond what the human being can perceive within her limited 
grasp of the world as ‘reality’.  Because ‘corporeal music’ can be located in the 
body, it is considered “less inadequate” to Bourdieu.  But, to refer to Belsey’s 
notion of the ‘real’ outlined in Chapter Three, it may be possible to argue that 
music which cannot be easily located within everyday sensations in fact gets 
closer to the ungraspable ‘real’.   
Interestingly, Kant agreed that music “plays merely with sensations”,33 for 
him making it the least valued of the arts.34  Whilst agreeing on the ontological 
features of music, and on the relative merit of music as an art form (the double 
negative of Bourdieu’s “least inadequate” arguably reflects his underlying attitude), 
they disagree about the potential threat it might cause.   For Kant it threatens 
‘proper’ art which is appreciated through the rationality of the ‘pure judgement of 
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taste’, for Bourdieu it supports ‘proper’ art and its bourgeois trappings because it 
can so easily be channelled into art removed from the reality present in the 
working class and life itself.   
What is interesting here, I think, is the fear for both that the aesthetic 
brings.  It threatens the security of their intellectual argument, being located in an 
abstract world.  There is at least part of music that cannot be explained in social 
terms.   In fact, the kinds of categorisations attempted by Bourdieu become 
difficult in the varied world of the arts.  Rave music may sit more easily in the 
“function” rather than the “form” pole of Bourdieu’s binary (music for dancing), but 
easy listening, another popular art form, would sit less comfortably in this pole and 
might be seen as prioritising its formal characteristics in such an analysis.  
Bourdieu is keen to present working class entertainments as eschewing aesthetic 
distance, because “being less formalised [...] and less euphemised, they offer 
more direct, more immediate satisfactions”.35  However, many contemporary 
cultural theorists, such as Roland Barthes in Mythologies, show how popular 
entertainment can actually be seen as a highly formalised entertainment, 
dependent on a range of rules and symbols for its success.36  In contrast, whilst 
Bourdieu may claim that art sees itself as being above the profane,37 Bakhtin’s 
dissection of Rabelais (a writer who he suggests has been compared to 
Shakespeare and Voltaire)38 sees profanity as a crucial component of Rabelais’ 
art39 (and indeed many others, including Shakespeare).40   Ultimately, then, I want 
to suggest that any notion of art as being influenced by the social needs to also 
grasp the way in which art is able to challenge the social from its own unique 
place. 
 
                                                          
35
 Bourdieu (1984), p.34  
36
 See Barthes (1973), pp. 15-26 
37
 Bourdieu (1984), p.7 
38
 Bakhtin, p.1 
39
Ibid, p.17 
40
 Ibid, p.11 
137 
 
Rancière and Art  
A different approach which seeks to value rather than fear the 
heterogeneity of art can be seen in the work of Jacques Rancière.  However, 
Rancière does not exist in a simplistic binary opposition to Bourdieu’s work.  
Rancière recognises, as Bourdieu does, the ways in which society can influence 
art.  In a phrase that chimes with the description of Bourdieu’s argument above, 
Gabriel Rockhill states that Rancière “thwarted the artifice at work in the 
discourses [such as art, which were] founded on the singularity of the other by 
revealing the ways in which they are ultimately predicated on keeping the other in 
its place”.41 Like Bourdieu’s notion that the working class are not really interested 
in aesthetics, wanting “every image to explicitly perform a function”,42  Rancière 
notes that ancient Greek society did not see art as being for its artisans, since 
they “do not have the time to devote themselves to anything other than their 
work”43.  And in his description of the “ethical” regime of art which “fit[s] in with the 
distribution of the city’s occupations”44 and the “poetic” regime which “renders the 
arts autonomous [but is] also what links this autonomy to a general order of 
occupations and ways of doing and making”,45 Rancière articulates a view of art 
that sees it as inextricably linked to social movements and hierarchies.   
However, there are many other ways in which Rancière challenges some 
of the notions underpinning Bourdieu’s arguments in Distinction.  Kristin Ross 
outlines Rancière’s critique of Bourdieu thus: 
Rancière [...] attacked Bourdieu and the new sociology as the latest and 
most influential form of a discourse deriving its authority from the presumed 
naïveté or ignorance of its objects of study [...] Rancière uncovered a logic 
whereby the social critic gains by showing democracy losing.  It was, for 
example, all too obvious, he wrote, to say that working –class youth are 
almost entirely excluded from the university system, and that their cultural 
inferiority is a result of their economic inferiority.46 
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There may be a logical connection between levels of access to art and power 
more generally, but this is hardly surprising.  What is debilitating about Bourdieu’s 
analysis is that from his perception of the misfortune of working class youth above 
(and, in the case of Distinction, the working class generally), he develops a theory 
in which the working class themselves have no space within which to see their 
situation.  They are trapped in an inescapable circular logic from which there is no 
escape.  As Richard Jenkins suggests, this can lead to the criticism that “the 
superficiality of his treatment of the working class is matched only by its 
condescension”.47   
In another challenge to Bourdieu’s Distinction, Rancière sees art as being 
able to transcend social colonisation.  In addition to the ethical and the poetic 
regime, he proposes the notion of the ‘aesthetic’ regime of art which  
strictly identifies art in the singular and frees it from any specific rule, from 
any hierarchy of the arts, subject matter, and genres.  Yet it does so by 
destroying the mimetic barrier that distinguished ways of doing and making 
affiliated with art from other ways of doing and making, a barrier that 
separated its rules from the order of social occupations.  The aesthetic 
regime asserts the absolute singularity of art and at the same time 
destroys any pragmatic criterion for isolating this singularity.48 
 
For Rancière, the aesthetic’s ‘singularity’ does not separate it from a social 
function, since via the avant-garde it can invent “sensible forms and material 
structures for a life to come”,49 moving beyond the technique of the representative 
and the ‘sensible’ nature of the mimetic into territory beyond mainstream 
discourse, territory that cannot easily be talked about within language.  The 
aesthetic regime defined by Rancière allows for a celebration of aspects of art that 
are not reducible, not wholly quantifiable, and not able to be mapped on to 
something else.   
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Such a notion articulates the possibility discussed by Terry Eagleton that 
aesthetics might not just reproduce but also question social norms: 
The category of the aesthetic assumes the importance it does in modern 
Europe because in speaking of art it speaks of [...] other matters too, which 
are at the heart of the middle class’s struggle for political hegemony [...] 
But my argument is also that the aesthetic, understood in a certain sense, 
provides an unusually powerful challenge and alternative to these 
dominant ideological forms, and is in this sense an eminently contradictory 
phenomenon.50 
 
Here Eagleton does not dispute the power of social factors in influencing the 
aesthetic, but he does not see the aesthetic in a wholly subordinate position to the 
social.  Rather, he adopts a Gramscian position which introduces the idea of 
hegemony: acknowledging the dominance of class structures whilst seeing any 
set of practices as a contradictory body whose position is “always contested, 
always trying to secure itself, always in ‘process’”.51  Furthermore, the aesthetic, 
existing as it does at a remove from the everyday, has a unique opportunity to 
challenge hegemonic relations.  As Rancière suggests, art “is political because of 
the very distance it takes”.52  Like any discourse, the aesthetic consists of a range 
of heterogeneous elements which can be contradictory.  It is obvious to say that 
aesthetics reflect social relations, but this does not mean that they only reflect 
them.  It is also possible for the social to reflect the aesthetic, as he suggests 
happened when “modern literature contributed to a general reconfiguration of the 
sensible order”,53 or when Schiller’s “aesthetic state” became the “aesthetic 
programme of German romanticism [...] The failure of political revolution was later 
conceived of as the failure of its ontologico-aesthetic model”.54  Art became the 
scapegoat for social failure, but the link was nonetheless acknowledged.  It can 
influence the social because in Rancière’s aesthetic regime “the future of art, its 
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separation from the present of non-art, incessantly restages the past”.55  Art is 
posed as having the potential to point to the future, and when it does stage the 
past, it is a restaging, an opportunity to reimagine what seems familiar.   
According to Jenkins, Bourdieu ends up as “no less reductionist” than 
Kant: “[c]ulture and taste are, for Bourdieu, wholly arbitrary: history and social 
construction are all”.56  In fact, according to Rancière, Kant allows for what 
Bourdieu does not: the possibility for the aesthetic to “suspend [...] the power 
relations which usually structure the experience of the knowing, acting and 
desiring subject”.57  Whilst a Bourdieu perspective suggests that at the moment of 
apprehending the art work, the spectator is able to imagine that he can 
understand or decode it, for Kant there is a tension (or to cite Kant, an antinomy) 
at this moment between the subjective and the objective.  The spectator 
simultaneously has their own response (subjective) whilst relating this response to 
socially codified reasons and responses (objective, at least in appearance).  In this 
antinomy, I would argue, after Rancière, that the spectator is caught in a moment 
where normal power relations are called into question.  For Rancière such a 
moment allows for an egalitarian space where all are able to engage with the work 
presented.  This space is not socially neutral, but neither can it be entirely socially 
controlled since its status as art means that it functions at a remove from everyday 
social relations.  For Rancière, Bourdieu reduces the art work to being only a 
social phenomenon, with its aesthetic nature ignored: “Questions about music 
without music, fictitious questions of aesthetics about photographs when they are 
not perceived as aesthetic, all these produce inevitably what is required by the 
sociologist: the suppression of intermediaries, of points of meeting and exchange 
between the people of reproduction and the elite of distinction”.58  
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However, despite Rancière’s claim, Bourdieu’s suggestion in Distinction 
that “it is the aesthetic point of view that creates the aesthetic object”59 does, 
perhaps subconsciously, recognise the contingency of art and aesthetics: that the 
aesthetic point of view is neither simply a naturally occurring phenomenon nor a 
culturally imposed phenomenon, but a shifting concept.  Rancière seems to chime 
with Bourdieu when he states that “[f]or art to exist, what is required is a specific 
gaze and form of thought to identify it”.60  Kant would of course disagree: for him 
the aesthetic would mark itself as such with its beauty, aligned with nature rather 
than culture, separate from the everyday.   What is interesting about this, I think, is 
that despite differences it is again possible to find agreement: all three view art not 
as solely embedded within the everyday, but as an at least partially distinct realm.   
Even Bourdieu, who sees art as largely a social construction, agrees, albeit 
grudgingly, that “the product of an ‘art’ [...] always contains also something 
ineffable, not through excess, as the celebrants would have it, but by default”.61  It 
is this ‘excess’ that creates its independence, offering what Terry Eagleton calls 
“an alternative to thought”.62   
Despite Rancière’s enthusiasm for the avant-garde, which he saw as the 
epitome of his aesthetic regime, he is keen to not map any one form of aesthetics 
to a specific politics.  He states “there are no criterion for establishing a 
correspondence between aesthetic virtue and political virtue”.63  He also notes the 
way in which Futurism and Constructivism was related not only to social change, 
but also to advertising.64  However, he notes that “there are politics of art that are 
perfectly identifiable”.65  Where his ideas differ from conventional notions of 
political art, however, is where he suggests that “[i]f this politics coincides with an 
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act of constructing political dissensus, that is something that the art in question 
does not control”.66  For Rancière, art may or may not chime with political events; 
that is not something that can be directly mapped without a full understanding of 
the complexities of each social and political situation.  The notion I have outlined 
above is again pertinent: that of two independent discourses which nonetheless 
may sometimes interconnect.   
For Rancière, seeing either art as being in the service of politics or politics 
as being in the service of art may dampen the radical potential of each.  It is 
important that art and politics do not attempt to fuse, since “to want to make 
politics and art disappear as singular processes, is to miss the singular effects that 
they can bring about and to return them to the logic of consensus”.67  It is 
aesthetics and politics’ very separation from the everyday that gives them their 
unique power.  They have the potential to imagine what might be possible, rather 
than what is; to “set up a tension (or contradiction) between reality – the way we 
live – and the felt capacities of human beings”.68  But to attempt to mix them would 
be for them to return to the everyday, making them serve each other, losing their 
potential to articulate a unique space.  In this Rancière’s attitude is similar to 
Adorno’s view that “the notion of a ‘message’ in art, even when politically radical, 
already contains an accommodation to the world”.69   
Rancière is not, however, arguing that art has no relation to social life, just 
that it exists in its own autonomous realm alongside social life.  How this realm is 
characterised differs from critic to critic.  For Adorno, art “holds fast to the idea of 
reconciliation in an antagonistic world”.70  For Rancière, on the other hand, rather 
than creating consensus it can create dissensus (like other potentially “dissensual” 
behaviours such as politics) because it can “involve forms of innovation that tear 
                                                          
66
 Ibid, p.62 
67
 Corcoran, S., Introduction to Rancière (2010a), p.3 
68
 Whybrow, p.280  
69
 Adorno, T (2007) ‘Commitment’ in Adorno et al, p.193 
70
 Eagleton (1990), p.354 
143 
 
bodies from their assigned places and free speech and expression from all 
reduction to functionality”.71  For him “through the ‘free play’ of aestheticization” 
the “field of experience [is] severed from its traditional reference points”.72  
Conventions, including conventions of thought and behaviour, are challenged.  
And for Bourdieu, there is often a conflict “between the intrinsic necessity of the 
work of art which demands that it be continued, improved and completed, and 
social pressures which direct the work from outside”.73  Again, the differences are 
striking, but so are the similarities.  For all three, art holds up the promise of a 
different world.  
Rancière attempts to articulate how this might happen.  For him, the 
suspension of ordinary relations in art and politics is potentially an egalitarian one, 
since it suggests a space where anyone can speak or listen (or sing, listen, paint 
or look).74  This equality is not something to be striven towards, but a point of 
departure.  This is to say that whilst access to making or looking at the arts (or, for 
that matter, political speech) may not be egalitarian right now, influenced as it 
inevitably will be by social factors, there is an egalitarian potential in the principles 
of both discourses: discourses which are theoretically open to everyone.  Here, 
then, he slips away from Bourdieu’s determinism75 to suggest the possibility of 
change.  Ultimately, he boldly and rhetorically proposes that this can initiate a 
“generative principle for a world without domination”.76   
For Rancière the work of art, like the discourses of aesthetics and politics, 
stands as “self-sufficient”.  The “simple solitude of the work” is a solitude which 
“authorizes [...] the purity of internal contradiction, [...] the dissonance by which the 
work testifies to the non-reconciled world”.77  These contradictions are held within 
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the work which cannot resolve them, held in “tension between contraries”.78  It is 
this “aesthetic strangeness” that cannot be fully colonised by the social, a 
strangeness that can “carry the promise of a new sensible world”,79 a world where 
“testimony and fiction come under the same regime of meaning”80 and therefore 
what is known as experience and what can be imagined through art are given 
equal weight.  This is not some kind of manifesto for making a contradictory art 
work, however.  It is about allowing responses to, and aspects of, the work to exist 
in tension; a tension that has to be resolved beyond the structures of everyday life 
in the psyche of the subject.  Rancière gives the example of Adorno’s linking of 
diminished seventh chords with “the salons of the nineteenth century”.  Rather 
than eliminating them as part of a politically correct project, however, he suggests 
that “[o]ne day, however, we really must face up to the obvious fact that we can 
still hear them”.81  If the nineteenth century is evoked by diminished seventh 
chords, music cannot be reduced to this.  It contains these chords amongst other 
heterogeneous elements. 
 
Ethics, Artistic Antinomy and Artistic Autonomy 
This notion of the aesthetic as a heterogeneous force, living next to but not 
within the social, means that Rancière is wary of what he terms “the ethical turn” in 
artistic practice.  This ‘turn’ focuses on what he calls the desire to “restore lost 
meaning to a common world or repair the cracks in the social bond”.82  For 
Rancière, this social restoration is viewed as necessary because of horrific events 
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such as the Holocaust.  Adorno’s “it is barbaric to write poetry after Auschwitz”83 is 
one such starting point: the type of approach which is outlined by Žižek thus:  
[T]he reference to the Holocaust as the ultimate, unthinkable, apolitical 
crime, as the Evil so radical that it cannot be politicized (accounted for by a 
political dynamic), serves as the operator which allows us to depoliticize 
the social sphere, to warn against the presumption of politicization.  The 
Holocaust is the name for the unthinkable apolitical excess of politics itself: 
it compels us to subordinate politics to some more fundamental ethics.84 
 
The contemporary “war on terror” is another such event calling for a nebulous 
concept of consensus, a ‘coming together in difficult times’ to overcome a totalised 
evil.  There is a public malaise in response to such horror for which, Rancière 
suggests, George W. Bush’s controversial desire for “infinite justice” was “only too 
fitting”;85 a boundless and totalising term which means that “[w]ar against terror 
and infinite justice then fall into a state of indistinction, occasioned by a 
preventative justice which attacks anything that is sure, or at least likely, to trigger 
terror, anything that threatens the social bond holding the community together”.86  
In such an ‘ethical’ dimension the search for an ideology that can restore security 
to the social body brings about what Steven Corcoran has characterised as an 
“ethical attitude of infinite respect for otherness”.87 Political dissensus thus 
becomes associated with the criminal or deviant, and the hope for change 
becomes sublimated into a desire for consensus.   
The consequence for aesthetics, Rancière argues, is that theories such as 
Lyotard’s rewriting of Kant’s sublime, in their desire to eschew totalitarianism, 
become poised to deliver ethically appropriate art.  In doing so, Rancière 
suggests, the heterogeneity of art and its dissensual complexity is displaced by 
unifying theory, blunting art’s dissensual potential.  He gives the example of the 
shift in Godard’s films, where “what was once a clash of images [in the 60s] 
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became a fusion [in the 80s]”.88  In such an attempt to assimilate disparate 
elements of an art work Rancière detects a “fantasy of [...] purity”89 which can be 
aligned with the ethical turn, which can ultimately be linked with the desire for 
‘infinite justice’. For Bush, this can mean justice at any price, even the atrocities in 
Abu Ghraib, and even, in the famous words of George Bush’s supposed political 
opponent Madeleine Albright, “the price [of half a million dead children as a result 
of US sanctions in Iraq] is worth it”.90  In addition, the danger of focusing on 
“ultimate, unthinkable, apolitical crimes” is that, as Eagleton puts it, that “the 
abandonment of utopia” 91 occurs, with humanity losing the capacity to imagine 
that things can be different, replacing politics with a desire for the ethical.   
Politically, Rancière’s project of dissensus chimes with Chantal Mouffe’s 
The Democratic Paradox.  In it, she argues that the ethical approaches can “either 
avoid or do not emphasise enough the need to put some limits to pluralism, and 
they do not acknowledge the hegemonic nature of every possible consensus and 
the ineradicable violence that this implies”.92  However, she notes, unlike 
Rancière, that ethics can be “conducive to apprehending the limits of reason and 
to conceptualising the plurality of values”93 in a democracy.  The need for change 
in the political sphere, she suggests, can be contrasted with the rights for all to 
have a voice in the ethical sphere.  Mouffe suggests that it is not possible to 
resolve elements into a unified whole where all members of a democracy are 
always addressed.  Instead, she argues for the possibility of discarding “the 
illusion of a possible reconciliation of ethics and politics and to come to terms with 
the never ending interrogation of the political by the ethical”.94  These two 
discourses are to be kept in tension and not subsumed into a binary in the way 
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they are in Rancière’s conception of the ethical.  This tension is developed 
throughout the book as the notion of “agonistic pluralism”, which holds “tension 
between its constitutive elements [...] to harness it in a productive way”.95  Like 
Rancière on aesthetics, she suggests that the tension is productive and ultimately 
politically significant; avoiding any attempt to subsume differences and erase 
different individuals or groups’ needs.  Indeed, for her this agonistic pluralism, 
rather than attempting to resolve elements within it, can suggest the possibility of 
a truly liberal democracy: “by warning us against the illusion that a fully achieved 
democracy could ever be instantiated, it forces us to keep the democratic 
contestation alive”.96  For Mouffe, this ‘agonism’ is to be distinguished from the 
notion of “antagonism”, a state that can also be strategically important and for 
which she argued in her earlier book Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (co-
authored with Ernest Laclau).  In ‘antagonism’, tension exists between “enemies 
[...] who have no common symbolic space”, whereas agonism suggests rather 
“friendly enemies”.97  In both cases, though, Mouffe is keen to sustain rather than 
ameliorate tension.   
Mouffe’s call informs Claire Bishop’s call for “antagonist” art practices 
rather than “art practices that seek to create a harmonious space of inter-
subjective encounter [...which] risk neutralising the capacity of critical reflection”.98  
Bishop also cites Rancière as an influence, noting that his argument for the 
aesthetic regime  
is predicated precisely on a confusion between art’s autonomy (its position 
at one remove from instrumental rationality) and heteronomy (its blurring of 
art and life).  Untangling this knot – or ignoring it by seeking more concrete 
ends for art – is slightly to miss the point, since the aesthetic is, according 
to Rancière, the ability to think contradiction.99   
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For Bishop, “[t]he best collaborative practices of the past ten years address this 
contradictory pull between autonomy and social intervention, and reflect on this 
antinomy both in the structure of the work and in the conditions of its reception”.100  
Bishop sees a tendency in contemporary art makers to compromise their artistic 
practice in a desire to ‘do good’, “foreground[ing] the extent to which “ethical 
judgements” and a “generalised set of moral precepts” govern the goals and 
analysis of such work in lieu of aesthetic criteria”.101  Bishop posits Rirkrit 
Tiravanija and Liam Gillick as such artists, and instead suggests artists such as 
Santiago Sierra, Thomas Hirschhorn, Francis Alÿs and Alexsandra Mir as artists 
who support her requirement for antinomy.102  However, Shannon Jackson points 
out that Bishop thus starts to undo her own antinomy, since she herself starts to 
label art as “good” or “bad” depending on its adherence to her set of principles.  
For Jackson, “clarity about whether or not something is legible or illegible, feel-
good or antagonistic, committed or uncommitted is erroneous at best”.103  Jackson 
argues that Bishop becomes over-simplistic and over-dependent on binary 
oppositions, ultimately falling into the trap identified by Rancière of wanting to 
colonise what the art is, and missing out the “knot” of “contradiction” which she 
herself argues for.   
However, her choice of the Kantian term “antinomy” which holds 
contradictory elements together is interesting in the light of this chapter which has 
tried to suggest the connections as well as the differences between writers from 
different periods and traditions.  To continue this ‘antinomic’ approach, Raymond 
Williams’ essay ‘The Creative Mind’ might initially seem to see art in different 
terms from Rancière.  However, I wish to suggest that it is possible to find 
connections as well as differences between these two writers from different 
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periods and contexts.  For Williams, art does not exist in a vacuum but as part of a 
social context.  He states that “communication is at the crux of art”104 and that 
“nobody can see (not understand, but see) the artist’s actual work unless he and 
the artist can come to share the complex details and means of a learned 
communication system”.105  He would therefore seem to see a shared 
understanding as being essential between art and life, as well as artist and 
audience, with meaning passing directly between the two.  Moreover, in stating 
that when the concept of art as ‘creative’ was “extended to a contrast between art 
and life, between art and ordinary experience, the consequences were very 
damaging”,106 he seems to be suggesting that the idea of art moving too far away 
from life as being potentially problematic.  This would appear to be an attitude far 
removed from the concept of the aesthetic that I have argued Rancière and, in 
their different ways, Bourdieu and Kant, are talking about, which sees art as an 
autonomous realm. 
However, on closer inspection one can begin to find useful connections 
between their writings.   Williams is clear that whilst art is linked to experience, it is 
not experience itself: “The special nature of the artist’s work is his use of a learned 
skill in a particular kind of transmission of experience”.107  The arts function as 
“developments from general communication”108 as the artist channels responses 
to contemporary experience into artistic media with a “substantial number of the 
offered meanings [becoming…] composed into new common meanings”.109  
Rancière is actually articulating a similar view of the artist’s relation to society in 
his articulation of the aesthetic regime, since he indicates the aesthetic’s radical 
difference from everyday life as being its ability to comment on it.  His notion of the 
aesthetic offers new ways of imagining, of work that understands its social 
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necessity but which defines its own rules, of work at the vanguard of creation. He 
does not argue that all art does this: his notion of the “ethical” or “poetic” regimes 
of art described above, for example, are conceptually limited by contemporary 
understanding, doomed to remain in a reproduction of it – albeit in an altered, 
artistic form.  The aesthetic regime, on the other hand, is paradoxically both inside 
and outside the existing order.  It lies beyond everyday existence, but this 
separation from the everyday is what gives it its social charge.  For both Rancière 
and Williams, then, social relations are at the centre of art.  And yet for neither is 
this about subsuming art to a purely social function.  To quote Bishop, “for 
Rancière the aesthetic doesn’t need to be sacrificed at the altar of social change, 
as it already contains this ameliorative promise”.110  Rather, it is about recognising 
art as a social function in itself that creates its own parameters.   
Indeed, even Marx did not see art as something to be ultimately 
subordinated to politics.  For Marx “art is a form of creative surplus” which 
“contrasts with enforced labour”,111 something to be striven towards.  This surplus 
comes from the “excessive subjectivity of the worker”, which “remains outside 
capital as capital’s own negation and as the worker’s possibility of transcendence 
and freedom”.112  Therefore as the worker becomes increasingly emancipated, 
there is an increasing possibility for leisure activities (including art) that engage the 
worker with his own potential.  For Marx this might be a post-revolutionary fantasy, 
but Rancière gives the example of two workers in the seventeenth century 
describing a day in the countryside in the most detailed aesthetic way: the “leisure 
of aesthetes who enjoy the landscape’s forms and light and shade”.113  For 
Rancière then, aesthetic enjoyment is available to all and is not, as Bourdieu 
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claims, exclusive to some.  Rather, as Marx suggests, it is the worker’s relation to 
leisure time that limits her from participating in aesthetic activities more fully. 
In contemporary culture where the internet may offer a wealth of leisure 
activities which are influenced by a range of agendas, including commercial and 
politically dubious ones, it may seem hard to argue for leisure as being inherently 
progressive.  But, Marx is articulating something else here: not just the worker as 
a consumer of art but also as a maker of art.  For Rancière it was precisely this 
double nature of the actor which so threatened the Platonic republic:  
[T]he mimetician is, by definition, a double being.  He does two things at 
once, whereas the principle of a well-organised community is that each 
person only does the one thing that they were destined to do by their 
‘nature’ [...] He sets up a stage for what is common to the community with 
what should determine the confinement of  each person to his or her place 
[...] It removes the artisan from ‘his’ place, the domestic sphere of work, 
and gives him ‘time’ to occupy the space of public discussions and take on 
the identity of a deliberative citizen.  The mimetic act of splitting in two, 
which is at work in theatrical space, consecrates this duality and makes it 
visible.114 
 
Indeed, art is not something that only happens in arts centres or in ways 
sanctioned by the Arts Council.  Clifford Geertz argues that Western societies are 
unique in positing a difference between art and the wider social context, and that 
in other cultures it is an integral part of everyday life in the form of ritual or 
celebratory events, for instance.115  Human beings create, as part of life, moments 
that can be considered artistic.  We can create plates of food that have great 
visual beauty (and regardless of Kant’s opinion, isn’t the taste a kind of aesthetic 
experience too?).  When describing Brecht’s street accident the witness can 
reveal an unerring awareness of the driver’s arrogance.116  The song sung during 
work can bring tears to a listener’s eye.  All of these contain an element beyond 
their immediate utilitarian function, of something that lies beyond the everyday.  
They do not, either, fit with a consciously poetic reflection of the everyday.  Such 
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elements do fit with Rancière’s definition of a “destr[uction of] the mimetic barrier 
that distinguished ways of doing and making affiliated with art from other ways of 
doing and making”.117  They do more than just reproduce the expectation of such 
a moment, producing rather a moment that is difficult to comprehend in any realm 
other than the aesthetic realm of art.  
This conception of art sees as false any division between the notion of art 
as either being subsumed to a social function or being consigned, in the Kantian 
model, to being “removed from the scope of common and community life”,118 or as 
being part of a bourgeois “aesthetic disposition” in the Bourdieu model.119  Rather, 
it suggests that because art “breaks open a dimension inaccessible to other 
experience, a dimension in which human beings, nature and things no longer 
stand under the law of the established reality principle”,120 new possibilities of life 
can be imagined for both makers and viewers alike.  And it suggests that this is 
possible for all.  To quote Jonothan Neelands, “Every member of the group is 
seen as a potential producer – a potential artist”.121   
 
 
Rancière, Social Practice and Theatre 
 
In their different ways, I have tried to propose that Kant, Bourdieu, 
Rancière and Williams all see art, via the notion of the aesthetic, as potentially 
important for both holding society in place and for imagining new futures.  
However, I have also outlined ways in which Rancière, along with writers such as 
Mouffe and Bishop, suggest that art, like politics and other discourses, contain a 
range of heterogeneous elements that cannot be easily resolved and which sit in a 
state of productive tension within the work.  I now wish to turn to the issue of 
theatre itself, and to consider how these issues that can be applied to a range of 
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art forms might be of particular relevance for theatre.  In particular, since I have 
argued that they are particularly interesting for my thesis, I want to consider how 
Rancière’s theories can be applied to theatre. 
Despite Rancière’s anxiety to maintain independence between the 
discourses of aesthetics and politics, he nonetheless asserts “the plurality of ways 
in which they are linked.  On the one hand, politics [...] has its own specific 
aesthetics [...] On the other, aesthetics has its own specific politics”.122  He 
suggests that aesthetics is political in the sense that it both asserts itself as an 
independent discourse, but also because it offers the social possibility of life being 
different.  In terms of theatre, according to Hallward, for Rancière 
political performance [....] takes place in the gap between two extremes, 
and ends when the performers identify with either pole.  On the one hand, 
there are the actors themselves, action in its direct and unmediated state 
[...] On the other hand, there is the role to be played, pure play 
uncontaminated by the grubby complexities of context or personality [...] 
The only place they can occupy is the one between themselves and their 
role – between Rousseau’s sincerity and Diderot’s technique.  Politics is 
extinguished when the distance between actor and role collapses into a 
paranoid and definitive immediacy.123 
 
The stage actor is thus a political actor.  As Hallward notes, this uncertainty 
embedded in the process of acting can cause a fear of theatre that dates back to 
Plato: “If Plato is especially hostile to theatre it is because those who speak on the 
stage do not speak in their own name and do not identify with or authenticate what 
they say”.124  It opens up a dissensual space such as that articulated by Rancière, 
a space that cannot be reduced to either role or actor.  In this liminal space, 
Marvin Carlson discusses, citing Victor Turner and reminiscent of the views of 
Richard Schechner outlined in Chapter Two, “not so much the “set-apartness of 
performance but its “in-betweenness”, its function as transition between two states 
of more settled or more conventional cultural activity”.125  Not only does 
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performance often blur the boundaries between truth and illusion, but there is also 
an inherent duality in the simultaneous reality of the live performative event 
alongside its existence as “restored behaviour”, or, to use Schechner’s 
terminology more precisely in the case of theatre, as “restored restored 
behaviour”.126  Carlson similarly states that “objects and actions in performance 
are neither totally “real” nor totally “illusory”, but share aspects of each”.127  
Theatre is simultaneously both unreal and a representational staging that, in order 
to be understood, can be held against what is known.   
In addition to the kinds of politics posited by aesthetics, the aesthetics 
provided by politics are also important: politics “has its own modes of dissensual 
invention of scenes and of characters of demonstrations and statements, which 
distinguish it from, and sometimes even oppose it to, the invention of art”.128  For 
Rancière “politics is about the establishment of a theatrical and artificial sphere”.129  
The theatrical language of both these quotations is notable.  Indeed, Peter 
Hallward goes so far as to suggest that Rancière proposes a “theatrocracy”.130  
The metaphor of theatre is utilised to suggest that political moments such as “the 
East German crowds crying “we are the people” against their statist 
incorporation”131 introduce “a supplementary speech that is irreducible to the 
constraints of social place”.132  This “supplementary” speech, like the “excessive” 
subjectivity of Marx’s worker, suggests the articulation of a different possibility for 
a society.  To quote Hallward, “mimesis confounds the order of function and 
place”.133  In contrast, Rancière suggests the police’s “Move along!  There’s 
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nothing to see here!”134 as doing the opposite: refusing the potential for politics to 
appear, refusing the possibility of a rearticulation of social behaviour.   
In both cases, there is an awareness of the social significance of what 
might be termed theatrical acts, and of the theatrical significance of what might be 
termed social acts.  As Nicholas Ridout recognises, “theatre is a social art form.  It 
tends to represent people in social relationships with one another, rather than in 
isolation”.135  Such awareness can be traced back to the Greeks.  As outlined 
above, for Plato theatre was socially dangerous since watching and hearing 
characters of an unsavoury nature could have an unhealthy effect on its spectator, 
who would “begin to excuse his own vices [...T]herefore let us put an end to such 
tales, lest they engender laxity of morals in the young”.136  In this Plato assumes a 
passive spectator manipulated by an active performer.  Furthermore, the imitation 
offered by acting would potentially fragment the performer and the spectator’s 
identity as he loses his grip on his true self, a situation “unsuitable for Our State, in 
which human nature is not twofold or manifold, for one man plays one part 
only”.137  The stage thus is seen as “disturb[ing] the clear partition of identities, 
activities, and spaces”.138  As Joe Kelleher summarises, for Plato “actorly 
representation, or mimesis, which involves the actor in a division between himself 
and the character he is imitating or inventing, is a sign of human weakness. It is 
also a means of provoking weakness in others, and hence a threat to or an 
infection of the body politic”.139  John O’Toole suggests that Plato “confused fiction 
with untruth”,140 as not recognising the fact that dramatic art is clearly framed as 
fictional, as nonetheless existing as a reflection on real life, and that this is 
understood by both spectator and performer.  However, O’Toole goes on to make 
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a telling comment: “In his imaginary perfect Republic, human nature might not be 
manifold, contradictory and ambiguous, but in any real world it assuredly is”.141  In 
this O’Toole, perhaps unknowingly, makes a comparison between the process of 
acting and the socialised individual who is engaged in a variety of contrasting 
roles or performances within his life.  Acting, or fiction, is thus paradoxically 
‘truthful’, since it reflects the way in which the individual behaves in the social 
body.  And in devised theatre, to return to the subject of this thesis, the act of 
acting may be particularly socially significant since it suggests a tendency for the 
individual to participate in the creation of such roles, as she does in her own life.  
In differing ways for both Plato and O’Toole’s critique of Plato, then, acting has an 
inherent social significance, suggesting a danger of how society might operate for 
Plato and how it actually does operate for O’Toole.  And although O’Toole may 
disagree with Plato’s fear of theatre, he is actually in agreement with him about 
the presence of a vital link between theatre and life. 
Plato’s conception of theatre can be contrasted with Aristotle’s, which 
provided the recipe, according to Brecht, for the drama of his time,142 and arguably 
still does.  Aristotle does not see theatre as threatening in the same way – at least, 
not in all cases.  For Aristotle, theatre can improve the harmony of a society by 
offering an “artwork which takes on its own independent and separate life”143 from 
the everyday, meaning it is possible that what Jonothan Neelands has called 
“something more perfect through the representative” 144 can be created.  For 
Aristotle, however, the apparently autonomous work of art actually conceals that 
what can be represented and what the potential response should (and can) be is 
highly controlled: 
It should imitate actions which excite pity and fear, this being the distinctive 
mark of tragic imitation.  It follows plainly, in the first place, that the change 
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of fortune presented must not be the spectacle of a virtuous man brought 
from prosperity to adversity: for this moves neither pity nor fear; it merely 
shocks us.  Nor again, that of a bad man passing from adversity to 
prosperity: for nothing can be more alien to the spirit of Tragedy; it 
possesses no single tragic quality; it neither satisfies the moral sense nor 
calls forth pity or fear.145   
 
Augusto Boal describes Aristotle’s notion of “exciting pity and fear” in the 
spectator, through catharsis, as “a powerful system of coercion”,146 and instead 
argues (via Brecht) for the spectator to be turned into a spect-actor, a participant 
instead of a passive observer.  In conventional theatre the passive observer, the 
argument goes, stays passive and sees himself as unable to change things.  The 
possibility of acting is left to the actors but is not open to everyone.  And any 
possibility of change, the argument goes, is ultimately dissipated in a theatre form 
that reinforces the passivity of the majority. 
In turn, Rancière challenges this notion.  For him, any assumption that 
there is an opposition between activity/passivity is a particular “distribution of the 
sensible”.147  For Rancière, according to Gabriel Rockhill, there are many such 
distributions which function as “an implicit law governing the sensible order that 
parcels out places and forms of participation in a common world by first 
establishing the modes of perception within which these are inscribed”.148  Such a 
distribution appears invisible since it is normalised within society and the 
individuals within it, and usually functions to disempower the individual.  In The 
Emancipated Spectator he argues that in twentieth century theatre makers keen to 
overcome this passivity and effect social change, such as he sees in practitioners 
as diverse as Brecht and Artaud, there is an assumption of inequality between the 
performer and the spectator that needs to be effaced.  Rancière links this to his 
work on education in The Ignorant Schoolmaster, where he suggested that most 
teachers assume an inequality between themselves and their pupil.  Even when 
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keen to challenge this relationship, he suggests “[I]s it not precisely the desire to 
abolish the distance that creates it?”149  For Rancière the well-meaning theatre 
maker such as Boal, Brecht or Artaud, anxious to redress his abuse of power as a 
theatre producer, is recast as someone who perpetuates his power as he 
disavows it.   
For Rancière, this assumption of seated spectator as passive, or an 
equation of passivity in the theatre with passivity outside the theatre, is far too 
simplistic.  Instead, Rancière suggests, equality could be a presupposition of what 
is possible in the suspension of normal relations offered by art.  Rancière 
proposes seeing spectators themselves as artists: “spectators see, feel and 
understand something in as much as they compose their own poem, as, in their 
way, do actors or playwrights, directors, dancers or performers”.150  For him there 
is nothing wrong with distance between people: it “is not an evil to be abolished, 
but the normal condition of any communication”.151  Again, The Ignorant 
Schoolmaster makes a similar point: “People are united because they are people, 
that is to say, distant beings.  Language doesn’t unite them.  On the contrary, it is 
the arbitrariness of language that makes them try to communicate by forcing them 
to translate – but also puts them in a community of intelligence”.152   In the process 
of communication, as discussed in Chapter Three, two or more people are 
communicating and all are essential to the process. Rancière says, “Every 
spectator is already an actor in her story; every actor, every man of action, is the 
spectator of the same story”.153   Both enter into a relationship of communication, 
and listening/spectating is as valuable as speaking/performing in that moment.  
This is not, of course, to deny the importance of speech to those disenfranchised 
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politically.  But politics is not aesthetics, is not art, and has its own discursive 
features.  It is the distance in aesthetics that allows for freedom of thought. 
The notion of distance created by art is similar to the distance created by 
the political eruptions Rancière characterises as theatrical, where “an untutored 
expression of the people [...is put] at a maximum distance from the community’s 
sense of itself”.154  This distance allows it to see itself and creates a space to think.  
This space is what he sees in the notion of the statue outlined by Schiller in 
Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man, which is “closed on itself”,155  meaning 
that it has a “free appearance”.156  In a neo-Kantian formulation, the spectator is 
given space by the autonomy of the work to contemplate it.  Again like Kant, it is a 
“resistant volume”157  which the viewer can only keep a distance from.  Unlike 
Kant, he formulates a theory which includes not just the observer and the thing, 
but also “a third thing” between the two “that is owned by no one, but which 
subsists between them, excluding any uniform transmission, and identity of cause 
and effect”.158  This ‘third thing’ is unpredictable and therefore impossible to limit, 
since it exists in the individual response. 
Despite opposing the authoritarian basis of Plato’s argument, for Rancière 
Plato is therefore right in recognising the subversive power of theatre to offer a 
unique space of perception for the viewer, meaning, to quote Hallward, that “it is 
Aristotle, rather than Plato, who is Rancière’s most significant adversary”.159  
Aristotle’s attempt to control theatre is doomed to fail.  Instead, Rancière 
reformulates Plato’s conception of an audience, which Rancière characterises as 
the notion of a group of “ignoramuses [who] are invited to see people suffering”,160 
into the political possibility of an individual spectator able to interact with the 
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performance in her own way.  The actor is specifically a ‘man of action’ who is 
able to participate in creating his own stories, and he hears others’ stories as he 
works on his own.  This story takes on a life of its own and is witnessed by the 
spectator as it becomes an aesthetic work.  The spectator similarly views this 
creation of stories and develops her own relation to them and to her own stories, 
stories which she continuously creates and acts out in her life.  This link between 
theatre and life, with the spectator simultaneously a performer and the performer 
simultaneously a spectator, can be particularly related to the notion of devising 
theatre, where the devisor’s creation of roles, stories, images and other theatrical 
material is conceived of as part of a process.  A spectator himself can be seen as 
a devisor, as he develops his own creative response to the work he sees.  As 
such devised performance can be conceived of as political in its social nature.  It 
can be related to everyday life but is also clearly separated from it.  Like O’Toole’s 
suggestion that Plato mistakenly connects “fiction” and “untruth” mentioned above, 
devised theatre has the potential to sit both within and beyond life for both makers 
and watchers. 
In the theatrical co-presence of a performer and a spectator (and for 
Rancière “there is no theatre without a spectator”),161 the principal feature of 
theatre, or what Alan Read calls a “‘face to face’ relation”,162 the self is made to 
encounter an ‘other’ that exists between the viewer and the art work.  This ‘other’ 
is a complex phenomenon: for Read, not a bipartite but a tripartite relationship: 
“There is, in the act of theatre, the performer, the audience and you [...] This 
relationship, three as a crowd, maintains the essence of ‘difference’.163  Read 
invokes here the notion of theatre as offering something that cannot be reduced to 
either the self or the other.  Lesley Wade Soule suggests a slightly different 
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threesome of “performer, spectator and character”.164  To conflate the two, one 
might suggest the co-presence of an external dialogue between 
spectator/audience and performer/character, but also an internal dialogue within 
the spectator/audience and performer/character, as each negotiates the role 
assigned to them by the theatrical event.  This multiplicity of perspectives is one 
element of Hallward’s notion of Rancière’s theatocracy.  He claims, “Rancière 
privileges multiplicity over unity.  A theatocratic democracy is never monological 
for the simple reason that ‘there is no voice of the people.  There are scattered 
voices and polemics which in each instance divide the identity that they stage”.165 
  
Conclusion – Part Two 
For Žižek, Rancière’s writings are “one of the consistent conceptualisations 
of how we are to continue to resist”.166  Ultimately Rancière is, however, vague 
about the ways in which his ideas can be applied by those who want to facilitate 
change in a specific social situation.  Indeed, in the case of The Ignorant 
Schoolmaster, he points out ways in which attempts to include his ideas of 
universal teaching in the school system failed.167  Instead, his focus is more on 
creating a dissensual space which may yield change, it may not.  For Hallward, 
this dissensual disruption of boundaries, or what he calls “innovative blurring” of 
boundaries between the theatrical and the non-theatrical, “can only continue, in 
the domain of both politics and art, if it is illuminated by a decisive commitment 
that is itself organised, unequivocal, categorical and combative”.168 I am also 
mindful of Shannon Jackson’s point that “when a political art discourse too often 
celebrates social disruption at the expense of social coordination, we lose a more 
complex sense of how art practices contribute to inter-dependent social 
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imagining”.169  My purpose in this thesis is ultimately to articulate such social 
imagining, to propose a vision of devised theatre that can be fused with an 
appropriate pedagogy.   
In the final part of this thesis, then, I am going to attempt to suggest ways 
in which the ideas in Part Two of the thesis can be applied to a pedagogical 
praxis.  In the models of language, creativity and social practice I have outlined, I 
want to suggest three common features to these frames through which art can be 
perceived.   
First, all three contain structures that exist and which the student and 
teacher as speakers, creators and social beings come into contact with. Through 
art the human subject collides with ways in which people speak, create and 
socially function and finds herself in a dialogue with these structures.  The human 
agent is not able to articulate herself wholly freely in response to these structures, 
but neither is she unable to articulate any kind of response.  She is both inside 
and outside the structures, which constrain her but also provide a way to speak, 
create and socially function.   
Second, all three frames engage with aspects of an artistic process: of 
speaking, creating and socially being.  As such, they function not just as a means 
to an artistic end but as an end in themselves where what the person does 
achieves something in the moment: as an act of speech, an act of creation, and as 
a social act.   
The enactment is not only a practical thing, but something of wider 
significance.  In its unique iteration, it offers reflection on existing perspectives. 
This leads to the third common feature.  They all offer the possibility of 
simultaneous action and reflection – praxis.   In acts of speech, creativity and 
social practice lie not only opportunities for creation, but also for reflection.   In the 
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doing and understanding of human activities such as language, creativity and 
social practice concepts are debated and created in an ongoing dialogue.   
I will use these three features to inform a pedagogical approach 
appropriate to devised theatre in Part Three of the thesis.   In particular I will argue 
that the notion of praxis is particularly useful to understanding what both pedagogy 
and devised theatre can be.  In praxis, the act is important in itself and is not a 
means to an end.  It opens up a space for debate.  It harnesses fluidity and 
process over a prescriptive set of demands.  It suggests the possibility of both 
devised theatre and pedagogy as an ongoing process of reflection and creation.   
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CHAPTER SIX – PRAXIS AND PEDAGOGY 
 
 In the last chapter, I outlined my interest in the work of Jacques Rancière, and 
suggested that his notion of art as a dissensual realm, which can paradoxically 
obtain its greatest social import by situating itself outside the everyday, is of 
particular use for my thesis.  However, I also outlined that Rancière himself is 
reluctant to align himself to direct practice, and that his work is more interested in 
proposing the possibility of a dissensual realm than conceiving what this might 
actually look like.  This approach is strategic for Rancière, allowing him to avoid 
prescribing specifics that might harden into a concrete approach.  For him such an 
approach might limit the possibilities which a dissensual realm might take, and 
mean that it becomes channelled into a prescriptive “distribution of the sensible”1 
rather than retaining autonomy through its multiplicity of possible articulations.  
However, since my aim in this thesis is to consider devised theatre in 
relation to making and teaching, I do wish to propose some specific suggestions.  
Throughout the thesis I have used the term praxis to suggest how devised theatre 
might be conceptualised.  In the Introduction I defined praxis as a “unity of theory 
and practice”.  In this chapter I seek to propose a pedagogic approach to devised 
theatre which harnesses a notion of praxis.  I wish to propose devised theatre as 
an activity which is thought about and created in tandem; an activity which offers a 
social opportunity for the creativity of individual students, audiences and 
performers to be connected in a plethora of profound ways.  Such creation is more 
likely to be owned by a range of participants than in traditional theatrical models, 
such as that where the playwright or director is seen as omniscient.  I would 
suggest that such creativity is not only a practical activity centred on the creation 
of theatre but also involves creative theorising, developing ways in which art might 
be imagined and how it might interrelate with life.   
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In Chapter Two I outlined Jonothan Neelands’ notion of theatre as a lens 
that is “a window for looking into ‘nature’”.2  It is the means through which the 
familiar can be viewed anew.  It can be an active process through which students 
devise outcomes that help them to think about the world.  However, the social 
creation of devised theatre is also the creation of a work of art which exists at a 
remove from the everyday world.  It is a creation developed through the lens of the 
theatrical frame, a lens which may variously distance, refract, dazzle and even 
obscure.  The practice is simultaneously providing a space for the possibility of 
dissensus from social convention and a space for imagination; a space within 
which one can articulate alternative ways of moving, speaking and imagining.  In 
such an art form there is a particular opportunity for the conventional separation of 
process and product, of social and aesthetic, to be eschewed in favour of a social 
space where all these aspects co-exist.  The activity in itself allows for a space in 
which human beings come together to express, debate and create possibilities for 
their world.   
In this chapter I will seek to define praxis, and to consider how this has 
been conceived by various writers.  I will then apply some of these ideas to 
pedagogy, before going on to discuss pedagogy for devised theatre specifically. 
 
Praxis 
The term praxis was used by Aristotle in both The Politics and 
Nichomachean Ethics.  For Aristotle, human activity could be divided into three 
aspects: praxis (used to describe action in itself), poiesis (production) and theoria 
(thinking, or contemplation).3  According to Bottomore this tripartite distinction was 
ultimately elided into a binary distinction between the theoretical and the practical 
within Aristotle’s own school, a move which continued into medieval scholastic 
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philosophy and to the present day.4  However, Aristotle’s initial separation of 
practice into poiesis and praxis is significant for my thesis, since it suggests the 
possibility of practice that does not only aim for an outcome but which exists for 
itself.  Aristotle recognises here a separation between action that is rooted in an 
intended end point (what might be termed production), and action that is activity 
for its own sake: in his words, “good action itself is its end”.5  His own prioritisation 
of the latter is also evident when he states “Life is action [praxis] and not 
production [poiesis]”.6  Indeed, according to Smith, for Aristotle “praxis is guided 
by a moral disposition to act truly and rightly [called phronesis by Aristotle]; a 
concern to further human well being and the good life”.7  This is because it cannot 
be compromised by the needs of production; rather, it has no intention other than 
to be true to itself. 
According to Backman, for Aristotle this “implies that what decides the 
quality of an individual life is the way in which it is lived, not what is achieved in 
that life”.8  And how the life is lived, in terms of praxis, is always in the moment: 
Backman goes on to say that “praxis [...] is an activity considered in terms of what 
is enacted or performed during the action itself, and of the way in which this is 
done; its outcome, if any, is extraneous to the action itself”.9  The theatrical 
language of this is notable, and brings to mind Peggy Phelan’s notion that 
performance’s “only life is in the present.  Performance cannot be saved, 
recorded, documented, or otherwise participate in the circulation of 
representations of representations: once it does so, it becomes something other 
than performance”.10  It is in the moment of action, the ‘now’ of that moment, that 
performance takes place.  From this perspective the process of devising theatre 
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could also be conceptualised as praxis, not only in terms of it being a means to an 
end but as an end in itself; as an engagement in a creative activity where the 
focus is not only on the end point of a performance to an audience but also on the 
creative process of the group and the individual concerned. 
However it also suggests a potential political charge to praxis.  Hannah 
Arendt goes so far as to invoke praxis as an alternative to the Nazis’ Final 
Solution.  Focusing on the moment rather than an end point resists “the 
murderous consequences inherent in a line of thought that forces one to admit 
that all means, provided that they are efficient, are permissible and justified to 
pursue something defined as an end”.11  Praxis was also politically significant for 
Marx.  According to Bottomore, for Marx praxis “became the central concept of a 
new philosophy which does not want to remain philosophy, but to transcend itself 
both in a new meta-philosophical thinking and in the revolutionary transformation 
of the world”.12  The German word for practice in a more conventional sense is 
also praxis, so the word is translated variously as either practice or praxis.  
Nonetheless, in his ‘Theses on Feuerbach’, for example, Marx’s intimation of an 
Aristotelian notion of praxis is clear when he emphasises the importance of his 
theory being coupled with action, stating that “All social life is essentially practical” 
and “the philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways, the point is 
to change it”.13  
The term was taken up by Gramsci in particular, who referred to Marxism 
itself as a “philosophy of praxis”. He said it was “the crowning point of this entire 
movement of intellectual and moral reformation”,14 and suggested, according to 
Bruno Gulli, that “the point is moving toward a conception of labour that brings 
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together production and creation”.15  This labour, as praxis, emphasises the 
possibility of the worker’s capacity for “creative activity” beyond her diversion into 
capitalism’s projects.  Such a conception of labour would fuse activity and 
production with theory, as the worker fulfils her capacity for thought, action and 
production.  Aristotle’s distinction between production and action is reconfigured 
here in economic terms.  Capitalism’s diversion of the worker’s creativity onto its 
projects does not realise the worker’s full potential for creative action, but the 
notion of praxis, defined by Kitching as “conscious creative activity”,16 holds forth 
the promise of such a possibility.  This possibility always exists, according to Gulli, 
because “capital cannot avoid creating a mass of superfluous labour, which is still 
living, yet cannot become productive”.17  This superfluity exists in the creativity not 
satisfied by unfulfilling labour.  In a similar vein Jack Mezirow suggests that praxis 
offers the potential for “a dialectic in which understanding and action interact to 
produce an altered state of living”.18   
There is an emphasis in all these writers on the agency of the subject in 
determining their action.  Rather than taking action as a habit, or because 
someone has been told to, action is an end in itself.  It is not done as a theoretical 
imperative, but it is a theoretical position.  It insists on the possibility of 
transforming what is taken for granted.  In the transformational concept of praxis 
then, as in the model of devised theatre I outlined in Chapter One, conceptual 
divisions elide: according to Smith, citing Gadamer, the process of praxis “involves 
interpretation, understanding and application in ‘one unified process’”.19  Indeed, 
for Zygmunt Bauman, “human praxis, viewed in its most universal and general 
features, consists in turning chaos into order, or substituting one order for 
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another”.20  In this transformational process the conventional divisions between 
terms and concepts normally considered distinct start to loosen, and what 
Bauman calls “sliminess”21 is generated.  This ‘”sliminess” for Bauman suggests 
the creation of new meanings that are socially significant for the individual and the 
society.  As I outlined through theoretical models of language, creativity and social 
practice in Part Two, praxis offers a model of theory leading to human activity and 
of human activity being seen as potentially theoretical: as a model which leads to 
liberating action, and as an activity which offers the theoretical possibility of 
agency through what it does.  And devised theatre, an art form which I have 
suggested is similarly resistant to definition, an art form which envisions the 
possibility of art as a process as well as a finished object, and which has a 
tendency towards being an ephemeral form that is in process and able to be 
shaped by its participants, can be seen as a highly appropriate vehicle for this 
conception of praxis. 
 
Pedagogy and Praxis 
But what of education?  How have educational models attempted to 
explore the notion of praxis?  Education is of course taught as a theoretical and a 
practical subject.  Yet this does not necessarily mean that it offers the opportunity 
for its participants to simultaneously reflect as they do an activity, or to see their 
activity as having a wider significance.  If truly functioning as a praxis, it should 
develop the kind of ‘sliminess’ Bauman discusses which starts to blur previously 
distinct conceptual boundaries, allowing its participants – both teachers and 
students – to see what they do as an holistic practice which offers the opportunity 
of Mezirow’s “altered state of living”.  For Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude 
Passeron, however, much educational practice does the opposite.  In 
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Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture they discuss the ‘symbolic 
violence’ of the education system.  Systems of symbolization and meaning are 
imposed on groups or classes of people in a way that “renders them legitimate in 
the eyes of the beholder”.22  Pedagogic actions reproduce the values of the 
teacher, whether in a family or an institution, and are given legitimacy through the 
discourse of education.  This reproduction of cultural values through education is 
what they call the ‘cultural arbitrary’ – it passes itself off as the natural order of 
things rather than as the arbitrary socio-historical construct that it is.    
For Bourdieu and Passeron, those being taught are also in a system that 
focuses on being able to manipulate and reproduce culture rather than make it or 
seek to change it (in their terms ‘symbolic mastery’ is favoured over ‘practical 
mastery’).  This reproduces a method of education that suits the teacher, 
someone who has already mastered the academic discourse around the subject, 
rather than one that suits someone who seeks to creatively expand the subject, to 
explore what the academic discourse might be, or to reflect on how their practice 
might function in a broader context.  In a reproductive system such as this, the 
students of such a teacher are not encouraged to do these things either.  For 
those involved in teaching the arts this is reflected in the ‘heritage’ attitude of 
someone such as Peter Abbs, who emphasises in his book Living Powers the 
value of “inherited culture and a personal sense of cultural solidarity, of belonging 
to an historical past which gives depth and meaning to the present”.23 For 
Bourdieu, writing six years before Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture, 
this educational system, like his outlining of the artistic system in Distinction 
(discussed in Chapter Five), is part of a wider “cultural unconscious” where 
“attitudes, aptitudes, knowledge, themes and problems, in short the whole system 
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of categories of perception and thought” are “organised” by the school.24  Such an 
unconscious will inevitably shift over time.  For example, Lyotard suggests that 
positivist certainties have recently given way to a more market-driven notion of the 
purpose of education: “The transmission of knowledge is no longer designed to 
train an elite capable of guiding the nation towards its emancipation, but to supply 
the system with players capable of acceptably fulfilling their roles at the pragmatic 
posts required by its institutions”,25 reflecting a social shift in priority from “Is it 
true?” to “What use is it?”.26  
From this perspective it might appear that Bourdieu is arguing that 
teaching is doomed to reproduce social phenomena: teachers are subject to social 
pressures, education reproduces, and the ‘habitus’ (a “structured and structuring 
structure”27 of education) structures its subjects, meaning that they lack agency in 
a system which controls them.  Yet the very fact that the cultural unconscious 
changes over time means that there is another story behind what might appear on 
the surface to be Bourdieu’s resignation.  Bourdieu notes that “[h]abitus is not the 
fate that some people read into it.  Being the product of history it is an open 
system of dispositions that is constantly subjected to experiences, and therefore 
constantly affected by them in such a way that either reinforces or modifies its 
structures”.28  And in his later essay ‘Understanding’, Bourdieu proposes a sense 
of habitus not as solely controlling its subjects but actually as a “regulated 
improvisation”,29 according to Bridget Fowler.  The practice of life is a socially 
conditioned performance.30  The subject is caught within a structure, but within this 
structure there is nonetheless the opportunity for moments of choice, self-
                                                          
24
 Quoted in Jenkins, p.136 
25
 Lyotard, p.48 
26
 Ibid, p.51 
27
 Jenkins, p.141 
28
 Bourdieu, P and L.J.D. Wacquant (1992), An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology (Chicago: University 
Press), p.133.  Original emphasis. 
29
 Fowler, p.10 
30
 This notion is similar to Judith Butler’s notion of gender where the subject and her/his body is 
structured by social factors.  See Butler, J (2007) Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of 
Identity (Abingdon/New York: Routledge). 
173 
 
discovery and insight which offer the potential of leading to change.  Like the 
models of language, creativity and hegemony outlined in Chapters Three, Four 
and Five respectively, structure is present but is not all controlling.  Even if their 
choices are socially circumscribed, the subject is still able at moments to 
recognise their habitus, reflect on their behaviour and to make choices.   
This notion leads Bourdieu to outline a notion of “reflex reflexivity”, where 
the sociologist interviewing a subject (in his case) “monitor[s] on the spot [...] the 
effects of the social structure within which it is taking place”.31  In this model, 
theory enables the person in power to examine their behaviour and to critically 
reflect on it as they do it.  The theory modifies the action, but the action is crucial 
since it is what allows for the possibility of discovery.  The theory in itself would 
remain abstract without the practice of the practitioner.  Through reflex reflexivity 
the practitioner can see what they are doing and what is happening between them 
and their interviewee.   
However, what is missing from Bourdieu’s essay is a discussion of the 
person who is not in power.  What remains is a sense of the power differential 
which needs to be corrected by the sociologist, but which is actually reproduced in 
the moment of the interview.  So on the surface it may at first appear that what is 
happening here is praxis, theory and practice working together and leading to 
Aristotle’s phronesis, a course of morally right and prudent action.  But what 
actually happens in the moment of enactment does not offer a different power 
dynamic.  The sociologist stands outside, able to analyse and understand and 
now even self-critically reflect through his superior insight.  
I will discuss Rancière as offering an alternative model to this later in this 
chapter.  In the meantime, I want to suggest that what Bourdieu does point 
towards is an interest towards action that can be reflective, towards action that 
can be theoretically and morally justified, towards Aristotle’s phronesis, which was 
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part of the Greeks’ “establishment of rationality as a dominant system of 
thought”.32  For Bourdieu however, such rationality is not fixed but is negotiated in 
an ongoing process of reflection aimed at understanding better what is happening 
between and within people at any given moment.  Such an approach shifts from 
the positivistic notion that truth can be ‘proved’ in an empirical way towards 
recognising the ways in which phronesis is a shifting concept.  According to Carr 
and Kemmis, in the early twentieth century such a positivist discourse dominated 
in the form of science, which developed into a “conformity with established ways 
of thinking”, and ossified into orthodoxy, meaning that “questions of the values 
underlying these courses of action were believed to be beyond the scope of 
science and were therefore left unexamined”.33  Carr and Kemmis map this 
approach onto Habermas’ notion of the “technical interest”, which focuses on the 
human acquiring control over objects.   The politics and morality of such an act are 
ignored in favour of the priority of controlling through the overarching discourse of 
science.   
The ‘technical interest’ is part of Habermas’ broader theory of “knowledge-
constitutive interests”, which  
rejects any idea that knowledge is produced by some sort of ‘pure’ 
intellectual act in which the knowing subject is himself ‘disinterested’.  
Knowledge is never the outcome of a ‘mind’ that is detached from 
everyday concerns.  On the contrary, it is always constituted on the basis 
of interests that have developed out of the natural needs of the human 
species and that have been shaped by historical and social conditions.34 
 
Habermas, according to Carr and Kemmis, outlines three such interests which 
constitute human knowledge.   In addition to the technical interest, Habermas 
suggests a practical interest, linked to an “interpretive” approach, where the focus 
is on interpreting the practical specifics of each subjective human act of 
communication.  However, this is limited too, since it “fails to recognise that the 
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subjective meanings that characterise social life are themselves conditioned by an 
objective [social, cultural and political] context that limits both the scope of 
individuals’ intention and the possibility of their realisation”.35  Habermas’ third 
‘interest’, the ‘emancipatory interest’, however, understands the bigger context 
within which individual acts occur, and considers how the individual and the social 
context might interact, thus allowing for the possibility of “acquir[ing] an 
emancipatory knowledge of the objective framework within which communication 
and social action occur”.36  Such an interest, the one which Habermas is most 
committed to, allows for a “critical social science” that “goes beyond critique to 
critical praxis”.37  The supposed objectivity of the technical interest, focused solely 
on mastery of supposedly scientific ‘objective’ truths, is called into question by the 
subjective practical interest of specific human acts.  And the subjective experience 
is in turn influenced by social structures.  Again, as with Bourdieu, there is a sense 
that the individual is both trapped within social structures, but is able to gain 
awareness of these structures as part of a process of transforming them.  This 
transformation is not to be gained through theory in itself, but through praxis; 
through “an integration of theory and practice as reflective and practical moments 
in a dialectical process of reflection, enlightenment and political struggle carried 
out by groups for the process of their own emancipation”.38 
 
Freire and Pedagogy Of The Oppressed 
A similar desire to develop emancipation from oppression, where human 
beings are engaged in reflecting on their lives as a means to improve it, spurred 
Paolo Freire to develop his Pedagogy of the Oppressed.  Working in Brazil, a 
country where many peasants were illiterate and furthermore had little interest in 
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education, considering it irrelevant to their lives, Freire demonstrated to them that 
their notion of education was culturally and historically specific, seeking to support 
them in “[t]heir struggle to become free subjects and to participate in the 
transformation of their society” through education.39  For Freire, education was 
suffering from “narration sickness”,40 where the teacher-student relationship was 
focused on “a narrating subject (the teacher) and patient, listening objects (the 
students)”.41  In this model the teacher’s task is “to ‘fill’ the students with the 
contents of his narration – contents which are detached from reality, disconnected 
from the totality that engendered them and could give the significance”.42  This 
idea of “filling” the students led Freire to a notion of the current pedagogical 
system as a “‘banking’ concept of education, in which the scope of action allowed 
to the students extends only as far as receiving, filing, and storing the deposits”.43  
The student is seen as passive, but adapting to this approach is beneficial to the 
student: “the more completely they accept the passive role imposed on them, the 
more they tend simply to adapt to the world as it is”.44  There is a pay-off for the 
student who works hard in this ‘banking’ system: the ability to participate in the 
world as it is currently conceived, which ultimately brings the financial reward of 
deposits in the bank as a result of the deposits in the head.  Education conceived 
thus is prescribed, focused and measurable: “verbalistic lessons, reading 
requirements, the methods for evaluating ‘knowledge’, the distance between the 
teacher and the taught, the criteria for promotion”45 are all made clear.  However, 
according to Freire, “everything in this ready-to-wear approach serves to obviate 
thinking”.46  In this model, enquiry is dulled and the student’s agency limited, and 
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as with Bourdieu and Passeron’s notion of reproduction, the education serves to 
perpetuate rather than improve society. 
In opposition to this, Freire invokes what Grundy terms a “critical 
pedagogy” which “goes beyond situating the learning experience within the 
experience of the learner: it is a process which takes both the experiences of both 
the learner and the teacher, and through dialogue and negotiation, recognises 
them both as problematic”.47  Such a pedagogy opens up a process of debate 
where meanings and possibilities are opened up to challenge and redefinition.  
Freire proposes this as a problem-posing approach to education: 
The banking concept [...] distinguishes two stages in the action of the 
educator.  During the first, he cognizes a cognizable object while he 
prepares his lessons in his study or his laboratory; during the second, he 
expounds to his students about that object.  [...] The problem-posing 
method does not dichotomise the activity of the teacher-student; she is not 
“cognitive” at one point and “narrative” at another.  She is always 
“cognitive”, whether preparing a project or engaging in dialogue with the 
students.  He does not regard cognizable objects as his private property, 
but as the object of reflection by himself and his students.48 
 
In the ‘banking’ concept knowledge is reduced to a commodity – something to be 
passed on as part of the transaction of education.  In the problem-posing 
approach, however, he refuses a concept, or even a stage, of education which is 
solely about passing on what has already been understood by the teacher.  
Rather, education is seen as an opportunity to explore what that understanding 
might be.  Education is not just a practice, a skill to be passed on, but something 
happening in the here and now between teacher and student: a process.  He goes 
on 
The students – no longer docile listeners – are now critical co-investigators 
in dialogue with their teacher.   The teacher presents the material to the 
students for their consideration, and re-considers her earlier considerations 
as the students express their own [...]  Whereas banking education 
anaesthetizes and inhibits creative power, problem-posing education 
involves a constant unveiling of reality.  The former attempts to maintain 
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the submersion of consciousness; the latter strives for the emergence of 
consciousness and critical intervention in reality.49 
 
For Freire, then, problem-posing education is emancipatory in a Habermasian 
mode.  It is also notable here that the process benefits both teacher and student.  
Habermas’ comment on enlightenment is relevant here: “The vindicating 
superiority of those who do the enlightening over those who are to be enlightened 
is theoretically unavoidable, but at the same time it is fictive and requires self-
correction: in a process of enlightenment there can only be participants”.50  And 
this collective process of problem-posing is a praxis.  Like Habermas, Freire states 
that breaking free from oppression “can only be done by means of the praxis: 
reflection and action upon the world in order to transform it”.51  Freire states in a 
later book Pedagogy of Freedom that “one of the radical differences between 
education as a domesticating and dehumanising task and education as a 
humanistic and liberating task is that the former is a pure act of transference of 
knowledge whereas the latter is an act of knowledge”.52  In this notion of reflection 
and action working simultaneously, or of knowledge and action working 
simultaneously, one can see praxis clearly articulated.   
Indeed, for Grundy, exploring the development of a curriculum based on 
the ideas of both Freire and Habermas, “[p]raxis is the form of action which is the 
expression of the emancipatory interest”.53  She suggests five features of praxis in 
Freire’s work: action and reflection, existing in a real as opposed to a hypothetical 
world, existing in a real world that is a world of social and cultural interaction, 
existing in a socially constructed as opposed to a natural world, and a process of 
meaning-making that recognises meaning as being socially constructed.54  
Looking across these features it is possible, as with Habermas’ notion of 
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knowledge-constitutive interests, to see a sense of a socially constructed view of 
the world as being crucial to the content and form of pedagogy.  What both offer is 
a socially constructed view of the world in which the individual is trapped in a web 
of meanings and influences which s/he cannot escape, but a view where fatalism 
is eschewed in favour of recognition of the possibility of human agency in 
response.  In this model, it is not inherently wrong to teach students facts.  The 
problem is, to quote Freire, that in the ‘banking’ model “[t]he teacher talks about 
reality as if it were motionless, static, compartmentalised, and predictable”.55  
Knowledge is predetermined, and however entertaining or enjoyable the teacher 
makes the lesson, the content is ultimately limited.  Rather, what is essential for 
Freire is a full dialogue between teacher and student so that the pedagogical 
process is a praxis: students exploring and trying out the relevance and 
significance of ideas and models to their own lives, reflecting on their own lives 
and practices, and then in turn adjusting their own activities.  It is possible 
however to also reverse this: students trying out practices which then inform 
theoretical models; going on to participate in activities in a new way which again 
revise models.  Neither theory nor practice are prioritised in this model, each 
informs the other and is inherently interconnected.  
However, in the writings of Freire and of Carr and Kemmis, whilst the 
importance of theory as part of the process of praxis is made clear, the importance 
of practice to theory is not always so clearly articulated.  Friere states that praxis 
“requires theory to illuminate it”,56 and that failure to do so runs the risk of activism 
– “action for action’s sake”.57  For him, “reflection – true reflection – leads to 
action.  On the other hand, when the situation calls for action, that action will 
constitute an authentic praxis only if its consequences become the object of 
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critical reflection”.58  For Carr and Kemmis, critical theory enables the possibility of 
praxis, with the theory providing a critical frame within which truth can be 
revealed.59  In these examples the writers are anxious to avow the presence of 
theory in the practice, and that theory is informing practice.  But the need for 
practice to inform theory, and for theory to be influenced by practice, is not 
articulated as emphatically.  There seems to be a sense of academic teleology 
here, similar to that noted by Shannon Jackson’s notion, when discussing the 
recent move towards practice-as-research and performance-as-research, of 
“initiatives that seek to align research with another activity that has been 
heretofore understood as not research”, with research being seen as a “condition 
to which the former term aspires”.60   
Whilst in Pedagogy of the Oppressed Freire does mention the importance 
of theory to practice more than the importance of practice to theory, he is aware of 
the latter’s importance.  He states that “[w]hen a word is deprived of its dimension 
of action, reflection automatically suffers as well; and the word is changed into idle 
chatter”.61  A praxis where the theoretical components are informed by practice is 
outlined by Deborah Britzman, who argues that educational theorising is situated 
within “the lived lives of teachers, in the values, beliefs, and deep convictions 
enacted in practice, in the social context that encloses such practice, and in the 
social relationships that enliven the teaching encounter”.62  In such an approach it 
could be said that understanding, or theorising, is going on even as the actor does 
the activity, in a manner similar to Bourdieu’s reflex reflexivity mentioned above.   
Such an approach of understanding through practice is undertaken by 
Donald A. Schőn in his books The Reflective Practitioner: How Professionals 
Think in Action and Educating the Reflective Practitioner.   The title of the former 
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book suggests that an action can contain thought, even if subconsciously, and it is 
this idea that motivates Schőn.  He suggests that “inherent in the practice of the 
professionals we recognise as unusually competent is a core of artistry”, and that 
this “artistry is an exercise of intelligence, a kind of knowing”.63  Indeed, he coins 
the term “reflection in action” to describe the activity of professional practitioners.  
In doing so he is keen to challenge what he calls “positivist doctrines”, where 
“practice appeared as a puzzling anomaly”64 to a culture of professionals and 
educators who found the “phenomena” of reflective practice “disturbing”.65  For 
Schőn, this disturbance is because conventional, ‘scientific’ knowledge, or what he 
terms “Technical Rationality”, is seen as sufficient to solve practical problems.  Yet 
in practice, he argues, practitioners reveal “artful competence”66 which reflects a 
complex level of understanding that goes beyond what someone who only 
theorises can achieve.   The skilled practitioner presents a challenge to the 
hegemony of positivist academic knowledge and thought by demonstrating “a kind 
of knowing which does not stem from a prior intellectual operation”.67  In this 
conceptualisation practice and theory are not separated: citing Gilbert Ryle, he 
states “‘thinking what I am doing’ does not connote ‘both thinking what to do and 
doing it’.  When I do something intelligently... I am doing one thing and not two”.68  
In reflective practice, theory and practice are not divided but co-exist, in a manner 
which suggests that Schőn is actually outlining a theory similar to that of praxis.  
All praxis, where action is part of thought and thought part of action, continuously 
incorporates reflection and practice.  There is here a subtle but telling distinction 
from the model of action research outlined by Kurt Lewin, which consists of a 
process of “planning, fact-finding and execution”.69  This process is a movement 
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between theory and practice with an end point: to quote Phillip Taylor, “whereas 
action researchers tend to emphasise evaluation, rather than ongoing reflection, 
as a culminating activity, [...] reflective practitioner researchers are concerned with 
documenting and understanding the tacit and known knowledge base which 
enables reflection-in-action to occur”.70 
In terms of teaching, Schőn suggests a model of coaching rather than 
teaching.  Quoting John Dewey, he notes that the student “has to see on his own 
behalf and in his own way [...] Nobody else can see for him”.71  In this vision of 
dialogue between teacher and student one can see a vision reminiscent of Freire’s 
notion of dialogue between teacher and student.  The truth is not there to be 
passed from teacher to student, but something to be worked on together as a 
process.  One can also hear an echo of Freire’s notion of education as an 
emancipatory space, where meanings are open to negotiation and redefinition.  As 
Schőn suggests, “In a school supportive of reflective teaching, teachers would 
challenge the prevailing knowledge structure.  Their on-the-spot experiments 
would affect not only the routines of teaching practice but the central values and 
principles of the institution.  Conflicts and dilemmas would surface and move to 
centre stage”.72  This may not sit neatly with a prescriptive curriculum such as 
currently exists in the UK, but it does sit well with a curriculum which seeks to 
make its students understand the practical components of the discipline and how 
they fit into a broader social perspective.  
In a similar vein Jonothan Neelands suggests the notion of reflexivity-in-
practice, a development of Schőn’s model for teaching and learning which 
“stresses an active commitment to articulating and making visible the essential 
dialectic within teaching and learning processes and within/between the 
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experiences of teachers and learners and others who are directly or indirectly 
effected by these experiences”.73  In such a model “both teachers and learners are 
made aware of knowledge as an interactive process which is selective, produced 
and constructed between teachers and learners rather than as the mechanical 
transference of naturalised and un-contestable facts and figures”.74  There is a 
dialogue between participants in the educational process where what is learned is 
open to negotiation in the moment.  For Neelands, part of this critical praxis is the 
way in which critical theory is brought to bear on activity, where what appears 
‘instinctive’ to the reflective practitioner is brought under the microscope through 
the critical frame.  This critical frame is crucial, and in this he identifies a problem 
with Schőn’s notion of reflective practice, since Schőn’s practitioner’s reflection  
may tell us more about how effectively a teacher has been socialised and 
institutionalised into accepting, and therefore practicing, particular 
dominant values and pedagogical and epistemological selections, rather 
than providing an insight into how the emancipated or fully conscious, 
practitioner might work if they were free to determine their own practice.75   
 
If Freire and Carr and Kemmis prioritise theory over practice, then for Neelands 
perhaps Schőn prioritises practice over theory.   Here Neelands articulates an 
understanding of how within praxis, notwithstanding Gilbert Ryle’s notion of “doing 
one thing and not two” mentioned above, theoretical elements can be important in 
informing and supporting practice.   
Yet as I have already intimated, I am also keen to consider how practical 
understanding might inform theoretical understanding within the frame of 
pedagogical praxis.  Freire’s notion of students as “critical co-investigators in 
dialogue with their teacher”76 offers the possibility of the classroom functioning as 
a model for a wider social democratic model.  Indeed, for Richard Shaull, Freire 
believes that  
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every human being, no matter how ‘ignorant’ or submerged in the ‘culture 
of silence’ he or she may be, is capable of looking critically at her world in a 
dialogical encounter with others.  Provided with the proper tools for such 
encounter, the individual can gradually perceive personal and social reality 
as well as the contradictions in it, become conscious of his or her own 
perception of that reality, and deal critically with it.77 
 
There is, however, another perspective to Freire’s work illustrated by Shaull’s 
point.  In this model, the student needs to be “provided with the proper tools”, and 
this needs the teacher to supply the educational frame.  When Freire starts to 
outline practically how his ideas will work, the egalitarian basis of his theory starts 
to soften.  Freire outlines that “[o]nce the investigators have determined the area 
in which they will work and have acquired a preliminary acquaintance with the 
area through secondary sources, they initiate the first stage of the investigation”.78  
There is no mention here of the people with whom they work determining the 
content they will be working on.  The educators determine the people who need 
their help and in what way help is needed.  The investigators do, however, “call for 
volunteers among the participants to serve as assistants”.79  We are reminded 
here that the participants are not paid and are there to assist the better trained 
educators.  The investigators, however, “observe certain moments of the life of the 
area [...] and register everything in their notebooks”.80  The area under 
investigation becomes an exotic other to be analysed and supported through a 
paternalistic model.  Ultimately, after their work, educators present their findings to 
the people in “systematized and amplified form”.81  Presumably Freire assumes 
that the people need this “amplification” to enable them to grasp the findings, 
which would otherwise be too complex for them. 
In this model the notion of students emancipating themselves is absent.  
As Bingham and Biesta assert, in Freire’s model “one must be led to 
emancipation, that the one who emancipates knows more than the one who is 
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emancipated, and that the experiences of the one who is emancipated are not to 
be trusted”.82  Freire himself appears aware of the problem when he states that 
many well-intentioned professionals 
do not listen to the people, but instead plan to teach them how to ‘cast off 
the laziness which creates underdevelopment.’  To these professionals, it 
seems absurd to consider the necessity of respecting the ‘view of the 
world’ held by the people.  The professionals are the ones with a ‘world 
view’.  They regard as equally absurd the affirmation that one must 
necessarily consult the people when organising the program content of 
educational action.  They feel that the ignorance of the people is so 
complete that they are unfit for anything except to receive the teachings of 
the professionals.  
 
Yet Freire’s own guidance on how to provide a pedagogy for the oppressed 
seems to contain just such an approach.   The specific context of Freire’s desire to 
pass on literacy to those who did not possess it as part of a process of 
empowerment makes the need for him to pass on knowledge rather than just 
‘pose problems’ wholly understandable.  But despite his own interest in the term 
praxis, his description of activity cannot be seen to be an example of theory and 
practice working together simultaneously.   
How has this slippage occurred?  In Freire’s model, educational practice 
will later lead to an understanding, or ability to theorise, the situation which in turn 
leads to greater understanding.  But as with Bourdieu’s sociologist, in its 
enactment in the present it reproduces the very power relations which it seeks to 
dissolve.  To quote Rancière discussing socialist reformers’ work on education, it 
“reproduces an approach that confirms present inequality in the name of an 
equality to come”.83  Freire is posed with a problem in the present – inequality – 
which needs to be erased in the future.  Emancipated theory leads to 
unemancipated practice in order to reach its future goal. 
I want to propose that the notion of praxis offers a way of understanding 
and moving on from this.  In praxis, as already noted, theory and practice must be 
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intertwined, and praxis exists in the present for itself, with no practical outcome 
needed.  Whilst I note Neelands’ outlining of the potential absence of theory 
informing practice in Schőn’s model, it does at least allow the student to learn for 
herself through her own practice; indeed, it allows for the possibility of practice as 
a form of learning in itself.  In this sense, despite its lack of social 
contextualisation, Schőn’s model is in some ways closer to praxis than Freire’s.    
 
Rancière and The Ignorant Schoolmaster 
Yet this lack of social contextualisation is key.  As I mentioned in Chapter 
Two, Andy Kempe has suggested that a move towards what might be seen as 
‘child-centred’ learning, can lead to a sense of a child as “stationary”,84 and that 
instead a teacher might play a vital part in ‘moving’ the child into new areas of 
understanding.  I want to once more use the theory of Rancière to suggest some 
ways in which Freire’s notion of emancipatory education rooted in praxis might be 
reimagined, with the child moving into new territory without such a move being 
perceived as manipulation from within a hierarchical relationship with a teacher.  I 
will suggest that Rancière’s notion of universal teaching outlined in his book The 
Ignorant Schoolmaster offers a vehicle for this.   
Rancière suggests that most education follows a duplicitous process, 
where education appears to be benevolent but where the student is rendered 
passive and the teacher active.  Rancière terms such education “explicatory”, with 
the teacher passing on knowledge to the student. For Jacotot, Rancière’s 
inspiration in this book, such “explication is the myth of pedagogy”.85  The myth is 
sustained because for the student 
the more intelligent he becomes, the more he can peer down from on high 
at those he has surpassed [...] This is the genius of the explicators: they 
attach the creature they have rendered inferior with the strongest chains in 
the land of stultification – the child’s consciousness of his own superiority. 
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This consciousness, moreover, doesn’t kill off good feelings.  The 
little educated child will perhaps be moved by the ignorance of the 
common people and will want to work at instructing them.86 
 
However well intentioned, such a concept of education rooted in Freire’s ‘banking’ 
model or Rancière’s notion of ‘explication’ “supposes a radical distinction between 
two types of intelligences [...] For children and common minds there are stories, 
for rational beings there are reasons”.87  In this distinction lies a logic which keeps 
people in their place.  And this logic perpetuates itself: the fortunate teacher or 
student who has accrued knowledge then wants to pass it on.  But in doing so 
Rancière’s description echoes Freire’s well intentioned ‘investigators’, looking to 
help the impoverished community they are working with from what is ultimately a 
superior and patronising position.  As such, it spurs into action a reproductive logic 
which can never be satisfied: “at each stage the abyss of ignorance is dug again; 
the professional fills it in before digging another”.88  Knowledge is infinite and so 
an attempt to educate through only passing on knowledge is doomed to constantly 
reinforce not only what is known but the things that are not known.  Education is 
confused with knowledge.   
The aim of such a logic is to “lift [...] a veil off the obscurity of things”.89  Yet 
in this model the veil remains; indeed education is only there until the veil is lifted.  
Once the veil has disappeared, education becomes unnecessary.  The educator 
will have done his job.  To quote Bingham and Biesta, “If the child is free, then 
there remains no role for the pedagogy of the oppressed”.90  The possibility of 
education for its own sake as an ongoing participation in the world, as a process 
of developing understanding, as a praxis of self discovery and social engagement, 
is absent.   
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Rancière’s project in the book is to imagine what a different educational 
process might be.  To do this, Rancière looks at things the other way round.  
Rather than accepting the “axioms” of ordinary pedagogical logic, where 
inequalities of knowledge are presupposed, and a knowledge of inequality leads to 
insight and a subsequent lessening of that inequality in the future rather than the 
present,91 he suggests presupposing equality between all parties involved.  In the 
words of Kristin Ross, Rancière asked, “What would it mean to make equality a 
presupposition rather than a goal, a practice rather than a reward situated firmly in 
some distant future so as to all the better explain its present infeasibility”?92  His 
starting point is the teacher Joseph Jacotot, a French teacher who had to teach 
his Flemish students the book Télémaque without a common language.  For 
Rancière, this situation offered the possibility of mutual discovery; of an 
emancipatory opportunity.  It reflected the “reality” of a “basic equality”93 between 
human beings which exists in the “equality of speaking beings that comes before 
the relation of inequality”.94   
This process, he suggests, begins before school by all human beings with 
the learning of the mother tongue.  He says, “They hear and retain, imitate and 
repeat, make mistakes and correct themselves, succeed by chance and begin 
again methodically, and, at too young an age for explicators to begin instructing 
them, they are almost all – regardless of gender, social relation, and skin colour – 
able to understand and speak the language of their parents”.95   Indeed, the 
process of learning to speak offers Rancière a starting point to assume an equality 
of intelligence amongst people.  All people learn to speak, and language is an 
incredibly complex system that requires considerable intelligence.  The child 
adapts and learns in relation to circumstances, as adults do later in life.  The child 
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is already exhibiting an ability to be a reflective practitioner.  It is thus “useless to 
discuss whether their [the ‘common people’s] “lesser” intelligence is an effect of 
nature or an effect of society: they develop the intelligence that the needs and 
circumstances of their existence demand of them”.96  Their intelligence has 
already proved itself – and before any formal education. 
Rancière’s notion of the student and teacher recognising each other as 
intelligent beings is not merely a liberal agenda of everyone listening to each other 
as a democratic project.  Rather, for Rancière the activity of speech itself is deeply 
political.  As outlined in Chapter Three, for Rancière the ability to attempt to 
communicate with each other offers the potential for a radically egalitarian space, 
an ongoing process in which all subjects seek to understand and be understood.  
Bingham and Biesta characterise a difference between Freire and Rancière as 
centring on the figure of the child.  Freire’s child “does not speak”,97 is waiting to 
learn how to speak through the pedagogical process.  For Rancière, however, the 
child or student “is already political even as she is acquiring her first language.  
That is, she is political even before she goes to school to become autonomous 
and emancipated”.98  They state that according to Rancière “the child must force 
his or her will onto another in order to be understood in a way that reconfigures 
the distribution of the sensible”.99  Because language is “arbitrary”, a means of 
“fragmenting truth”,100 a space for debating truth, it actually functions as a space 
for translation between different dialects, different subjectivities.  And Jacotot’s 
teaching of a text without a common language opened up such a space: “the 
relation between two ignorant people confronting the book they don’t know how to 
read is simply a radical form of the effort one brings every minute to translating 
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and counter-translating thoughts into words and words into thoughts”.101  One of 
the roles of the teacher in this model is thus to draw the student’s attention to this 
act of translation and to refute any notion that truth is wholly graspable through 
language.  Instead, truth is something to be contested, and any educational 
slippage from working through something with the child to passing on supposed 
‘truth’ is avoided.   
 What happens in education is thus a potential space of exploratory 
communication that is essentially egalitarian and hence political.  Bingham and 
Biesta contrast the politicised nature of the child/student in Rancière with the 
“psychological figure”102 of the child/student in Freire, with Freire mapping out a 
set of binaries where the child is led from oppression to liberation, from ignorance 
to knowledge.  Whilst they recognise that in Friere’s model “it may indeed by the 
case that one side of the binary is a more agentive state, and that one is less 
agentive”,103 this is ultimately for them a psychological rather than a political model 
where “an imbalanced psychic equation of teacher-over-student will change into a 
state of psychic balance between teacher and student”.104  I suspect that Freire 
would challenge this and claim that his process can ultimately lead to political 
change.  And as I have suggested above, the specific context of his 
consciousness raising and literacy programmes might make such an approach 
understandable.  But what is noticeable is that his description of an educational 
process does not in itself create an egalitarian space in the way that Rancière’s 
conceptualisation offers. 
In relation to the debate around praxis I am exploring, I am interested in 
the way in which Rancière’s description of Jacotot’s experience outlines an active 
pedagogical practice analysed in theoretical terms.  But I am also interested in the 
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way in which the practice enables what could never be achieved through the 
theory in isolation.  The ‘doing’ of pedagogy is what creates the egalitarian space, 
and as such functions as praxis: bringing something into being through its very 
action in a manner that fits praxis’ desire for phronesis without being focused on it 
as an end point.  It is a process in itself between two people that is liberational for 
them in that moment at that time.  In what Rancière calls ‘Jacotist pedagogy’, “the 
circle of emancipation must be begun”.105  Emancipation should not be a future 
goal, but should exist in the praxis of teaching now. 
So what then is the function of the teacher in Rancière’s work?  It is to 
make “each man becom[e] conscious of his nature as an intellectual subject”;106 it 
is to reverse Descartes’ thought to say “I am a man, therefore I think”.107  Because 
students and children learn anyway, the role of the educator is to “remind her 
students that they can already speak”, to be a “teacher who refuses her students 
the satisfaction of admitting that they are incapable of speaking”.108  The position 
of being incapable of speech may be disempowering but nonetheless reassuringly 
predictable, and encouraging students to recognise their intelligence may require 
effort.  The aim though is not to move towards this position, but to exhibit in the 
teacher’s emancipatory praxis a belief and a demonstration of that capacity.  For 
Rancière, “whoever teaches without emancipating stultifies.  And whoever 
emancipates doesn’t have to worry about what the emancipated person learns.  
He will learn what he wants. Nothing maybe”.109  The pressure of passing on 
deposits, to invoke Freire’s term, or of explicating knowledge, to invoke 
Rancière’s, is overturned in favour of providing an emancipatory space.  This can 
be achieved through focusing on the two fundamental jobs for the teacher: “He 
interrogates, he demands speech, that is to say, the manifestation of an 
                                                          
105
 Rancière (1991), p.16.  Original emphasis. 
106
 Ibid, p.35 
107
 Ibid, p.36 
108
 Bingham and Biesta, p.154.  My emphasis. 
109
 Rancière (1991), p.18 
192 
 
intelligence that wasn’t aware of itself or that had given up.  And he verifies that 
the work of the intelligence is done with attention”.110 
What Rancière asserts here as needing to be at the centre of 
emancipatory educational praxis is work on the student’s will.  He suggests that 
“man is a will served by an intelligence”.111  The intelligence is already there, it is 
evident in the learning of language, yet most education works on a relationship 
between teacher and student focused on the relationship of one intelligence to 
another intelligence.  What if, Rancière asks, education was to focus on “a pure 
relationship of will to will?”112  Education could then function as a microcosm of 
emancipation, with students working alongside teachers and teachers alongside 
students, to understand, question and debate through speech.  Through this 
process students might gain a sense of self-worth and of their own potential 
power.   
The importance of speech and of language within an emancipatory 
educational praxis is noted by Grundy: “The emancipatory interest is identifiable in 
the intentionality of the act of speech”.113  However, speech in itself is not enough 
to offer empowerment: for McCarthy, free communication can happen only when 
“there is an effective equality of chances to assume dialogue roles.  In particular, 
all participants must have the same chance to initiate and perpetuate 
discourse”.114  The importance of speech is also supported by Habermas, who 
stated that “all speech, even intentional deception, is oriented towards the 
definition of truth”.115  Freire, too, recognises the power of words when he claims 
that “There is no true word that is not at the same time a praxis”.116  However, 
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Habermas and Freire differ from Rancière in two important ways.  Firstly, Rancière 
would challenge the idea that there is a ‘truth’ that can be uncovered through 
language.  He rather suggests, as I have outlined in Chapter Three alongside 
Belsey’s distinction between reality and the real, that the real can only be explored 
through language, never mastered.  Secondly, the potential of the word is 
something that will happen now, rather than something that will happen in the 
future.  Freire may invoke language as praxis, but his notion of a ‘true’ word is 
found through an educational practice that I have argued lies in the future rather 
than the present.  Rancière’s praxis, on the other hand, exists through practice 
and theory co-imagined in the present. 
 
Pedagogical Praxis and Devised Theatre  
I have documented a shift in educational philosophy and practice from 
knowledge centred education, through child centred learning, towards socially 
centred learning.  In the latter praxis reflects the way in which education in theatre, 
or indeed in any subject, functions simultaneously as an emancipatory social 
practice.  In the educational act as articulated by Rancière, the assumption of 
equality and the creation of a space to think and explore disrupts the hierarchy of 
normal social relations, and articulates the possibility of a space of growth.  
If for Rancière the teacher’s job is to articulate a role of will to will between 
teacher and student, though, is he not substituting one locus of power difference – 
knowledge – for another – will?  How might one create an educational space 
where both teacher and student not only exist in a state of mutual recognition of 
each other’s innate potential intelligence but of each other’s innate potential will?  
Furthermore, how does one deal with the problem Rancière himself outlines 
happened with Jacotot’s method: that when his philosophy was institutionalised it 
lost its oppositional edge and became an orthodoxy to be learned as part of a 
mythology of Progress, “the pedagogical fiction built into the fiction of the society 
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as a whole”117 which is always located in the future, rather than the present of 
praxis? 
Here I again want to return to Chapter Three, where I outlined the 
importance for Rancière of the novel Jacotot and his students were working on 
together.  For Rancière, the “intelligence of the book [...] was also the thing in 
common, the egalitarian intellectual link between master and student”.118  
Rancière suggests the importance of the art work in creating an emancipatory 
educational space.  In The Emancipated Spectator, however, he also applies this 
idea to the relationship between the performer and the spectator.  He says that in  
the logic of emancipation, between the ignorant schoolmaster and the 
emancipated novice there is always a third thing – a book or some other 
piece of writing – alien to both and to which they can refer to verify in 
common what the pupil has seen, what she says about it and what she 
thinks of it.  The same applies to performance.  It is not the transmission of 
the artist’s knowledge or inspiration to the spectator.  It is the third thing 
that is owned by no one, whose meaning is owned by no one, but which 
subsists between them.119  
 
In this analysis the ‘third thing’ of performance, or theatre, does not exist to move 
towards an abstract notion of progress, but it contains a space in the moment of 
performance that may allow for individual and social progress.  I stress the may: 
this is not a given, since as I have suggested throughout this thesis, art and 
performance exist in a space that lies at least partly beyond the everyday, a space 
which resists colonisation and easy definitions.  It may also be racist, politically 
conservative, intellectually limited.  An abstract notion of progress cannot be 
assured in the ambiguous state of art.  But art, performance or theatre can provide 
the focus through which student and teacher, spectator and performer, come 
together to engage their mutual will and intelligence.   
I therefore want to suggest the possibility of moving from socially centred 
education in the sense of trying to create social change, to art centred education 
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focused on trying to create art.  In this shift teacher and student co-create, devise 
and discuss works of art.  In doing so the art is still socially focused, but is socially 
focused because of its celebration of itself as art.  And in works of devised theatre 
specifically, participants embody physicalities and speak words that fit particularly 
well with Corcoran’s depiction of art as “tearing bodies from their assigned places 
and free speech and expression from all reduction to functionality”.120  As a drama 
student quoted by Gavin Bolton says, “our job wasn’t just to find out stuff that was 
already there, but to make stuff – to find out how it felt and to show other 
people”.121  The student’s existing social role is challenged as he “finds out how it 
felt” for someone else.  Such an act of conceptual understanding is possible 
through the practical act of ‘making stuff’.  The student also recognises here that 
understanding happens in the presentation that is part of theatre: the process can 
be engaged with by others as audiences interact with it.   
An emphasis on both the pedagogical process and performance is present 
in Performing Pedagogy, where Charles R. Garoian claims that “performance art 
represents the praxis of postmodern theories in art and education”.122  For 
Garoian, performance re-presents; quoting Elin Diamond, he states that 
performance is defined “in terms of the prefix re”.  Diamond states that to  
reembody, reinscribe, reconfigure, resignify acknowledges the pre-existing 
discursive field, the repetition – and the desire to repeat – within the 
performative present, while ‘embody’, ‘configure,’ inscribe,’ ‘signify,’ assert 
the possibility of materialising something that exceeds our knowledge that 
alters the shape of sites and imagines other as yet unsuspected modes of 
being.123 
  
Like Corcoran’s eschewing of functionality, for Garoian postmodern performance 
is the praxis of postmodernism because “as compared to the hegemonic 
discourse and practices of modernist art, the function of subjectivity and agency 
for postmodern performance artists is the production of critical citizenship, civic 
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responsibility, and radical democracy”.124  Whilst many writers on postmodernism 
such as David Harvey would dispute such a characterisation as being innately or 
even typically postmodern and therefore counter-hegemonic,125 Garoian is 
arguing, as I have, that in a contemporary context performing can offer human 
beings the ability to articulate new possibilities for themselves and their lives, and 
that such an activity has social significance since it opens up the possibility for 
alternative social realities to be created and imagined. Working through the 
personal as students devise “from the perspective of their personal memories and 
cultural histories”126 (and Garoian assumes devising in his book as the method of 
performance making), their personal experience takes on social significance 
through the process of making art.   
Garoian suggests his performance art pedagogy is founded on three 
attributes: performance, performativity, and performance art.  In his model, 
performance behaviours that are socially familiar are reproduced, and this 
includes, “[w]ithin the context of educational practice, [...] the teacher’s pedagogy, 
the students’ interaction with that pedagogy, and their mutual involvement in 
school”.127  As I have outlined in this thesis, Bourdieu, Rancière and Friere 
variously suggest that educational institutions contain within them an innate 
politics as a result of their history and political context.  Through what Garoian 
calls performativity, students articulate a subjective response to these “dominant 
cultural paradigms from the perspective of personal memories and cultural 
histories”.128 In the third stage this is developed further as students create 
performance art in a “liminal space, an aesthetic dimension, wherein socially and 
historically constructed ideas, images, myths and utopias can be contested and 
new ones constructed as they pertain to students’ experiences of reality and their 
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desires to transform that reality”.129  Social reality is understood in the dimension 
of performance, and then transformed through the pedagogical process into 
performativity and finally performance art. 
Garoian’s aim is to prove that “teaching is an art form just as art is a form 
of teaching”,130 hoping that his own artistic practices could be replicated in the 
classroom to “produce a similar agency, curiosity, and desire for art praxis in [his] 
students”.131  His vision of a creative space where new possibilities to art and life 
are articulated means a “pedagogical method [which] seeks a diversity of images, 
ideas, perspectives, and interpretations”.132  However, what I find interesting as I 
read Garoian’s documentation of his practice in the book is the lack of diversity of 
interpretations of the art he makes.  Describing his performance Dialogue with an 
Object of Conversation, he states that his students “gagged, hog-tied and dragged 
my body before a white package tied with string”133 to reflect his parents’ limited 
opportunities when they emigrated to America.  When the package is unwrapped 
and reveals “a large cow’s tongue purchased from the local butcher”,134 he 
attempts to move towards the severed tongue and speak about art, but he is 
inaudible, with his “loud nonsense sounds and mumbles [...] ironically juxtaposed 
with the severed tongue on the floor”.135  Garoian knows what he is trying to ‘say’ 
through this piece, since the juxtaposition is knowingly ‘ironic’.  He decodes this in 
a singular way: “My movement suggested attempts to retrieve my tongue”.136  
Similarly, his description of student work where the student walks on a treadmill, 
with “the visual image of her ‘going nowhere’ and the monotonous sound of the 
treadmill’s rollers provid[ing] a basis from which to experience futility directly” 
imposes meaning on the work.   The performance is led by conceptual 
                                                          
129
 Ibid, p.10 
130
 Ibid, p.3 
131
 Ibid, p.3 
132
 Ibid, p.29 
133
 Ibid, p.7 
134
 Ibid, p.7 
135
 Ibid, p.7 
136
 Ibid, p.7 
198 
 
understanding here, meaning that it ultimately remains a commodity beyond 
praxis; a commodity designed to say a particular thing rather than a process which 
leads to its own outcome which is impossible to predict in advance.  The student is 
not involved in creating a process of theory and practice simultaneously, but works 
out what she wants to say and then finds a practical means of doing so.  The 
notion of art being able to open up understanding, or to think something previously 
unthought, remains elusive. 
Garoian later states that he will “refer to ‘artist/teacher’ and 
‘spectator/student’ as parallel roles to convey the similarities between artists and 
teachers as cultural agents and spectators and students as cultural 
depositories”.137  Apart from wondering how his students might feel about being 
described as cultural depositories rather than agents, what is missing here is the 
possibility of the art functioning as an egalitarian space, as having the possibility to 
suggest something new where both teacher and student learn together such as is 
articulated by Rancière.   What is also missing is any possibility that within the 
pedagogical process, the student will make art that the teacher might learn from, 
or which might provide the starting point for a conversation.  It appears that 
however much the work which is produced in Garoian’s classroom is 
experimental, postmodern or challenging conventional roles, the teacher is still 
very much defining what happens in the classroom. 
In suggesting that the spectator is a cultural depository, like the theatre 
practitioners discussed by Rancière in The Emancipated Spectator which I 
outlined in Chapter Five, Garoian assumes that the spectator is by default 
passive.  In contrast he invokes Allen Kaprow and Artaud amongst others to argue 
for an active spectator, where “the traditional role of art spectator and audience is 
shifted to that of participant”.138  But unless the audience has been involved in the 
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process of the work, there is inevitably a distinction between spectator and 
performer; the question is, to invoke Rancière, whether this is inherently a 
disempowering thing, or whether such a notion is based on an ultimately rather 
patronising presumption that the spectator is not able to think for themselves 
about what they are seeing.  Indeed, with the reductive meanings that Garoian 
puts on his performance, I am tempted to suggest that there is not very much 
space for Garoian’s spectator to think at all.  What is missing here is a notion that 
spectating as well as making can be understood as a praxis – as a mentally 
creative engagement with both aesthetic and philosophical concepts for the 
individual perceiving it through the ‘third thing’ articulated by Rancière: the work of 
art. 
Indeed, the arts have often seen theory and practice as separate rather 
than thought together, as praxis.  Terry Eagleton states that “[a]esthetics is born 
as a discourse of the body”.139  According to Eagleton, aesthetics were contrasted 
to “the more rarefied domain of conceptual thought”,140 and were mapped on to 
the materiality of what can be perceived through human senses, as opposed to 
the immateriality of ideas and thoughts.  From such a viewpoint, art with its roots 
in aesthetics and its tendency to be experienced through sensation is linked more 
to practice than to abstract theorising.  A contrasting view is outlined by David 
Hornbrook, who outlines a need for theory to lead practice in art: “formulating 
theories is the way we make sense of our experience by giving ourselves 
meaningful structures within which it may be explained”.141  In doing so, according 
to Philip Taylor, Hornbrook limits the power of practitioners in favour of theorists: 
“the practitioners are not the authorities because they have seemingly avoided a 
theoretical framework”.142  In contrast, Taylor outlines the understanding of a 
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teacher who builds up the confidence of 5-year old Frank through their relationship 
in process drama.  This was a relationship built up over a period of time that was 
rooted in praxis: a simultaneous engagement with both theory and practice, where 
the artistic process in lessons was embedded in decision making but also where 
decision making in lessons were embedded in the artistic process.  Discussing 
such process drama, Hornbrook suggests that “[i]t is by no means obvious to most 
people that the slim – at times invisible – outcomes of these experimental 
encounters are worth the hours of role-playing that precede them”.143  The local, 
practical knowledge of the teacher working with Frank is considered unimportant; 
theoretical understanding is superior.  The irony of Hornbrook’s own case is that 
he himself is clearly party to just such a knowledge when he describes a school 
production where 
over two hundred children from all parts of a large comprehensive had 
researched, written and performed a play with songs, about their locality 
and its old mining tradition.  Almost all their parents, and many of their 
grandparents, had been involved in one way or another [...] the 
atmosphere was electric.  Anyone who has experienced the massive 
outpouring of energy and enthusiasm harnessed by a successful 
community play of this kind will know what rich and unforgettable festivals 
they can be.144 
 
As Taylor suggests, in this passionate description lies a recognition of 
understanding being created in the moment of art, in the moment of the practical 
work being shared, that cannot be reduced to theory alone.  The art itself provides 
a vehicle for understanding, an experience that “is no different from the one that 5-
year old Frank and his teacher encountered, who at a moment in time found that 
through the drama they could transcend the boundaries of their real existence and 
discover some new mode of being within the imaginary world”.145 
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This call for reflection within the artistic process is supported by Maxine 
Greene’s suggestion that in aesthetic experiences “[t]here must be attending; 
there must be noticing, at once, there must be a reflective turning back to the 
stream of consciousness”.146  In such a reflection, as in praxis, the “end-in-view 
cannot be predetermined”.147   Pedagogically this chimes with Rancière’s notion of 
the teacher and student working not with knowledge as an end point, but as an 
activity useful in itself for self-reflection and learning. 
This emphasis on process, which emanates from a notion of praxis where 
the activity is important in itself and not just as an outcome, chimes with my 
conclusion to Part Two of this thesis.  I suggested that the three frames explored 
therein (creativity, language and social practice) contained at least three common 
features.  One was that they were all conceived in a way which was compatible 
with the notion of praxis.  Another was that they shared an emphasis on process 
as well as outcome.   For Taylor, explorations of drama and theatre pedagogy 
similarly need to not just focus on the outcome of the ‘game’ but on “how the 
game is played”.148  Discussing creativity, one of the three frames explored in Part 
Two, Ruth Dineen quotes a teacher who states that “Creativity isn’t a street which 
is bramble-free... we need to allow students to actually get stuck in the brambles a 
bit more in order to find their own creativity and their own particular voice”.149  The 
process of exploration, even when difficult and not bound up with progress, is 
important in itself.  And ultimately this may be important, because as the teacher 
Dineen quotes states, “You won’t be doing the students any good if you just teach 
them to make fascinating objects if they haven’t got the mechanisms of creativity 
that took them there”.150  Such mechanisms cannot necessarily be learned in a 
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schematic way, but are rather learned through the dialogue created through the 
artistic process itself. 
For both Freire and Rancière, in their different ways, such a dialogue 
occurs in the dynamic relationship between teacher and student.  In terms of my 
own study, this focus on fluidity and dialogue seems to be echoed by many writers 
contemplating the pedagogic process in drama and theatre.  For example, John 
Carroll states that drama is “a non-reproducible experience.  The participants 
within a drama in education session or series of sessions create a unique set of 
social relationships that becomes a single unit of experience capable of analysis 
and study.  Because of the complexity of the interactions, the whole creative 
sequence needs to be studied and not just aspects of variables within it”.151  Andy 
Kempe proposes, quoting Helen Nicholson, seeing drama as a “process of 
transportation [where] the outcomes are clearly focused but not fixed, and change 
may take place gradually, a collaborative and sustained process between 
participants and often in partnership with other supportive agencies”.152  Amanda 
Stuart Fisher cites Badiou’s philosophy as being about the emergence of a “truth 
process”, and states that for Badiou “it is our encounter with this emerging truth 
that can ultimately force us towards an ethical confrontation or choice: the 
recognition of the truth of an event ‘compels us to decide a new way of being’”.  
The concept of ‘truth’ here is not a fixed, immutable truth but the truth of a work of 
art emerging that is never attainable: it is in process.   
Anne Berkeley proposes a similar model.  Via Habermas, she suggests a 
need for a move towards a “critical dialectic where action follows from critical 
reflection”,153 or, a shift from “curriculum-as-product to curriculum-as-
conversation”.154  This would incorporate “the theory, practice and history of 
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theatre”, but such an incorporation could “be launched from the aesthetic 
enthusiasm of students”.155  This means that teachers and students can innovate 
and explore new possibilities whilst also showing a grasp of their discipline’s 
history.  Such an approach is also outlined by Peter Abbs when discussing the 
teaching methods of Caldwell Cook: 
What we see in action here is neither obviously progressive nor in any way 
simply traditional, but a model which envisages the teaching of art as 
complex aesthetic practice; as dynamic and dialectical; as constantly 
moving from the teacher to the pupil, from the pupil back to the teacher, 
and constantly moving, also, from the cultural heritage to the expressive 
act of the pupil and from the expressive act of the pupil back to the 
heritage.156 
 
This need for understanding a discourse such as devised theatre through an 
engagement with it practically, whilst practising it with a theoretical and cultural 
contextualisation of it, might help alleviate the problem identified by Tim Etchells of 
Forced Entertainment, who has bemoaned students who are taught about their 
work and then proceed to make their own but have “understood a set of formal 
codes, of stylistic options, but have not understood anything else”.157  For such 
students understanding is limited to knowledge-concepts of stylistic features, but 
has not come from working through theatrical material practically in a sustained 
and engaged way.   
The act of theatre itself can, I would argue, also be seen as a process.  
There is a dynamic interaction between spectator and performer which exists in 
the live moment of theatre.  Even at its most conventionally representational, the 
spectator is witnessing something physically and temporally present and is 
witness to a live event that takes place over time, as a process.  Indeed the notion 
of ‘witnessing’, identified by several writers on contemporary theatre and 
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performance,158 foregrounds spectating as an active process, like Rancière’s 
emancipated spectator. 
The third common feature running through the three frames of language, 
creativity and social practice in Part Two and which are identified in my conclusion 
is the importance of structures as a means of containing artistic exploration.  As I 
outlined in Chapter One, the importance of structure is noted by many writers 
discussing devised theatre in performance.  And the importance of understanding 
the structures one is working in is common to Berkeley, Abbs and Etchells’ 
comments above.  
It is also echoed in Schőn’s work on reflective practice, where he 
discusses the benefits of frame analysis.  For Schőn, applying a (theoretical) 
framework from the arts (he uses the example of literature) to a practical design 
task means that “as students become aware of conflicting frames and appreciative 
systems, they acquire a new basis for interest in studies that reveal how human 
beings experience and cope with the sorts of dilemmas that arise when frames 
come into conflict”.159  Schőn does not provide an example, but he states 
elsewhere that the frame is important since by applying an (unfamiliar) theoretical 
frame, the (familiar) subconscious frames the practitioner might use can be 
foregrounded: “Once practitioners notice that they actively construct the reality of 
their practice and become aware of the variety of frames available to them, they 
begin to see the need to reflect-in-action on their previously tacit frames”.160  
Structuring practice can open up new areas of perception.  Such an approach is at 
the core of several pedagogical texts on drama and theatre.  For example, John 
Carroll suggests that  
drama can be seen as a deliberately structured activity [...] bracketed off 
from the usual world of everyday classroom interaction by the art process 
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[...] The framed nature of drama encourages analysis [...] Because drama 
occurs in a negotiated reality it throws the taken-for-granted structural 
limitations of the school social context into high relief.161   
 
Similarly, in Structuring Drama Work Jonothan Neelands suggests 71 dramatic 
conventions,162 all of which “disrupt realism and make strange”.163  Like Schőn’s 
frames, the conventions enable what is taken for granted to be illuminated.  Each 
convention will emphasise different elements of the drama.  Neelands arranges 
the conventions into Context-Building Action (which is useful for setting the scene 
and adding information), Narrative Action (which emphasises the ‘story’ 
dimensions of the drama), Poetic Action (which emphasises the symbolic potential 
of the drama) and Reflective Action (which emphasises reflection).164  Within each 
of these four groups, different conventions will in turn focus on different aspects of 
drama.   
What is key to Schőn, Carroll and Neelands’ points is that the theoretical 
concept of the structure, frame or convention only functions through practical 
exploration.  What each emphasises is praxis: theory which only exists in practice, 
and practice which exists through its incorporation of theory.  
 
Two Examples of Pedagogical Art Praxis 
I will now engage with two brief examples of ‘third things’, to cite Rancière 
– two artistic processes that might be seen as examples of pedagogical art praxis.  
Each articulates a process that is important, and each also sees practice and 
theory as working together: with practice informing theorisation, as well as theory 
informing practice. 
In her book Artificial Hells, Claire Bishop outlines the work of Paul Chan, 
who staged Beckett’s Waiting for Godot in New Orleans as part of a wider art 
                                                          
161
 Carroll, J (2004), ‘Escaping the Information Abattoir: Critical and Transformative Research in 
Drama Classrooms’ in Taylor (ed.), p.72 
162
 See Neelands and Goode, passim 
163
 Neelands, J., quoted in O’Connor (ed.), p.4. 
164
 Neelands and Goode, p.6 
206 
 
project in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.  The aim however was not only to 
stage the play: 
To imagine that the play was the thing is to miss the thing.  We didn’t 
simply want to stage a site-specific performance of Godot.  We wanted to 
create, in the process of staging the play, an image of art as a form of 
reason.  What I mean is that we wanted to use the idea of doing the play 
as the departure point for inaugurating a series of causes and effects that 
would bind the artists, the people in New Orleans, and the city together in 
a relationship that would make each responsible for the other.  The project, 
in other words, was an experiment in using art to organise a new image of 
life in the city two years after the storm.165 
 
The similarity between this and process drama is striking.  Despite starting from a 
conventional playtext in this case, in both processes a group of people artistically 
explore a stimulus, whilst simultaneously considering and debating potential 
responses to it.  In both processes, what happens before the performance is as 
important as what happens during it. 
Despite such positive intentions, Chan had to engage with an initially 
resistant community, who “were sick of being a backdrop to catastrophe tourism.  
They didn’t want art, but concrete help”.166  Nonetheless, as a result of working 
with key activists and organisers Chan encouraged the community to see 
themselves as mattering to the creative process, demonstrating his own 
commitment to a process as well as a performance through running workshops 
and setting up a fund for the rebuilding the city .  Although the documentation of 
the process is mostly focused on the performance itself, Bishop points out that no 
actual official footage of the performance exists either.167  The event principally 
existed in the moment, with the practice of doing theatre linked to a broader range 
of activities that clearly went beyond the mere performance of ‘doing a play’.  
Instead, a playtext was used as a springboard to develop various artistic activities 
within the local community.   The play was the starting point for the debate; it was 
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an example of Rancière’s ‘third thing’ that served as a focal point for participants 
to engage in dialogue. 
A second example is offered by Garoian in Performing Pedagogy: Robbie 
McCauley’s ‘talk-about workshop’ following a performance of Fragments she gave 
at the Performance Art, Culture, Pedagogy symposium at Penn State University in 
1996.  Fragments explored issues of race and identity pertinent to McCauley and 
her family’s own history as African-Americans across several generations in 
America.168  The workshop involved students in an embodied experience that 
drew on psychoanalytic theory, “enabl[ing] hitherto subconscious ideas to surface 
and enter into discourse”. 169  The practice of participating in the workshop led 
participants to discuss and consider their own attitudes to identity, including race, 
class and gender.   
McCauley started by asking students to consider where they have placed 
themselves in the room, and to reflect on why they are there.  She then asked 
students to move around the space and to discuss their movements, considering 
how they felt about their movements.  This then started a series of conversations 
about being looked at: “What does it feel like being looked at?  Is it more 
comfortable being the looker?”170  From this, participants who saw McCauley’s 
performance started to engage with questions about race and class related to 
looking: for example, about who did and didn’t feel comfortable being watched, 
and when.  They also related their questions to those raised by McCauley’s own 
performance.  After more conversation McCauley asked students to physically 
respond to a provocation from Rachel Rosenthal that “race means nothing any 
more.  It is a [culturally constructed] concept that is passé, no longer supported by 
scientific fact”.171  Students developed a physical vocabulary which some 
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participants then stepped out to watch and discuss, considering what they saw in 
the abstracted physical responses to Rosenthal.   
What is interesting here, when considering the rest of this chapter, is that 
rather than continue a discussion, where familiar positions and opinions are 
played out, McCauley abstracted the debate into what might be called art, an 
abstracted aestheticised movement, which then offered the potential for unfamiliar 
responses.  The physical response was held next to the debate on race within the 
workshop and functioned like Rancière’s ‘third thing’.  McCauley’s own 
performance also functioned as a stimulus for debate and discussion: another 
‘third thing’.  Art led to the possibility of new understanding beyond what was 
previously known.  Art birthed new ways of thinking. 
In my final chapter I will discuss devised theatre in relation to the work of 
Goat Island, a Chicago-based company who made work between 1987 and 2009.  
I will discuss how their processes, performances and pedagogy interrelated, with 
their work functioning as praxis, offering a creative opportunity for performers, 
spectators and workshop participants to engage in a liminal space where new 
possibilities could be imagined.  In their approach to devising performance which 
enshrined a set of theoretical tenets in their practice, as well as letting practice 
inform their own and their audiences’ understanding, I will argue that their work 
offered a model of how devised theatre might function as pedagogical praxis: 
learning happening through practice and theory combined.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN – GOAT ISLAND: A CASE STUDY OF DEVISED THEATRE 
PRAXIS 
 
In this chapter I want to suggest some ways in which Goat Island’s work 
between 1987 and 2009 realised devised theatre in a social context as part of a 
social vision that extended beyond either socially engaged content or socially 
engaged practice.  I will argue that their work functioned as praxis: working 
simultaneously as both an activity and as a set of theoretical concerns.  I will 
argue further that Goat Island did this through both their processes and in their 
performances.  I would also argue that their work intersects with debates about 
pedagogy and teaching in a way that offers a useful antidote to the trends noted in 
my Introduction: that UK education in devised theatre is increasingly seen in terms 
of focusing on a finished product rather than a holistic understanding of the work.  
Whilst all educational practices exist within specific social contexts (and the 
American based company Goat Island’s own practice existed primarily in 
American academies), I hope however to draw conclusions that can also be 
applied beyond the UK context in ultimately suggesting a vision of a pedagogy for 
devised theatre praxis that can be used anywhere in the world. 
Although the company no longer exists, I will sometimes be referring to 
them in the present tense.  This is because much of the literature, particularly 
when quoting company members speaking at the time of their existence or when 
outlining conceptual ideas brought up by the pieces which could exist beyond the 
duration of the work itself, exists in the present tense.  Changing between tenses 
is grammatically problematic and sometimes confusing, and I am keen to preserve 
the original quotations as far as possible.  I am also keen, though, to present the 
company’s description of their methodology and praxis as an example that could 
be taken on today: in their own words, using the present tense, “We end Goat 
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Island in order to make a space for the unknown that will follow”.1  Their work not 
only has its own legacy, but also the company continue to work as performers 
and/or teachers today.2  Their work also lives on, as Laura Cull identifies, in the 
work of companies such as Uninvited Guests and Cupola Bobber, many of whom 
also worked with the company as part of Goat Island’s commitment to pedagogy.3  
Indeed, I believe that Goat Island’s ideas have much to contribute to ongoing 
conversations about the creative and critical context of contemporary devised 
theatre and are still very much alive and in the present. 
 
Goat Island and Process 
Process was immensely important to the company, as signalled in their 
creation of “schoolbooks” and the 64 pages on process in Small Acts of Repair (a 
book about their work edited by company member Matthew Goulish and academic 
Steve Bottoms). When making work, they sought to create new ways of working 
that challenged conventional notions of performance as commodity, seeing it 
rather as a process or, indeed, a praxis.  Shows started from various seeds of 
enquiry, in the case of It’s an Earthquake in My Heart, with nothing other than “an 
idea to study cloud formations, which evolved into ideas about paths and chases, 
which evolved into research into cars and traffic patterns and then into hand 
gestures and the circulatory system.  Like a system of roots underground the 
sources of material fan out in several directions with many forks and diversions 
along the way”.4  Steve Bottoms compares this “forking out” to Deleuze and 
Guattari’s notion of the rhizome, which makes lateral and associative, rather than 
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linear and logical, connections.  In these connections appropriated fragments are 
“treated less as fragments (deconstructed originals) than as constituent 
components in a new structure, a new ecology of interconnected points”.5  
Drawing on David Graver’s distinction between montage and collage, Bottoms 
suggests that Goat Island’s processes are an example of the former: that they 
held distinct elements in productive tension rather than attempting to synthesise 
them or use them to comment on each other in a self-reflexive way.6  Thus, their 
work developed an approach that is “(re)constructive rather than deconstructive”.7  
According to director Lin Hixson, “We have all these disparate things, and as we 
keep looking at them, and trying different things around them, putting things next 
to each other, the piece starts getting bigger than us.  This thing starts getting 
bigger, and we have to start responding to it... And we start looking very 
specifically for sources that correspond to this thing”.8  The ‘thing’ was not a 
commentary on the disparate elements, or the elements themselves, but a new 
‘third thing’, to invoke Rancière from the previous chapter, made up of 
heterogeneous elements. 
I am interested here in the way in which Hixson articulates the importance 
of  trust in the doing, the process, in a similar way to the notion of praxis I set out 
in the previous chapter.  The making of the work creates what theory cannot.  The 
work is not there to reflect a particular viewpoint or perspective.  Rather, it creates 
a new world as its process develops in space and time.  In this model intuition is 
not something to be feared, but as Bottoms suggests, something that “opens up to 
the possibility of making leaps across conceptual boundaries”.9  The creative 
process develops new ways of thinking, seeing and feeling.  An example of this is 
the ‘impossible task’ set as a workshop exercise in Goat island’s Schoolbook 2, 
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where students were set the exercise of coming up with “impossible tasks” which 
were then turned into performative moments.  For example, “Fly.  Draw the world 
(actual size).  Dissolve my body”.10  As Sara Jane Bailes states, one of the 
boundaries that collapses in moments such as these is the boundary between 
creativity and criticism, since conventional approaches to either are insufficient.  
Instead what she calls “doing thinking”11 begins.  Again, Bailes’ term is noticeably 
similar to the notion of praxis I outlined in the previous chapter where thinking and 
action are not conceived of as two separate things but as combined through the 
activity itself.  
Part of what characterises the Goat Island process is a clear sense of 
structuring material.  As I have suggested in Chapter One and throughout Part 
Two of this thesis, structures underpin a range of human activities such as 
devised theatre, speaking language and creativity.  The extreme open-endedness 
of tasks such as those above is fused with strict rules during a Goat Island 
creative process.  For example, in one workshop task outlined in Small Acts of 
Repair, the process of tearing sheets in two and then in two again is outlined in 
detail, with specific rules governing how these pieces are then passed on, and to 
whom in the room.12  In another, a task has to be performed for exactly 54 
seconds.13  However, these rules are not there to restrict, but to liberate.  As with 
Carroll’s notion of “negotiated reality” in school drama mentioned in the previous 
chapter,14 the structure creates a safe space within which to play. The often 
arbitrary nature of these decisions allows an escape from normal reality, creating 
the possibility of unfamiliar behaviours within new safe limits.  Taking away such 
rules may paradoxically limit the devisor’s freedom to be intuitive since they are 
otherwise engaged in other decisions, like how long to perform for, or to whom to 
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pass the paper.  In such a moment the conscious mind may resurface and the 
opportunity to be intuitive may diminish.  Again, as with the notion of praxis 
outlined in the previous chapter, the importance of the activity itself as an 
unconscious as well as conscious process of learning is emphasised over a purely 
conscious attempt to decode, justify or understand something. 
The process of bringing together disparate elements was for Goat Island a 
collaborative one.  The montage effect Bottoms identifies, for Bailes, is the result 
of a collaborative process that allowed for multiple perspectives “grounded in the 
compositional directories of multiplicity and dissonance”.15  Performative material 
was developed “through associative methods that are able to refract the diverse 
political, cultural, artistic and social contexts and concerns that each member 
experiences and brings to the creation of new material”.16  There was no attempt 
to homogenise the different makers’ experiences.  Rather, the work stood as a 
testament to the different voices of the makers.  In Schoolbook 2 the company 
suggested that “each contribution has its place.  More than once [...] we have 
used the small fragment of a poorly articulated idea to its highest potential.  With 
this vision it is possible for all things to have new life, including human beings”.17  
This could even include moments considered as failure: when failure occurs it 
could be embraced as a necessary part of an unpredictable creative process and 
restaged with commitment.  As Matthew Goulish puts it, “We seek truth, we 
encounter error.  It is obvious, like truth”.18  Company performer Karen Christopher 
notes, “The key thing about both failure and impossibility is the dynamic of 
constantly moving toward but never arriving.  Process rather than goal is 
emphasised”.19  So, for example, in their work Goat Island deliberately staged 
moments or movement sequences where the human body’s frailty is exposed or 
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struggles to complete a task, such as Litó Walkey standing on one leg for 
extended periods of time in When will the September roses bloom? Last night was 
only a comedy.  For the company, the task was to explore the human being trying 
and often failing to do things; to not present an integrated human being that knows 
itself but rather a human becoming, something in process.   
This shift towards an ongoing process of becoming is in sharp contrast to 
much current UK educational practice, such as that outlined in the Introduction, 
which is focused on attaining measurable skills or knowledge.  Instead, it suggests 
a possibility of valuing the journey as well as the destination; of seeing a process 
as important in itself as part of a wider conception of personal and social growth.  
Indeed, the importance of process was enmeshed in all aspects of Goat Island’s 
work.  Their process was slow; deliberately so.  According to Bailes “the 
protracted periods of development applied throughout the group’s working process 
– an average of four years for each show from conception through to final 
performances – are preserved in the experience of the shows and their 
reception”.20  For Bottoms even the end point of their process, a performance, can 
be conceived of as related to the process philosophy of the early twentieth century 
where the human is seen as being “submerged (mind and body) within a world of 
flow and perpetual becoming”.21  In Goat Island’s praxis, everything was in 
process: making a performance and performing it.  The different voices of the 
participants were heard in the process, and the spectator came into contact with 
this privileging of multiple perspectives present in the process through the 
performances.  To return to the contemporary conception of devised theatre 
outlined in my Introduction, devised theatre is here far from being seen as a 
means to teach a skills set or a stylistic choice.  It is a philosophical and political 
choice, a process, a praxis.  It is theory and practice working together, and it is 
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also process and performance working together.  In terms of pedagogy, it 
suggests the importance for teachers of not just engaging in short term projects, 
but of developing a practice; a practice that has a philosophical underpinning that 
can be thought about and changed as part of an ongoing process of growth for all 
involved. 
In this journey of growth, not only is the process of particular importance, 
but the end cannot be known.  Comparing the “economically oriented model” of 
traditional theatre with Goat Island’s practice where they “are out to discover 
something we can’t imagine at the point at which we start”, Christopher uses as a 
metaphor the “rigid controlling hand” of mono-crops with the complexity of 
attention needed in an eco-system to “creatures and minerals and soil and air and 
water”,22 stating that “[i]n taking our time, we have created an abundance of 
material that feeds the development process […] Eventually the work begins to 
make itself; the accumulation of material begins to suggest certain directions.  
This method is not at all efficient in an economic sense, and yet no part of it is 
superfluous”.23  Such a view could be seen as contrasting the reproductive logic of 
mono-crops with the creative logic of a holistic ecology.  This creative logic does 
not posit creation as an end in itself, but rather accepts its failures as part of a 
productive process which allows it to redefine its goals.  It sees itself as seeping 
into all areas of life.  It creates microcosms of effective praxis.  
The ongoing process of working together every week, despite all the 
company having other jobs, was crucial.  Company performer Mark Jeffery said 
We meet three times a week for three hours each meeting.  Here we 
exchange ideas in all weather seasons and respond to ideas given to us.  
A structure of living, of meeting three times a week, becomes engrained 
and gives us focus. We are not doing anything radical, and yet living within 
a hyper-capitalist world where structure and value are seen as individual 
commodities, we are making investments towards a non-capital market or 
language.24 
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As in their workshops, in this exchange it was “understood that once the idea was 
being explored by the group, it would change and no longer be ‘yours’”.25  A Goat 
Island show was the result of a communal experience amongst the performers, a 
recognition that the potential of art may lie in the liminal space of devising theatre 
as an individual within a social group.  As such the process of devising theatre 
functions as artistic praxis.  The exchange mentioned provides a debate around 
which the wider world might be understood.  But the exchange is itself the product 
of a particular philosophy.  This is an ongoing praxis that lives beyond the duration 
of the performance as it outlines new possibilities for understanding and imagining 
human behaviour.   
This praxis is intriguingly both seen as important – Bryan Saner from the 
company is quoted in Small Acts of Repair as saying “I believe that the work Goat 
Island is doing right now is going to stop the world from destroying itself”26 – and 
as part of labour in a broader sense: Saner states, “All of the members of Goat 
Island have day jobs [...] it’s tempting to think that one kind of work is more 
important than another.  When I have a healthy attitude (and it takes daily 
maintenance to stay healthy) I see artists’ work as a holistic endeavour [...] It’s 
important to find meaningful day jobs”.27   Spectators were important in this 
creative exploration and rearticulation of elements of life, but the company’s praxis 
was more than a commodity for them.  Nicholas Ridout goes so far as to describe 
it as a “work-as-life process to which the spectators have briefly been admitted”.28  
Their art, abstracted from representation, was nonetheless not something that sat 
totally outside everyday life.  The work of the company offered perspectives on 
that life and indeed was part of that life.  As Saner states, “the work precedes the 
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vision, creates the vision”.29  The company existed through its praxis: through its 
work and simultaneously through its philosophy.   
 
Goat Island and Performance 
Inevitably for a company for whom process and performance were 
intimately linked, I have already begun to talk about performance in the process 
section.  However, I want to now tease out a little more explicitly the spectator’s 
relationship to their work and consider how this, as well as the creation of the 
work, might be considered as a praxis.   
As already discussed, the shows were made up of many different 
heterogeneous and contradictory elements.  In a Goat Island show one might find 
movements originating from fragments of material from a workshop.  These 
movements might have presented themselves slowed down, or speeded up.  
Particularly in their early work, the company would perform intense physical 
sequences that would be exhausting for the performers to do and for the audience 
to watch.  Can’t Take Johnny to The Funeral, for example, started with what 
Christopher describes as “15 minutes [...of] a series of moves and jumps and falls 
to the floor and a lot of huffing and puffing and all this for no apparent reason” 
which ended with all four performers “flat on the floor heaving for breath and 
drenched in sweat”.30  In How Dear to Me The Hour when Daylight Dies, the 
performers “roll, convulse, thrust, and drag on the floor, shaking, twisting onto and 
around each other”.31  These moments of intense physicality were not a display of 
perfection, but they were a display of will.  Like Walkey’s attempt to stand on one 
leg, the body which fails to perform a highly charged physical sequence fully in 
Can’t Take Johnny to The Funeral, or Mark Jeffery’s attempt to perform Larry 
Grayson performing St Francis in The Lastmaker, Goat Island present difficult or 
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impossible moments that reflect in their enactment what Bailes calls "the fragility 
of the task at hand”. 32  In these moments which were doomed to fail or at least be 
a struggle, the sequences drew attention to the process of trying to do something 
the performers found difficult (as Bottoms notes, “Hixson is untrained as a 
choreographer, and the four performers [at the time of writing] untrained as 
dancers”).33  In moments like these, Becker suggests, the spectators “become 
committed to their excessive action... we are willing to suspend analysis of its 
symbolic meaning while we give ourselves over to its unravelling”.34  For Becker, 
the spectator’s conscious analysis gives way to a more instinctive response based 
on compassion for the performer, of what Garoian describes as a “forced 
empathy”.35 
In addition to such frantic movement sequences there were also many 
moments of slowness, stillness and silence.  Hixson sees such moments in the 
company’s work as reparative, offering a space for reflection and regeneration, 
and sees this as a challenge to the prioritisation of activity in contemporary 
culture: “For someone who is ill, or doesn’t have money, or is not in motion in this 
capitalistic way: those people are cut off the chart now in terms of being even 
considered a part of our culture”.36  These moments, and the moments of failure or 
struggle described above, present a philosophical challenge to the smoothness 
and slickness of much contemporary devised theatre, such as I outlined in the 
Introduction to this thesis, which is developed through a successful adherence to a 
skills set.  However, they present this challenge not only theoretically, but in the 
moment of being witnessed by the spectator.  In other words, they function as 
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praxis for the spectator: as working simultaneously as philosophical and physical 
material; as philosophical material experienced viscerally. 
In all these examples, the activity is presented as being important in itself, 
even if what it represents has been abstracted away from its original meaning.  In 
all these moments the body would take on unfamiliar physicalities and ways of 
moving that, whilst reminiscent of and partly inspired by dance, were a long way 
from its conventions.  In a Goat Island show one performer might speak text into 
microphones whilst another might undertake an action repetitively and 
obsessively.  For Bottoms, the plethora of material collected is reflected in the 
plethora of theatrical forms utilised: discussing How Dear to Me The Hour When 
Daylight Dies he states that it “presents a bewilderingly diverse array of 
performance activities”.37  The mood was hypnotic and could sometimes feel 
frustrating.  But in the watching of the work time felt different and the spectator 
could free associate, finding rhizomatic connections between different moments 
and different elements.  The work refused the security of conventional theatre 
which might provide meaning or clearly defined pleasure, potentially causing, 
according to Heathfield, the spectator to ask “I have paid for this.  Where is the 
pleasure?  Where is its meaning, its utility”?38  However, what was created brought 
the spectator face to face with a new, artificial world being created from the 
fragments of reality in front of the spectator’s eyes.  According to Christopher, this 
was about “pull[ing] spectators away from wherever they have been, mentally, 
during the day, and to bring them into this space, now”.39   
This was partly achieved through physical arrangement: Lin Hixson 
expressed her desire to work with no more than three rows of risers around the 
stage.40  It was also partly achieved through a configuration where the audience 
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are introduced as a performative element,41 with each piece having its own 
audience configuration.42  However, whatever the figuration was, it always had 
members of the audience able to see each other as well as the action, ensuring a 
level of intimacy missing in proscenium arch theatres.43  As well as the intensity 
provided by the spatial relationship, however, spectators were “brought into the 
space” by witnessing a world where material was presented in unfamiliar ways: 
intensely slow or manically physical for example; a speech from Lenny Bruce 
juxtaposed with an abstract movement sequence, as in The Lastmaker; a world 
where meaning was open, allowing the spectator to reflect on the strange yet 
familiar world in front of them in relation to their own world.  For example, 
Christopher outlines how in Can’t Take Johnny to The Funeral, when   
I hold my first finger pointing straight up and it describes a circle in the air, 
my hand swivelling at the wrist, I am thinking of a woman I once knew who 
had to leave her children in the custody of the state [...] One woman told 
me that when she saw this gesture in the performance, she saw a woman 
waiting for her husband to come home from the war.  Another saw her two 
year old winding up to wreak havoc.  These things were really seen by 
these women, and other people saw their own images too.44 
 
For myself watching this show, it was a moving depiction of time persistently 
passing whilst the horrors of physical violence were incessantly inflicted (violence 
that was depicted in surrounding scenes through the performers breaking the 
heads off the plastic dolls in the piece, and scooping out and eating the yoghurt 
which was placed inside their heads).  I, like the women Christopher describes, 
was creating what Bottoms calls “rationalisations of an experience which defies 
rationalisation, but [...which were] nonetheless revealing: in effect Goat Island’s 
work becomes a kind of psychic funhouse mirror for each spectator, functioning to 
open up a meditative space in which one is enabled obliquely to confront and 
process deeply personal questions and ‘traumatic realities’”.45  The subjective 
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space opened up by this artificial world, this ‘third thing’ that is neither the 
spectator nor the performer (to invoke Rancière), enabled reflection that a 
representative world could not.  This was functioning for the spectator as a praxis: 
it was creating meaning simultaneously through its presence, through its 
enactment.  Its meaning could not be reduced to theory or language, since its 
experience exceeded language.  I and the other spectators struggled to 
understand it.  It had to ultimately exist in its enactment in the present, between 
the spectator and the performance. 
Educationally, this suggests the creation of a space in which the spectator 
is using theatre as a means to look at their own life; in which the student can 
engage with the performance not as something to be understood or decoded in a 
singular way, but as a means to a new understanding of both the self and the 
world.  The theatrical event can function as a kind of mirror back to the spectator 
who is intimately involved with the performance.  It is important to note, however, 
that the subjective spaces opened up through Goat Island’s performances were 
carefully and meticulously structured.  As I have noted throughout this thesis 
(including in my comments above about Goat Island’s process), structure is 
conducive to and not in confrontation with creativity.  This can include the ability of 
the spectator to creatively respond to a work. Goulish makes the following 
comment about Goat Island’s performances:  
The structure appears as a second intelligence at work, shaping and 
forming and modulating the performance experience [...T]he performance 
is a series of parts that have been measured, metered sequenced, 
balanced, and unbalanced, patterned and ruptured – according to an 
intelligence distinct from the intelligence of the parts themselves, and 
located in relation to the parts both internally and externally.46 
 
This structuring might help the spectator find connections and provide a 
framework within which to watch the piece, reflecting that the work’s heterogeneity 
was the result of careful consideration and creation, rather than random 
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improvisation.  However it was still open for the spectator, since it did not make 
clear what the intended links between disparate elements were: Goulish 
continues, “[W]e suggest a particular route, although you are free to stray from 
that route if you choose.  The limits grant permission to stray.  The straying is the 
act of creative response”.47  Without the limits of the structure, straying might 
appear frightening and a journey into confusion.  However the clear sense of 
sections, patterns and repetitions that ran throughout Goat Island’s performances, 
whilst not clearly suggesting a specific link between disparate performance 
elements, helped to create the “meditative space” Bottoms articulates where the 
spectator can drift into the unfamiliar world of Goat Island’s work, as they interpret 
what they experience in relation to their own lives. 
This idea is reflected in Mark Jeffery’s (a performer in the company) 
comment that “artifice gives us another way of looking, another way of connecting 
to and working with both the fake and the real”.48  And Bottoms suggests, via 
Guattari, that the company’s work offers the spectator a “deterritorialization of the 
mind – opening out time and headspace to facilitate a more personal intuitive 
process of response than is normally experienced”.49  Through the lens of 
Rancière’s theories, one might map these conceptions of artifice and 
deterritorialization onto the dissensual articulation of a new territory within the 
individual spectator.  In this new reality it may be difficult to find the logic, but in 
the search to make sense of the juxtapositions the spectator is liberated to see 
things anew; to have a new experience in a manner similar to Kate Love’s 
comment that 
when I’ve said “I’ve had an experience” […] I realise that I have probably 
used the word because I want to register the precise feeling that that which 
I have just lived through was something like an approach to the world 
which I both recognised, and yet didn’t quite recognise, a space which was 
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both in language but yet not quite in language, at the limit of language but 
unequivocally not beyond. 
 
Such an experience is for Love a “negotiation with language”,50 and if one accepts 
the poststructuralist notion that language “is the place where actual and possible 
forms of social organisation and their likely social and political consequences are 
defined and contested”,51 one can see this negotiation as a political act, an act that 
functions as a creation of new possible meanings.  In its exploration of meaning 
and creation of new worlds, such work may have more political efficacy than a 
performance that attempts to confront an “issue” head on but fails to offer any 
imaginative perspective on it.  The spectator quoted in Small Acts of Repair by 
Karen Christopher is interesting here: 
[A]t first I was very frustrated, and then I thought these people are crazy 
and I didn’t get it, and then I felt bored into anger.  But then I felt a decision 
coming.  I realised I could just check out and reject this performance or I 
could relax and not worry about understanding it and just accept it. [...] I 
chose to relax and suddenly I started getting all these ideas and began to 
have all sorts of associations with the movements and gestures I was 
seeing.  It was because I was able to make this decision to accept the 
performance without understanding it.52 
 
In such a process, for Christopher and CJ Mitchell, “[t]he audience begins to hear 
itself”,53 and in the ‘hearing’ of oneself a process of discovery is initiated.  There is 
a process here of what Bottoms calls “unlearning”:54 a subjective pedagogical 
process of challenging what one thinks one knows and finding new ways of 
understanding the world and the self that allow what is taken for granted to be 
opened up anew. 
A key component of this hearing involves acknowledging rather than 
attempting to eliminate instability and failure.  Citing Bloch’s notion of  hope 
existing in the possibility to imagine both possibilities and supposed 
impossibilities, Bailes sees the imagining present in Goat Island’s work as being 
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hopeful: what she calls “mov[ing] forwards with the inclusion of vulnerability and 
weakness as functioning constitutive principles”.55  As Tim Etchells, director of 
Forced Entertainment and an occasional collaborator with Matthew Goulish, states 
about Forced Entertainment’s work, “a group of performers or perhaps characters 
[...] try to do something; they try to create order [...] Whether they succeed or not 
is another matter, the important thing to us has always been the trying”.56  In Goat 
Island’s work one might take this further and suggest that in not succeeding but 
trying, the hope provided by the will to succeed is what matters.  One might link 
this back to Rancière’s emphasis on the importance of the will in the pedagogical 
relationship outlined in Chapter Six.  In such a conception what is important is the 
activity in the present, not an intended end point.  Pedagogy and performance are 
important as processes that have the potential to create in their enactment, not in 
some future time, a space of creation where hierarchies between performer and 
spectator, or between teacher and student, can subside.   
Christopher notes that  
In discussing the idea of a broken performance we realised that whatever 
we chose to perform would appear whole as performed.  The moment 
material is performed it is the performance.  Therefore the attempt to show 
a broken performance is impossible, just as a mistake in a performance is 
only a mistake in reference to other “perfect” performances but it is the 
performance to the audience who only saw it once.57 
 
In the moment of its enactment the imperfections, impossibilities, silences, 
stillnesses and strangenesses of a Goat Island performance present themselves 
with commitment as there to be seen and to be valued as a new and strange 
whole.  Goat Island’s work functioned as an example of praxis for the spectator, 
allowing her to engage in a process of discovery and reflection that was both 
immediate and reflective; instinctive and conceptual.   
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Goat Island and Pedagogy 
In the previous section I have argued that Goat Island’s performances 
carried a clear trace of their process.  In this section I will try to demonstrate that 
their performances and processes were also clearly linked to their pedagogy.  For 
Garoian this is crucial to understanding the company’s work: he states that there 
is a “dialectical relationship between the collective’s performance art making and 
performance art teaching [...] It is the resonance between the two that is essential 
to Goat Island’s performance art pedagogy”.58  Indeed, for Bailes, pedagogy is 
foregrounded in the aesthetics of the performances: 
The practical demonstration of pedagogy is indexed by the inclusion in the 
performance of a movement that appears as if it is being recalled or still 
learned, or in the discovery of how to accommodate an impediment or 
weakness (structural, physical, in the materials used, or in the task to be 
completed); learning how to deal with damage and the restoration it might 
call for; or by seeking ways to perform the efforts required to imagine and 
push the body to work beyond its given limits.  The learning that each 
performance shares with its audience offers an inquisitive way to examine 
material and to draw attention to smaller inconsequential objectives and 
behaviours.59 
 
Pedagogically, this is distinct from most educative practices, such as Freire’s 
criticisms of the ‘banking’ approach to education, or Rancière’s critique of an 
‘explicative’ approach to education outlined in the previous chapter, where the 
student’s ability to reproduce what they have been told as fully and as competently 
as possible would demonstrate learning.  For Bailes, Goat Island’s performance 
was valued as an “inconclusive end in itself”,60 a learning in process which had an 
ability to generate new possibilities.  The performers learned during the process, 
the spectators witnessed learning in performance, and similarly students in Goat 
Island’s workshops experienced learning new concepts, new ways of moving and 
speaking for themselves and new ways of interacting with other human beings 
that went beyond what was possible in everyday life.   
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Whilst Bailes suggests that “[t]raining is an essential part of the process”,61 
Hixson stated in a ‘workshop introduction’ that “you do not need any specific 
training to participate in this workshop”.62  Training was essential to anyone 
participating in Goat Island’s work, but the training occurred within the workshop 
itself, not prior.  Workshops were accessible to all, the learning happened in the 
process.  This emphasis on activity allowed for learning to follow from a position of 
not knowing that included the company themselves learning.  To quote the 
company on collaborative methods, “Do not expect to understand everything 
intellectually or rationally while creating or performing.  There are many forms of 
understanding.  Also, if you work from a position of not knowing, you may find 
understanding will come later”.63  Learning is emphasised over knowledge.  It is 
seen as an important activity in itself.  And, indeed, to cite Bottoms’ term again, 
‘unlearning’ what is taken for granted may be part of a powerful pedagogical 
journey  
The focus on ‘not knowing’ over rational or intellectual understanding is 
achieved in several ways.  In Hixson’s workshop introduction she emphasises 
“doing and experiencing rather than [...] talking and discussing”.64  And Garoian 
outlines how in a Goat Island workshop such doing of tasks such as the 
‘impossible task’ exercise mentioned above made the body ‘explicit’, creating a 
new kind of knowledge as the body as currently known shifts into new unknown 
territory through abstraction.65  Another example is documented by Garoian, 
where he outlines Matthew Goulish asking students to write in detail their “first 
encounter with failure”.66  Goulish then gave each student an envelope with 
images which students then had to incorporate into their writing, and asked them 
to think of a sound which came from this experience.  Students then had to think 
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about how to use what was in the room to perform the sound.    Later in the 
workshop these elements were combined in an inevitably multilayered 
performance.  The structures provided shape for the art making, and provided a 
frame which moved away from representation to abstraction.  In this process the 
frame provided held up a lens through which the student could gain greater 
understanding and new perspectives.  For Garoian, “the inclusion of students’ 
cultural identities as educational content [...] enables students to ‘de-realise’ the 
social markings inscribed on their bodies by the body politic and to create new 
aesthetic and political codes significant to their lives”.67  Practice informed 
understanding, it brought about a new possibility for the body and the subject.  
And it was possible through the production of a ‘third thing’: the devising of 
theatre. 
The collaboration evident in the previous example was typical of Goat 
Island’s educational praxis: citing Irene Tsatsos, Garoian outlines their use of 
students ‘trading’: passing material on to another workshop member rather than 
holding on to it themselves; where “by performing another person’s task, 
[students] were able to learn from each other, to observe and critique their own 
performances from a distance, and to develop camaraderie”.68  The interactions 
with others in the workshop through collectively developing material made the 
body exist in a social relationship with other bodies rather than in a self-contained 
unit, encouraging the body to move in ways with which it may not be familiar.  
Interestingly, the company stated that “If you think you have no connection to 
someone else’s material and are having trouble performing it, try to allow your 
vision and yourself to expand to include that person’s material, and to learn from 
it”.69  Even when the mind precludes a rational understanding of the material, the 
material may allow for an expansion of the participant’s vision.  This notion of 
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‘trading’ is then further abstracted through a process Garoian calls ‘collage’ 
(though it is worth noting Bottoms’ distinction between collage and Goat Island’s 
‘montage’ mentioned above) where different elements are brought together.70  For 
example, Garoian outlines a group performing “the impossible task of building a 
skyscraper in a day with the sound of pushing down with fists on leather car 
seats”.71  Whilst this example may at first seem insignificant, it functions as a 
process of learning where participants are engaged in a social process of learning 
from each other and of considering, within the frame of performing, how elements 
may co-exist without being homogenised or hierarchised.  This task attempts to 
maintain difference, like Deleuze and Guattari’s rhizome.  The root of the 
performance forks out in many disparate ways that do not need to come together, 
but which stay distinct and in tension.  And through the task, it attains commitment 
and focus on the part of the participants, their ‘will’ (to recall Rancière’s use of the 
term in Chapter Six).   
When I participated in Goat Island workshops I found such letting go of my 
own material and allowing it to synthesise or be placed against the ideas of others 
challenging, since I had worked hard on the material.  However it also encouraged 
me to consider how I might work with others both within the rehearsal room, and 
ultimately how I might engage with collaboration generally in my life beyond the 
rehearsal room.  Here the pedagogical process was one which encouraged 
collective generosity and acceptance, with the artistic process functioning 
simultaneously as a means for the community of students to work together to 
reach a common goal.  To quote Mark Jeffery, a performer in the company, “this 
idea of [collective] ownership becomes a wider participation, and one of 
interaction, circulation, and creativity”.72   
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The emphasis on process is clear when Hixson outlines the importance of 
“the least interesting moment in your performance”, suggesting that students “Pull 
it out.  Expand this moment into a full performance piece”.73  In Goat Island’s 
vision, everything in the creative process can be valued as part of a pedagogical 
process of growth.  Activity is a process of learning that is important in itself.  This 
is not an abolition of thought and analysis.  The company usually engage and 
encourage students to discuss after working practically; after all, the company’s 
extensive writing on their own practice reflects a high level of intellectual and 
philosophical engagement.  But as suggested above, the link between the critical 
and the creative can be rethought as “doing thinking”,74 meaning that the critical 
can be reconceptualised.  As Matthew Goulish suggests,  
If we think of critical as negative […] then problems become the object of 
our creative mind masquerading as a critical mind.  We then start to see 
problems everywhere… For now we will try an experiment.  We will 
engage the critical mind to observe the moments in the work we are 
looking at that seem to us the most exceptional and inspiring – the 
miraculous moments. Maybe this approach will allow us to keep the 
creative mind deliberately engaged as we engage the critical mind.  Maybe 
we will start to see miraculous moments everywhere.75  
 
This creative criticality, as it might be termed, is present in Goulish’s comment on 
questions: “Compose responses that do not annihilate the question’s delicate 
ecology; avoid the answer that kills it, and seek the response that disarms and 
multiplies it [...] A question does not express a lack, but a creative force: propose, 
disarm, multiply”.76   Unlike Rancière and Freire’s criticism of much teaching, the 
teacher’s role is to avoid ‘killing’ questions with answers that close down the 
question, but to rather provide answers that ‘disarm and multiply’ the question, to 
cite Goulish, continually ensuring the presence of Rancièrian will in the moment of 
the process of praxis.    
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In terms of the student, this space of praxis can offer “liminal, contingent 
and ephemeral conditions”77 for a space of reflection and growth.  And writing 
about Goat Island’s work, Peggy Phelan discusses the relationship between 
teacher and student as an endless stream of questions to which all the answers 
can never be given.  For Phelan, “the facts [the teacher] proffers do not and 
cannot fulfil the student’s desire, because the student wants a response that 
cannot be given by the other”.78  For both Goulish and Phelan the process of being 
a student is not here figured as a lack.  Rather, in the process of asking, of looking 
for answers, the student is looking within herself and is demonstrating her will to 
grow and develop.  Like the spectator who has an ‘experience’ discussed above, 
devised theatre pedagogy offers a means through which the student who asks 
questions can enter a new realm of possibilities.  So: to end with a quotation from 
Goat Island, writing to a hypothetical young practitioner, perhaps devised theatre 
pedagogy can  
allow the act of creation to understand who you are. 
Understand who you could be. 
Understand the gap between the two. 
Sometimes, close the gap. 
Become who you might be for a moment. 
What if we call that moment: ‘the classroom’?79  
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Earlier in this chapter I quoted Bryan Saner from Goat Island as saying “I 
believe that the work Goat Island is doing right now is going to stop the world from 
destroying itself”,80 Mark Jeffery as saying that the company “are making 
investments towards a non-capital market or language”,81 and director Lin Hixson 
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as saying that Goat Island’s work is a challenge to capitalism.82 It is notable that 
Goat Island, a company known for making complex, abstract and what was often 
perceived as “difficult” work that was by their own request only going to be 
performed to a small audience, had such concern for its social impact.  I would 
suggest that this reflects the possibility that their “small acts of repair” were the 
enactment of Rancière’s “ameliorative promise”83 of the aesthetic; that their work 
attained a vital social charge through conceiving performance specifically (and the 
arts generally) as existing as a process in the moment that could be described as 
pedagogical: as a means of learning and thinking about the world and the self.  As 
well as the company’s emphasis on praxis through the focus on the activities of 
making and performing, I have tried to suggest that their work existed both within 
the everyday aspects of work and life, as well as in a distinct space clearly 
demarcated as beyond the everyday.  It created a social engagement by insisting 
on existing outside the economy of everyday life in order to be able to create 
“small acts of repair” which could function as possibilities for the future.  To quote 
Bailes, “one aspect that defines Goat Island’s praxis is its deep commitment to the 
impact of small and incremental daily objectives in the belief that the accumulation 
of such deeds can effect change”.84 
In my Introduction I suggested that the contemporary UK educational 
context of both universities and schools increasingly embraces devised theatre, 
but sees it as a skills set to learn rather than a process that might be valuable in 
itself.  In the work of Goat Island however, something else was realised, 
something that the UK context could learn from but which arguably has something 
to contribute to curricula across the world.  In their practice devised theatre 
involved the creation of a community that could explore possibilities for 
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themselves and their world, a community which could exist at some degree of 
separation from the world around it through their work in the frame of art.  In this 
pedagogical frame everyone is learning through the creative process, teacher and 
student.  In this frame artistic creation is a consequence of philosophical 
principles, but it also creates new understandings through its juxtapositions and 
through abstraction.  Goat Island’s work was a method of learning and thinking, a 
pedagogy of devised theatre praxis. 
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CONCLUSION 
In his essay ‘Diverse Assembly: Some Trends in Recent Performance’, 
Tim Etchells, director of Forced Entertainment, suggests that “in all the work I care 
about [there is] an engagement with a particular landscape (literal, literary, 
cultural, mythic, even personal) which seems to give it heart, and hate, and, in the 
case of Britain perhaps, a certain kind of smallness and of melancholy”.  He 
counterposes this to work “that looks like it was born on the floor of some 
nameless, placeless Euro-Novotel”.  He goes on, “There is a need and desire by 
artists like Keith Khan to rewrite the landscape from a black viewpoint, and the 
need for Bobby Baker, Annie Griffin and Neil Bartlett to remake the landscape for 
themselves and their communities, and the need by groups like ourselves [...] to 
work out and work through and work against the landscape of our cities, our 
sexualities, and our selves”.1  In emphasising ‘working out, working through and 
working against’, he emphasises the importance of process in this creation: that it 
is not only in the final performance that such a dialogue and articulation happens, 
but through the process of devising theatre itself.  Etchells sees here the creation 
of an aesthetic theatrical form through the process of devising as deeply social, 
where through the process of making theatre the individual and the community 
engage in a dialogue with the various landscapes around them and ultimately 
begin to articulate their own responses to them.   
However, in the same essay he states his desire to “put in a vote for 
transcendence, for escape into fiction”.2  For Etchells it is the artistic frame that 
offers a distinction between the ‘fictional’ context and the everyday, which allows 
for such social imagining.  Etchells’ holding of these two notions of art in tension, 
art socially engaged with the everyday through its process whilst being intrinsically 
distinguished from the everyday through its artistic form, is similar to the viewpoint 
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that this thesis proposes.  This thesis has attempted to outline how such an 
attitude might be understood theoretically, and how it might be practically 
articulated in a pedagogical form.  In this model, which I have also attempted to 
map onto a notion of pedagogical praxis where thinking and doing inform each 
other, the process of both devising theatre and of teaching devised theatre is not a 
means to an end (the enlightenment of performer, spectator or student to 
predetermined knowledge) but is rather part of an ongoing conversation which can 
facilitate growth. 
This sense of a holistic inter-relatedness of elements can be linked to the 
notion of theatre as an ecological system, noted in Bottoms and Goulish’s subtitle 
to their book Small Acts of Repair ‘Performance, Ecology and Goat Island’.  In 
such a notion, creative, personal and social elements connect to each other: to 
quote Bottoms, “There are finite resources in any ecosystem (man-made systems 
included), and the inhabitants of a given system are mutually dependent on each 
others’ activities for the distribution of those resources”.3  Any analysis of such a 
system cannot only measure specific elements at a specific moment, but rather 
needs to understand the interconnections of all elements, the whole of which have 
a legacy through time.  Understanding devised theatre as ecological recognises it 
as socially embedded within the constituent parts of the ecology of the society, 
personally embedded within the constituent parts of the ecology of the individual, 
and any performance created as part of the devised theatre process as part of a 
wider ongoing journey of human activity, a journey of which an analysis of any 
individual performance can only ever be a small part. 
The paradox at work here is that the interconnectedness between makers, 
audiences, and a wider social practice that exists through time in Goat Island’s 
work is possible because of, not in spite of, the abstract nature of their work.  
Exactly because of the ‘escape into fiction’ that their strange world offers, because 
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of the ‘working out, working through and working against’ the world beyond, 
because of the insistence on a working method which stands outside everyday 
capitalist notions of work, the work outlines the possibility of art generally and 
devised theatre specifically to offer a potential space of creation and exploration.  
It develops what Rancière calls a ‘third thing’ that is neither performer nor 
audience, neither spectator nor performer, but a something between which can 
function as a space of social reflection and engagement.  This space is an 
ongoing one, as artists and spectators, teachers and students, engage in an 
ongoing dialogue made possible through the existence of the art. 
But how might this theoretical thesis be applied to the existing UK 
performance context?  Most of the full list of devised companies and artists cited 
in Etchells’ 1994 essay were arguably making experimental and exploratory work 
which pushed boundaries of aesthetic expression, but no longer exist.  And since 
then (as I argued in the Introduction), devised theatre has increasingly been 
assimilated into the mainstream.  However, I think there have recently been some 
interesting developments that could suggest a notion of devised theatre as praxis, 
as having a wider sense of its own ecology.  In the last ten years in the UK, many 
venues have started to host ‘scratch’ nights, which host the showing of incomplete 
fragments of work in progress, usually of devised theatre companies.  These 
incomplete fragments gain a regular audience, leading theatre critic Lyn Gardner 
to suggest that “there’s a growing audience out there [...] that is becoming 
increasingly fascinated more with process than product”.4  Philip Stanier sees it 
slightly differently, saying that work in progress showings “blur the distinction 
between process and performance”.5  In either case, though, it is clear that the 
companies and audiences see the conventional boundaries between artistic roles 
starting to loosen.  In ‘scratch’ performances and work in progress showings the 
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work of art functions as a centre for people to come together and discuss 
performances not as a finished commodity, but rather as fluid and in process.  In 
such a process, the work can function as the springboard for a discussion of 
representation and communication, how art interacts with its community, and how 
it might be developed.  It is in flux, there to be opened up to inspection and 
consideration and engagement and development.  Peter Brook said “a play is 
play”,6 but in this conceptualisation a ‘play’ is not just play.  It is a form of work, a 
channelling of the body and of resources which requires thought and engagement.   
Such an understanding is not specific to a contemporary UK context, but can be 
applied to other contexts too.  As Neelands states,  
In local communities in my society and in many traditional societies, the 
arts still serve the important civic and community functions that ritual and 
art making once provided for us all.  In the so-called golden ages of 
Athenian and Elizabethan drama, going to the theatre was an important 
and integral part of the public life of the citizen.  The theatre still offers 
communities a public forum for debating, affirming and challenging culture 
and community ties.  In this community model, the arts are seen as 
important ‘means’ of representing and commenting on the cultural life and 
beliefs of the community, in turn the communal participation of the whole 
community in art-making strengthens their cultural bonds.  Every member 
of the groups is seen as a potential producer – a potential artist.  In this 
model, theatre is produced on the basis of a social agreement between 
members of a group who come together to make something that will be of 
importance to them; something that will signify their lives. 7 
 
In a similar vein, the playwright Howard Barker envisioned that “[o]ne day a play 
will be written for which men and women will miss a day’s work.  It is likely this 
play will itself be experienced as work”.8  Although Barker’s rhetoric sees a written 
play rather than devised theatre as the focus of this praxis, there may be a 
particular link for devised theatre to this conception.  As I outlined in Chapter One, 
devised theatre is a particularly fluid form that is hard to define.  It is variously 
scripted and unscripted, spontaneous and planned, product and process, original 
and derivative, physical and linguistic.  But in the work of companies like Goat 
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Island it fits with my outlining of a socio-aesthetic creative praxis: existing as a 
creative realm where theory and practice fuse or at least exist in tension, rather 
than as two discrete realms.  It is framed as separate from life, yet it is portrayed 
by living bodies for whom participation in it is an expression of their own ideas, 
feelings, opinions and speculations.   
In terms of pedagogy, I have suggested above that such a 
conceptualisation suggests the possibility of a shift from socially centred education 
to art centred education.  Doing so, I have attempted to suggest, is not a move 
away from social engagement, but is rather a recognition that art is a place where 
what is taken for granted can be seen anew, reconsidered, reimagined.  (This 
would not only include social elements of human activity, but also personal ones 
too).  Such a shift can be seen in the recent move in academic circles towards 
practice-as-research,9 with PhDs in theatre and performance increasingly 
incorporating an element of making work.  This notion in many ways seems to 
chime with the definition of praxis, where making is seen as something which has 
theoretical implications, and theory is seen to exist within practice.  In this space, 
Shannon Jackson’s notion of “artist-as-academic”,10 rather than one or the other, 
can begin to be realised.  (I am aware of the paradoxical nature of this argument 
being created within a solely academic thesis: my future research will explore 
praxis as a model, incorporating practice more directly).   
Key determinants of how devised theatre is taught are arguably curricula 
and assessment.  Recent political debates regarding what is on curricula illustrate 
the perceived importance of them both.11  The notion of curriculum, which seeks to 
prescribe what will be learned at any particular time, might seem contradictory to a 
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notion of educational praxis where outcomes cannot be predicted in advance but 
rather develop organically through an ongoing process of action and reflection.  
Similarly assessment, which seeks to quantify aspects of activity at a given 
moment, might seem contradictory to a notion of holistic praxis which unfolds over 
time.  Yet any attempt to intervene in current Western educational contexts must 
engage with assessment and curricula, since they are central to all current 
education structures.   
As I outlined at the very start of the Introduction, assessment has often 
been perceived as being aligned with a scientific paradigm which does not fit the 
more fluid nature of the arts.  Within arts pedagogy there has therefore often been 
what Steve Dixon calls a “nervousness” around assessment:12 for example, Paul 
Kleiman has given the advice, in his “Rough Guide to Assessment”, to “assess as 
little as possible, but as much as necessary”.13  This ‘nervousness’ has, according 
to Dixon, citing the research of Paul Bridges, resulted in discipline related marking 
behaviour where teachers of arts and the humanities in British universities “rarely 
mark outside the 40 - 70% range”.  Bridges suggests that this is due to the 
perception that “the extremities of the percentage scale are insecure territory for 
assessors of qualitative subject matter”. (These contrast, he says, with science 
subjects such as mathematics and computing where the whole percentile range is 
used).14 
Perhaps this ‘nervousness’ is reflected in the fact that although process 
has formed components of many assessment regimes, such regimes have rarely 
found ways of engaging with an ecological model which sees practice as praxis: 
as something which is not just production, but as simultaneous action and 
reflection and as something which has a wider sense of its own significance 
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beyond the theatre.  For example, in the UK the current AQA A level Unit 4 
assessment insists on separating process marks into three categories focused on 
dramatic intentions, creative cooperation and inventiveness, and skill 
development.15  What is missing here is any sense of how these elements 
interrelate.  There is also little sense of how process and the piece of theatre 
produced link to a wider social context, such as that identified in Neelands’ 
examples of companies in the tradition of process drama as well as in the 
example of Brecht in Chapter Two.  In other words, what is missing here is praxis, 
defined implicitly in John Dewey’s notion of the arts’ ability “to integrate children’s 
thoughts and feelings with their actions - a process that [...] brings together the 
child’s internal subjectivity and the external world of objects”.16   
However, perhaps it is possible to develop a model where assessment is 
considered to be something more than a solely numerical evaluation of a given 
activity or product, and to rather be reconceptualised as reflection.  Similarly, if 
curricula were reconceptualised as activity, praxis could develop as assessment 
(reflection) leads to a shift in curriculum (activity) in a continuous cyclical ecology 
which functions as a model for a pedagogical notion of praxis.   
Such a praxis could be taught and assessed in various ways.  An essential 
feature of such an educational approach would be to note the need identified in 
Chapter Six for any educational model truly rooted in the simultaneous action and 
reflection of praxis to be linked to a non-hierarchical relationship between teacher 
and student, similar to that identified by Rancière as a “pure relationship of will to 
will”.17  In such a model, teachers could create an activity (a curriculum) of work 
with students which focuses on developing a new response to a known situation, 
recontextualising it and enabling new perspectives on it to be created.  Students 
and teachers could then reflect on (assess) their response to that.  Teachers could 
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set students the activity (or curriculum) of asking students to engage with the 
limitations of representation, asking them to explore beyond what is already 
known or imaginable (such as in Goat Island’s “impossible tasks” outlined in 
Chapter Seven).  The student could be encouraged to think about the limits of 
representation and how to move beyond it.  It would not be possible to assess the 
success of a student’s response to this task by comparing their work with any 
preordained outcome.  Rather, the student and teacher could reflect on (assess) 
their ability to use skills such as imagination and creativity, or on their attempts to 
understand the world and to explore the frontiers of representation.  Teachers 
could ensure that student activities (or curriculum) include a consideration of 
social interaction, recognising that a student’s devising practice will have 
ramifications both within and beyond the rehearsal room.  Teachers could develop 
activities which encourages students to explore bravely, accepting the inevitable 
failures along the way as being an essential part of any truly exploratory process.  
Teachers could encourage students to see such failure as an opening to new 
understanding, and ensure that they embrace failure in themselves as part of their 
own process of praxis.  In this type of dynamic ecology, assessment is grounded 
as reflection that follows the curriculum of activity.   
However, to allow exploration, it may be essential to rethink the amount of 
summative reflection, or assessment, of students.  When students and teachers 
are focused on hitting specific assessment criteria, or are concerned about the 
marks which they obtain (which may affect job prospects or future academic 
opportunities) there may inevitably be a fear of failure, and there may be more 
likely to be a prescriptive aspect to the work.  Such an approach may not be 
conducive to the cyclical model of praxis, where activity leads to reflection which 
then feeds back into revised action, meaning that outcomes cannot be predicted in 
advance.  Similarly, whilst some kind of structure is necessary, in such a model it 
would be important that the action (curriculum) can be changed as the 
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pedagogical process develops.  In this sense I have some sympathy with 
Kleiman’s notion to “assess as little as possible, but as much as necessary”,18 but 
being clear that this is about summative, rather than formative, assessment.  
Formative assessment, indeed, is an essential part of the cyclical ecology of 
praxis.   
In the same paper, Kleiman outlines the notion of a negotiated assessment 
regime, where students and teachers come together to discuss what summative 
assessment criteria might be.  By involving students in this process, their learning 
(action) can feed into their assessment (reflection), and similarly such reflection 
can influence what action (or curriculum) is undertaken. An ecology develops here 
where people work together to a common goal of growth and development.   
In the kind of pedagogy articulated above, teachers engage in a dialogue 
with students which is rooted in a premise of equality.   But such a pedagogy has 
a wider significance.  It encourages students to see their devising of theatre as an 
ecology.  It encourages them to see their work as a praxis that interacts with and 
impacts on, albeit in a small way, the world.  Yet this approach is only possible 
because the student sees their creation as being able to step beyond notions of 
commodity; as being able to move beyond the everyday into the speculative.  The 
making of art is seen as being important because it enables the student to step 
beyond what is currently known and to reflect on what is currently known.  Like the 
notion of scratch performances where a performance is always there to be 
developed, it is a temporary thing that cannot be completed; it is part of an 
ongoing process of making and reflecting. It is praxis: a unity of theory and 
practice.   
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